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Chapter 1 – Introduction 2
The globalized world economy is experiencing a rising importance of multinational en-
terprises (MNEs). Referring to OECD data, worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI)
has sextupled since the early 1990s. These days, more than one third of international
trade is intra-company trade of MNEs with affiliates in different locations worldwide.
Hence, for the modern firm it is optimal to fragment the production process across
national borders irrespective of tax considerations (e.g. Krugman, 1995). At this level
of decision, when the firm has generally decided on establishing a production plant
abroad versus the alternative of exporting, the firm can then choose between different
locations, also taking national corporation taxes into account.1 From a theoretical view,
the incentive to locate in a specific country increases with a smaller effective average
corporate tax rate of that country.
This doctoral dissertation is concerned with the subsequent two levels of decision for
MNEs. First, conditional on locating in a particular country, the firm has the continuous
choice of the size of investment. The empirical literature has brought forward compre-
hensive evidence that the level of FDI is negatively affected by corporate taxes (see
Devereux and Maffini, 2007, for an extensive survey). Second, conditional on the level
of investments, the firm can decide the reallocation of realized profits among their affili-
ate locations worldwide by applying various tax avoidance strategies of income shifting.
The focus of this doctoral thesis is the empirical assessment of corporate tax effects on
MNEs’ location decision of assets, profits and debt. Thereby, the aim is to analyze with
a large database of European MNEs and with modern and sophisticated econometric
methods that explicitly control for unobserved heterogeneity between multinational
affiliates if corporate taxes and, more precisely, corporate tax rate differences between
affiliates of MNEs are relevant on these two latter levels of decision and, if yes, to
determine the extent of these tax effects.
The activities of MNEs may have various positive effects on the welfare of a country.
For example, multinational firms exhibit a higher profitability than domestic corpora-
tions which, on the one hand, leads to higher wages for employees of a MNE and, on
the other hand, yields positive spillovers for domestic corporations with respect to firm
productivity. In addition, the capital stock of a country may rise due to increasing FDI
undertaken by MNEs. Given these positive consequences, the analysis of the impact
of corporate taxation on the level of investments as well as on the level of profits of
MNEs is a highly relevant topic.
1For example, Devereux and Griffith (1998) provide evidence that the fundamental, discrete decision
of setting up a subsidiary abroad is to a much lesser extent influenced by tax considerations than the
concrete choice of investing in a particular country.
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The corporate tax system in the European Union (EU) is characterized by the sepa-
rate taxation of corporate income of each MNE’s foreign subsidiary (separate account-
ing). Therefore, along with different national corporate tax rates, this tax principle
provides MNEs with the opportunity to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax coun-
tries. Generally, three strategies of shifting profits can be distinguished. First, charging
intra-company (intermediate) goods for a higher or a lower than the arm’s length price,
i.e. the market price, to manipulate the gross profits of the trading affiliates in an over-
all tax-minimizing way (transfer pricing). Second, overhead costs e.g. for research and
development (R&D) or headquarters services can be allocated strategically to affiliates
in different countries in order to bias their pre-tax profits. Third, MNEs can shift profits
via the channel of intra-company financial transactions by strategies of debt shifting,
i.e. by the granting of an internal credit of a low-tax affiliate to a high-tax affiliate
to benefit from the interest depreciation tax shield. However, the current proposal
of the European Commission (2001) for the introduction of a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) aims to eliminate such profit shifting activities by con-
solidating all corporate tax bases of a MNE and reallocating the global profit to the
different affiliate locations according to a specific formula (formula apportionment).2
Providing quantitative evidence of profit shifting may support the argumentation for
the implementation of such a formula apportionment tax system (CCCTB) in the EU,
which is assumed to be more efficient than the current system of separate accounting
in many dimensions, but at the same time might suffer from ambiguous and potential
adverse effects (see e.g. Riedel and Runkel, 2007).
In the context of international tax competition, the possibility for MNEs to shift
profits from high-tax to low-tax locations has two opposed effects on the level of national
statutory corporate tax rates. On the one hand, obviously, the possibility to shift
profits intensifies tax competition in the sense of lower corporate taxes as countries
not only compete over mobile firms and capital but additionally over shifty profits
(see e.g. Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008). On the other hand, under the
assumption that profit shifting is not completely suppressed by national tax authorities,
the possibility to shift profits attenuates tax competition at the level of attracting firm
and FDI with lower corporate taxes. If MNEs have the opportunity to shift income
away from locations with a relatively high tax rate at sufficiently moderate costs they
might have a higher incentive to locate at such a high-tax country or might have a lower
incentive to relocate their business from the high-tax to a low-tax country, respectively.
2See Fuest (2008) for a comprehensive survey on the current state of the European Commission’s
proposal. In addition, see European Commission (2008) for possible parts of the final proposal.
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Hence, besides corporate tax rates, countries have an additional instrument via the
control intensity of profit shifting activities (and via the rate of the fine) to compete
with each other (Haufler and Bucovetsky, 2008). As a conclusion, tax competition
within the European Union can only be completely prevented if not only statutory
corporate tax rates are harmonized but also the imposition of taxes is harmonized,
potentially with a centralized EU tax collection authority.
The globalized world economy is not only characterized by a high degree of firm and
capital mobility due to open national borders, decreasing tariffs and cheap travel, com-
munication and transportation costs. These developments have likewise intensified the
competition between MNEs on a worldwide scale. Therefore, the need to save expenses
and costs is much higher nowadays for a modern firm that wants to be internation-
ally competitive. On top of this, the ambition to operate cost efficiently is also getting
more extreme due to the rising importance of the so-called shareholder value princi-
ple as more firms are quoted and their shares are traded at the major international
stock exchanges. According to this principle, the corporate activity consistently and
exclusively aims at maximizing the company value from the view of the sharehold-
ers. Consequently, in the spirit of this business philosophy and due to the competitive
pressure from globalization, the optimal saving and avoidance of taxes has likewise
become a more and more indispensable practice. But the planning, implementing and
monitoring of tax avoidance strategies like profit shifting requires specific knowledge
by business experts. However, the access to such know-how has become easier and
cheaper for MNEs over the past few decades as the international level of education has
increased and thus allowed relatively more white-collar and high-skilled workers to be
employed at MNEs.
The main conclusion of this doctoral thesis is that MNEs’ corporate activity is sig-
nificantly influenced by corporate taxation. Thereby MNEs use various strategies to
minimize, as well as to avoid, corporate taxes by relocating profitable assets and func-
tions, as well as by shifting profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. With regards
to research content, this thesis comprises four chapters which all exhibit an empiri-
cal focus. Three sections (Chapter 2, 3 and 5) deal with empirical evidence of MNEs’
investment and profit shifting strategies to reduce their global corporate tax liability.
One section (Chapter 4) highlights the importance of the MNEs’ headquarters location
versus their foreign subsidiaries and finds various implications for public economics, like
the impact on tax revenue or on firm’s profit shifting behavior. Each chapter can be
read separately apart from the others as each is designed as a stand-alone research
project that also includes its own introduction and conclusions.
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Chapter 2 (a revised version of Dischinger, 2008) provides evidence of profit shifting
activities between an affiliated multinational firm and its foreign parent. The influence
of the ownership share on the shifting volume between the two affiliates is analyzed
as well. This study is mainly inspired by an article of Huizinga and Laeven (2008)
and employs a large micro database which includes detailed accounting and ownership
information of mainly European MNEs for the years 1995 to 2005 that are located in
25 countries of the EU. While controlling for unobservable time-constant heterogeneity
between affiliates, the estimations explain variations in affiliates’ pre-tax profits with
various firm and country characteristics and in addition with the statutory corporate
tax rate difference to its foreign parent firm. This tax measure captures the direct
profit shifting incentive which is shown prior to the econometric analysis with a simple
theoretical model that yields testable hypotheses. The results show a strongly negative
relationship between an affiliated company’s tax rate differential and the affiliate’s gross
profits. Quantitatively, a 10 percentage points decrease in the tax rate of the affiliate
(relative to the parent) increases its pre-tax profitability by about 7%, if all else is kept
equal. Various robustness checks support this profit shifting inference. Furthermore, the
analysis presents first evidence that a higher parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary
leads to intensified shifting activities between these affiliates. The quantitative results
are compared with existing studies using U.S. and European micro data and divergent
econometric methods. Subsequent to this systematic observation of statistically and
economically significant responses of a multinational affiliate’s pre-tax profitability to
tax rate differences, the next chapter deals with the responsiveness of highly profitable
assets like intangibles to international tax differentials.
Chapter 3 is based on a joint project with Nadine Riedel (a revised version of
Dischinger and Riedel, 2008).3 In this teamwork, we analyze corporate tax rate dif-
ferences within a MNE and the location of intangible assets. Our study is amongst
others inspired by the work of Grubert (2003) and also by anecdotal evidence of MNEs
like Microsoft, Pfizer, Shell or Vodafone who transferred their R&D units, product de-
sign centers or intellectual property & licensing departments to affiliates in Ireland or
Switzerland, respectively. These affiliates then charge royalties to operating affiliates
worldwide. In general, intangible assets like patents and trademarks are increasingly
seen as the key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profit. Moreover,
they constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities in MNEs due to a highly
3Nadine Riedel holds a Ph.D. in Economics of the University of Munich since 2008, is a research fellow
at the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation of the Sa¨ıd Business School and is a research
affiliate of the CESifo Research Network, Munich.
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intransparent transfer pricing process. We argue that for both reasons, MNEs have
an incentive to locate intangible property at affiliates with a relatively low corporate
tax rate. To receive this hypothesis for our estimation approach, the chapter starts
out with a simple model of intangible asset location. In addition, we provide a short
overview of European accounting practices with respect to intangible assets to achieve
a clear identification strategy. Using the same micro panel data as in the analysis of
Chapter 2 and controlling for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity between affili-
ates, we find that the lower a subsidiary’s corporate tax rate relative to other affiliates
of the multinational group, the higher is its level of intangible asset investment. The
effect is statistically and economically significant, even after controlling for subsidiary
size, year effects, and country characteristics. Furthermore, the effect appears across a
range of specification and estimation model choices that address endogeneity issues and
the dynamic pattern of the intangible asset investment. Quantitatively, the estimations
suggest a semi-elasticity of around −1.4, meaning that a decrease in the average tax
differential to other group affiliates by 10 percentage points raises a subsidiary’s intan-
gible property investment by around 14% on average. Finally, we additionally provide
evidence that suggests more extensive profit shifting activities of MNEs which exhibit
a large share of their intangible asset holdings at low-tax affiliates within the group.
In the next chapter, we study among other things if, also as a consequence of this, the
profitability of foreign subsidiaries really has increased over the last decade relative to
parent firms.
Chapter 4 is again based on a joint work with Nadine Riedel (Dischinger and Riedel,
2009; Dischinger and Riedel, 2010). This time, we analyze the importance of the MNE’s
headquarters location versus the locations of their foreign subsidiaries in allocating
profitable assets and profits within the multinational group by comparing the prof-
itability rates of parents with the rates of subsidiary firms. Using a large panel dataset
of European MNEs for the years 1999 to 2006 and located in 27 European countries,
we provide evidence that operations at multinational headquarters are significantly
more profitable than operations at their foreign subsidiaries. Our most conservative
estimates quantify the profitability gap with around 30%. The results turn out to be
robust against the use of different profitability measures and the inclusion of a large set
of control variables like the firm age, the leverage ratio, the size of the input factors,
country and industry fixed effects, and multinational group fixed effects. Our find-
ings suggest that the profitability gap is partly driven by agency costs which arise if
value-driving functions are managed by a subsidiary that is geographically separated
from the headquarters management. We additionally show that this gap likewise exists
between headquarters and their domestic subsidiaries, whereas it is measured to be
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around two thirds smaller. In addition, in line with falling communication and travel
costs over the last decade, we provide robust evidence that the profitability gap be-
tween headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries is declining over time by at least 1.5
percentage points per year. Apart from that, our results indicate that a higher com-
petitiveness of MNEs in their home markets also contributes to the profitability gap.
Furthermore, we discuss various implications of our findings for public economics. For
example, we additionally show that tax payments at multinational headquarters are
found to be about 60% larger than at their foreign subsidiaries. With regard to profit
shifting behavior, we empirically observe that, on the one hand, MNEs are reluctant to
shift profits away from high-tax headquarters to low-tax subsidiaries and, vice versa,
that MNEs are eager to shift profits from high-tax subsidiaries to low-tax headquar-
ters. Overall, this chapter provides evidence for the increasing mobility of profitable
assets in the last decade which results in a growing profitability of foreign subsidiaries
reducing the gap to the parent. This observation is in line with the results of Chapter
3 of intangible asset relocations to low-tax affiliates.
Chapter 5 is carried out with the assistance of Ulrich Glogowsky and Marcus Stro-
bel (Dischinger, Glogowsky, and Strobel, 2010).4 In this research project, we study
the more complex method of shifting profits via intra-company financial transactions.
This work is amongst others inspired by an article by Mintz and Smart (2004) which
argues that a strategic allocation of debt and equity within the multinational group
by borrowing from low-tax affiliates and lending to high-tax affiliates allows the lat-
ter to deduct interest expenses from the tax base and, consequently, overall results
in tax savings for the MNE. We analyze multinational affiliates’ leverage responses to
tax rate changes and also identify debt shifting activities of MNEs. In addition, we
highlight the impact of the firm-specific risk on these financing strategies. In general,
multinational as well as domestic firms have the incentive to enhance debt financing
with higher corporate tax rates due to the increased value of interest deductions from
the tax base. However, external debt is relatively costly for corporations with a high
firm-specific risk. Moreover, for MNEs, the shifting of internal debt opens up additional
tax saving opportunities. Using a large database of MNEs for the years 1998 to 2006
and located in 30 European countries, we first provide evidence that the debt-to-assets
ratio is positively affected by the statutory corporate tax rate. Second, we show that
multinational subsidiaries use debt shifting with the parent firm as well as external
debt to get advantage of the depreciation tax shield. Third, we provide evidence that
4Ulrich Glogowsky and Marcus Strobel are students in Economics at the University of Munich and
student research assistants at the Seminar for Economic Policy of the University of Munich.
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subsidiaries with a high firm-specific risk are more involved in debt shifting than low-
risk subsidiaries. Vice-versa, low-risk affiliates use external debt more intensively in a
tax-minimizing way. We address endogeneity concerns on our firm-specific risk proxies
with a sectoral analysis comparing high-risk with low-risk industries based on exoge-
nous information and find a similar, even more extreme pattern. Our panel estimations
control for firm size, profitability, firm age, and various country characteristics as well
as for time and affiliate fixed effects. Overall, this chapter again highlights the ambition
of MNEs to minimize their global tax liability and stresses the flexibility of MNEs in
adjusting likewise their financial structure as a reaction to changes in corporate tax
rates and international tax differentials.
Chapter 2
Profit Shifting by Multinationals
and the Ownership Share: Evidence
from European Micro Data
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2.1 Introduction
The current corporate tax principle in the European single market is characterized by
a separate taxation of profits of each foreign subsidiary (separate accounting). This
main principle in addition with different national statutory corporate tax rates in the
European Union (EU) thus provides multinational enterprises (MNEs) with the op-
portunity to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. The incentive to relocate
corporate income could be even larger for European MNEs compared to U.S.-based
multinationals, as tax differences in Europe can be large even among neighboring states.
Additionally, most EU countries employ the exemption system for taxing foreign cor-
porate profits, under which international tax differentials in the source country of the
investment are directly relevant for the after-tax profits of companies.1 It is therefore of
fundamental importance for governments in EU high-tax countries to protect their na-
tional corporate tax revenue against various kinds of profit shifting.2 However, the tax
auditing of the MNEs’ transfer pricing documentations constitutes substantial costs
for governments and, furthermore, in many cases it is unfeasible to reveal all potential
shifting activities of a MNE. The current proposal of the European Commission (2001)
aims to eliminate or at least substantially reduce these tax avoidance incentives by con-
solidating all corporate tax bases of a MNE and reallocating this profit to the different
subsidiary locations according to a specific formula (formula apportionment). Fuest
(2008) gives a comprehensive review on the current state of the European Commis-
sion´s renewed proposal for a directive on the introduction of a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which were supposed to be submitted at the end of
2008.3
With respect to this proposed changeover to a EU corporate tax system of formula
apportionment, it is of fundamental importance to evaluate the actual magnitude of
1The system of foreign tax credit applied in the U.S. aims to equalize international differences in
corporate tax rates through compensating supplementary taxation of foreign source income in the
parent country. This should induce fewer incentives to shift profits, other things being equal.
2Basically, three methods of shifting profits can be distinguished. First, charging intra-company in-
termediate goods for a higher or a lower than the arm’s length price (transfer pricing). Second,
overhead costs, e.g. for R&D or headquarter services, can be allocated strategically to subsidiaries in
different countries in order to bias their pre-tax profits. Third, MNEs can shift profits via the channel
of intra-company financial transactions by internal borrowing and lending between affiliates to get
advantage of the interest depreciation tax shield.
3See European Commission (2008) for a recent working paper by the Commission´s working group
which presents and discusses possible parts of the final proposal.
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profit shifting in the EU under the current principle of separate accounting. A high di-
mension of multinational income shifting activities would give one strong argument for
the transition to formula apportionment. This paper estimates the intensity of profit
shifting behavior in the EU and thus can contribute to this decision making problem;
particularly, as empirical studies on profit shifting with European data are still scarce.
Hence, the results could help to assess the level of the bias in national corporate tax
bases in the EU that results from the relocation of profits. I analyze this issue using a
broad European micro data set in a panel structure (AMADEUS database) which thus
allows the application of the fixed-effects method. While controlling for unobservable
time-constant heterogeneity between affiliates, I explain variations in affiliate’s pre-tax
profits with various firm and country characteristics and additionally with the statutory
corporate tax rate differential to the parent firm. This tax measure captures the di-
rect profit shifting incentive. The baseline sample consists of 67, 804 observations from
14, 077 multinational subsidiaries within the EU–25 for the years 1995 to 2005. The
results show a robust inverse relationship between the statutory tax rate of a subsidiary
relative to the parent firm location and the subsidiary’s unconsolidated pre-tax prof-
itability which can be interpreted as indirect evidence of profit shifting. Quantitatively,
I find a semi-elasticity of −.73, meaning that a decrease in a subsidiary’s statutory tax
rate difference to its parent by 10 percentage points increases the subsidiary’s pre-tax
profitability by 7.3%, other things being equal. Various robustness tests support this
profit shifting inference.
In addition, the paper provides evidence that a higher parent’s ownership share
of a subsidiary leads to an increase in the level of profit shifted between these two
affiliates, and vice versa. Theoretically, the ownership share is highly relevant for a
MNE’s profit shifting activities as it directly affects the feasibility of implementing tax
planning strategies and thus determines the shifting cost.4 For example, an increase
in the parent’s ownership share can lead to a boost in shifting activities via an eased
enforceability of tax strategies. This may result since more management influence at
the subsidiary via more share voting rights is reached, as opposed management interests
from other parties involved are now reduced (management effect). Robust empirical
evidence for this positive impact of the ownership share on the intensity of profit
shifting is scarce in the existing literature. However, on the outbound side of German
4See Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a) for an analysis that includes the conflict of interests in the transfer
pricing process (coordination costs) when more than one owner is involved in the shareholding.
Furthermore, Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) and Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) empirically show
that the ownership share positively affects corporate tax effects on intra-company borrowing and
lending.
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FDI, Weichenrieder (2009) finds some evidence of the ownership share impact on profit
shifting behavior comparing tax rate effects for affiliates that are wholly owned vs. non-
wholly owned. My continuous ownership effect strengthen this result of Weichenrieder
(2009) by providing evidence that changes in the tax differential yield a stronger effect
on pre-tax profitability for multinational subsidiaries that are owned by their foreign
parent with a higher ownership share. My result is confirmed by a robustness check
using separate estimation samples with different ownership thresholds.
The existing empirical literature on profit shifting focuses mainly on U.S. data (see
Hines, 1997, Hines, 1999, and Devereux and Maffini, 2007, for comprehensive surveys).
Most studies provide indirect evidence as data on intra-firm transactions is limited even
in the U.S..5 In doing so, the standard method used in this literature tries to explain
differences in (unconsolidated) pre-tax profits of affiliated companies by the statutory
corporate tax rate which is effective at the affiliate’s location, while controlling for firm
and country characteristics. Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994),
for example, perform this with aggregate data on affiliates by country, whereas e.g.
Harris, Morck, Slemrod, and Yeung (1993) and Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998),
with a similar methodology, use firm-level data. A more precise tax measure is however
to describe the incentive of a MNE to shift profits between two affiliates with the
bilateral statutory tax rate difference of an affiliated multinational corporation to its
foreign parent firm. In my paper, I use this tax differential for the identification of
shifting activities.
Evidence of profit shifting with European data is still rare. Weichenrieder (2009)
confirms profit shifting into and out of Germany with German panel FDI-data (MiDi
database), using statutory tax rates and after-tax profits as identification. With the
same database, Overesch (2006) demonstrates for German MNEs a negative impact
of the statutory tax rate on the size of balance sheet items that reflect intra-company
sales. Huizinga and Laeven (2008), with a methodology close to Hines and Rice (1994),
perform a cross-section analysis for the year 1999 with affiliate level data from the
AMADEUS database to provide evidence of profit shifting within European MNEs
by explaining variations in Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) with various
tax differentials, among firm and country controls. I use the same micro database as
Huizinga and Laeven (2008), but undertake a panel analysis over 11 years controlling for
fixed firm effects. This method can alleviate the endogeneity problem of unobservable
firm-specific characteristics in explaining variations in profits. A firm’s profitability is
5So far, only a few papers yield direct evidence of profit shifting by using affiliate level data on
intra-company transfer prices (Swenson, 2001; Clausing, 2003; Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006).
Chapter 2 – Profit Shifting & Ownership Share 13
likely to be driven by internal firm-specific factors, which are impossible to control for by
variables available in standard accounting databases (e.g. management quality, degree
of product innovation, product popularity, etc.). Therefore, to analyze firm behavior
issues, using panel data in combination with the fixed-effects estimation model should
lead to more reliable and robust results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, a simple model of
profit shifting is presented. From this model, I derive hypotheses for the econometric
specifications. Section 2.3 describes the data and the sample composition. Section 2.4
presents the estimation approach, the empirical results and various robustness checks.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 A Simple Model of Profit Shifting
I set up a simple and well-established theoretical model of profit shifting.6 For this
purpose, I relate for instance to Grubert (2003) but incorporate a parameter for the
ownership share, as first introduced by Weichenrieder (2009). This model serves to
derive testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis of Section 2.4.
I assume a MNE with some degree of market power and with one foreign subsidiary.
The parent firm, subscripted with p, has to bear the statutory corporate tax rate
0 ≤ tp < 1, the subsidiary, subscripted with s, has to bear 0 ≤ ts < 1. The two affiliates
engage in exogenous intra-company, i.e. inter-affiliate, transactions T > 0, that is they
purchase and sell a given amount of intermediate products or intra-company services.
This provides the MNE with the opportunity to shift profits by deviating from the
arm’s length price for these intra-company sales.
Profit shifting is modeled through the shifting parameter s which represents the
amount of profit shifted per transaction. If tp > ts, profits are shifted from the parent
to the subsidiary, i.e. s > 0, and a higher s means more shifting. The opposite results
for a reversed tax scenario. The parameter ρ > 0 represents all expected costs of shift-
ing, including the probability of detection, the penalty, potential image loss, costs of
distorted management incentives, etc.
The parameter 0 < δ ≤ 1 denotes the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary, with
δ = 1 indicating a wholly owned affiliate. I incorporate a major effect that the parent’s
6See e.g. Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) for a detailed theoretical analysis why it is optimal for a
MNE to shift pre-tax profits from the parent to the subsidiary firm if the statutory corporate tax
rate of the parent is larger than the tax rate of the subsidiary, and vice versa.
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ownership share of its foreign subsidiary can have on the level of profits shifted from
or to this affiliate. A lower ownership share results in a limited enforceability of profit
shifting strategies due to more potentially opposed management interests from other
parties involved, and vice versa. I call this the management effect of the ownership
share on the shifting intensity and model this effect by an increase in the costs of
shifting if the ownership share declines, and vice versa.7
The output of the parent, Fp(Kp, Lp), is produced with mobile capital and immobile
labor with cost r and wp, respectively. I assume no depreciation of capital. The de-
ductibility of the tax penalty is fully embodied in ρ. Hence, the after-tax profit of the
parent is given by
pinetp = (1− tp) [Fp(Kp, Lp)− rKp − wpLp − s T ]
− (ρ/2)(s/δ)2 T (2.1)
The last term gives a quadratic specification of the expected shifting costs function
which is frequently used in the literature. I also assume that these costs are solely
borne by the parent.8 The respective after-tax profit of the subsidiary is
pinets = (1− ts) [Fs(Ks, Ls)− rKs − wsLs + s T ] (2.2)
Summing up these two affiliates’ profits yields the overall after-tax profit of the MNE:9
Πnet = (1− tp) [Fp(Kp, Lp)− rKp − wpLp]
+ (1− ts) [Fs(Ks, Ls)− rKs − wsLs]
+ (tp − ts)s T − (ρ/2)(s/δ)2 T (2.3)
The shifting term (first term in the last row of Equation (2.3)) reflects the tax gain from
shifting profits (before penalties). Maximizing overall net profits of the MNE holding
all input factors fixed yields the optimal level of shifting
s∗ =
(tp − ts) δ 2
ρ
(2.4)
7For simplicity, I assume the share of ownership to be determined by exogenous factors. See Weichen-
rieder (2009) for a similar procedure.
8I do not assume any effect of the ownership share on the probability of detection, i.e. I expect that
a parent with a partly owned affiliate (e.g. 51% of the shares) is treated equal by the tax authority
as if the affiliate is wholly owned (same intensity of investigation).
9The relevance of the ownership share for the overall profit of the MNE is not modeled, i.e. the effect
that a lower ownership share gives the incentive to shift profits from the partly owned affiliate to the
(wholly owned) parent, and vice versa, is not incorporated as this ownership effect is independent
of tax differences between these two affiliates. This analysis is focussing on profit shifting resulting
solely from tax differentials. See Grubert (2003) for a similar procedure.
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Thus, in the optimum, s∗ > 0 if tp > ts, i.e. the MNE shifts profits from the parent to
the subsidiary. Vice versa, s∗ < 0 if tp < ts and profits are shifted to the parent. The
optimal level of shifting has the following comparative static properties:
∂s∗




(tp − ts) 2 δ
ρ
> 0 if tp > ts
< 0 if tp < ts (2.6)
The optimal level of shifting increases with the tax differential (and decreases with the
expected cost of shifting parameter ρ). A rise in the ownership share δ increases the
optimal level of shifting s∗ via the management effect, independent of the direction
of shifting. I test this hypothesis from Equation (2.6) empirically in Section 2.4.4. If
tp > ts, profits are shifted to the subsidiary and, thus, s
∗ > 0. Hence, an increase in δ
leads to a higher level of shifting. The same results if tp < ts, as profits are shifted to
the parent and s∗ < 0.
Holding again all inputs fixed, I get the main theoretical hypothesis which will be
tested throughout the econometric analysis to identify profit shifting:
∂pigrossp














In the tax scenario tp > ts (tax scenario tp < ts), a rise (decline, i.e. getting more
negative) in the tax differential results in a higher level of shifting and yields a decrease
(increase) in the gross profit of the parent (and finally, a rise in the overall net profit
of the MNE). In addition, a rise in the ownership share δ leads to intensified shifting
(Equation (2.6)) which further reduces (increases) the pre-tax profit of the parent.
Summarized, the simple model results in the following propositions which constitute
the theoretical basis of the empirical analysis in Section 2.4.
Proposition 1.
A larger tax difference of the two affiliates leads to a higher optimal level of profit shift-
ing. This reduces the pre-tax profit of the ’high-tax affiliate’ and, vice versa, increases
the pre-tax profit of the ’low-tax affiliate’.
Proposition 2.
A rise in the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary leads to a higher optimal level
of profit shifting.
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2.3 Data
I employ the European micro database AMADEUS provided by Bureau van Dijk which
contains standardized unconsolidated and/or consolidated annual accounts for up to
1.5 million national and multinational, public and private companies in 38 European
countries from 1993 to 2006. The database involves detailed descriptive information,
numerous balance sheet and profit & loss account items, as well as information on the
ownership structure, but is unbalanced in structure.
There is no legal commitment for firms to give out information for the database.
However, usually the real source of the AMADEUS data is Creditreform. The purpose
of this institution10 insures a strong incentive for firms to participate and additionally
insures an adequate quality of the data. As in reality the calculation of arm’s length
prices for transfer pricing auditing by national tax authorities is difficult, time intensive
or even unfeasible, e.g. in case of specific patents, other methods are usually applied.
Mostly, this is the so called Transaction Based Net Margin Method, which compares
the net profit margin of the respective affiliate with similar but non-affiliated firms
of the same branch with the help of a database. For this, both sides, transfer pricing
consultants (e.g. Deloitte and KPMG) and also more and more tax authorities (e.g. in
Germany and France), use the AMADEUS database.11
The sample contains firms from the EU–25 member states (except Cyprus and Malta)
for the years 1995–2005 as these countries and years are sufficiently represented by the
database. The country statistics are presented in Table 2.1. Furthermore, the analy-
sis accounts only for non-public and for industrial MNEs. The observational units are
multinational subsidiaries. Thereby, I consider a subsidiary to be multinational if there
exists a corporate immediate shareholder with totally at least 90% of the ownership
shares, i.e. the parent firm, which is located in a foreign country worldwide.12 Finally,
the baseline regression consists of 67, 804 observations from 14, 077 multinational sub-
10Creditreform International traces active commercial enterprises worldwide and checks their credit-
worthiness to provide credit reports and debt collection services to creditors.
11However, firms can self-select into the database or stay out. But by assuming that (more intrans-
parent) firms which refuse the inclusion in the database are more willing to engage in (illegal)
profit shifting activities, my estimation results should be biased downwards. Thus, with possibly
underestimated but significant coefficient estimates, profit shifting inference is still feasible.
12The data restriction to subsidiaries which are owned by 90% or more ensures that the potential
relocation of profit to this affiliate is actually relevant for the MNE. I analyze the effect of the
parent’s ownership share on the shifting intensity in Section 2.4.4.
Chapter 2 – Profit Shifting & Ownership Share 17


























sidiaries; hence, each subsidiary is observed for 4.8 years on average.13 As the panel is
not balanced, the number of observations per year is continuously increasing over the
years. For the years 1997–2005, the percentage of observations per year in the baseline
regression ranges between 7.5% (i.e. 5,050 observations, in 1997) and 13.7% (i.e. 9,305
observations, in 2004). Moreover, 30.5% of the subsidiaries in the sample are owned by
a parent that is located outside of the EU–25, thus, for 69.5% of the cases there exists
an immediate shareholder within the EU–25.
13For the econometric specification (explained in detail in the next section), balance sheet items
have to be calculated in unconsolidated form. In addition, I have restricted the export from the
AMADEUS database to MNEs that are currently active. Finally, this baseline sample consists of
22, 991 relevant firms. Note, that no financial corporations are included in AMADEUS, and that
only profitable subsidiaries are considered in the regressions. Furthermore, I dropped observations
that exhibit implausible variable values, i.e. negative assets, cost or sales, or a financial leverage
ratio of less than 0 or greater than 1.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Subsidiary Level:
Profit before TaxationF 67,804 7,399 76,644 1 8,055,052
Fixed AssetsF 67,804 41,933 473,442 1 3.76e+07
Cost of EmployeesF 67,804 9,540 42,387 1 2,746,471
Number of Employees 67,804 211.0 887.3 1 62,784
SalesF 64,904 93,403 466,587 1 2.10e+07
Financial Leverage Ratio 62,355 .6230 .2335 0 1
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 67,804 .3337 .0549 .1 .5676
Tax Difference to ParentN 66,045 -.018 .089 -.4676 .432
Parent Level:
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 66,045 .3519 .077 0 .5676
Country Level:
GDPH 67,634 1,016 692.9 5.54 2,792
GDP per CapitaJ 67,634 108.0 17.37 35.4 222.4
Unemployment Rate 67,634 8.18 3.4 2.1 19.9
Corruption IndexI 67,634 7.46 1.66 2.99 10
Notes: Firm data is exported from the AMADEUS database, TOP-1.5-Million-Version, October 2006.
F Unconsolidated values, in thousand US dollars, current prices.
 = (total liabilities / total assets).
N = (subsidiary statutory corporate tax rate - parent statutory corporate tax rate).
H In billion US dollars, current prices.
J In Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), EU–25 = 100.
I Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI), ranges from 0 (extreme
level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
The AMADEUS data has the drawback that information on the ownership structure
is only available for the last reported date which is the year 2004 in most cases of my
database version. Therefore, in the context of my panel study, there exists some scope
for misclassifications of parent-subsidiary-connections since the ownership structure
may have changed over the sample period.14 However, in line with previous studies, I
am not too concerned about this issue since potential misclassifications would introduce
noise to the estimations that would (again) bias the results towards zero (see e.g. Budd,
Konings, and Slaughter, 2005). In addition, in Section 2.4.3.1, I regress the data for
the cross-section of the year 2004 as a qualitative robustness check.
The descriptive sample statistics are shown in Table 2.2. The mean of profit before
taxation is calculated with 7.4 million US dollars. On average, a subsidiary holds fixed
assets amounting to 41.9 million US dollars, observes yearly cost of employees of 9.5
14However, I have compared my 2004 ownership data with that of the year 1998 and found that for
87% of my subsidiaries the country of the parent firm is the same for both years.
Chapter 2 – Profit Shifting & Ownership Share 19
million US dollars and employs 211 workers. Furthermore, the mean of a subsidiary’s
sales amounts to 93.4 million US dollars, and the average subsidiary has 62.3% of its
total assets financed through borrowing.
I merge data on the statutory corporate tax rate (including local taxes) at the sub-
sidiary and parent location, as well as basic country characteristics like GDP, GDP per
capita, the unemployment rate, and a corruption index.15 On the subsidiary level, the
statutory tax rate ranges from 10.0% to 56.8% with a mean of 33.4%, whereas, on the
parent level, the tax rate spreads from 0% to 56.8% with a mean of 35.2%. The main
tax measure, the Tax Difference to Parent, is defined as the statutory corporate tax
rate of a subsidiary minus the tax rate of the parent. This tax differential ranges from
−46.8% to 43.2% with a mean of −1.8% and a standard deviation of 8.9 percentage
points.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I first describe the econometric methodology to test Propositions 1
and 2 from Section 2.2. Then, Section 2.4.2 presents the baseline estimation results. In
Section 2.4.3, two fundamental robustness checks are undertaken. Finally, in Section
2.4.4, the influence of the parent’s ownership share on the level of profit shifting is
empirically analyzed.
2.4.1 Methodology
The approach to identify profit shifting activities is the regression of the unconsol-
idated pre-tax profitability16 of a profit-making multinational subsidiary on various
firm and country characteristics and on the statutory corporate tax rate difference to
its parent firm, controlling for fixed firm and year effects.17 Taking tax differentials is
15The statutory tax rates are taken from the European Commission (2006). Data on GDP comes
from the IMF. Data on GDP per capita (in Purchasing Power Standards, EU–25 = 100) and on
the unemployment rate is from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat). The corruption index
(Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI) is taken from Transparency International and ranges from 0
(extreme level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
16Pre-tax profits are taken form the balance sheet item Profit (Loss) before Taxation which is net of
all cost but before taxation.
17Note that 69% of the observational units own no further subsidiaries and 22% own solely domestic
subsidiaries. Therefore, the vast majority of the subsidiary in the sample cannot engage in (down-
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a more precise procedure in capturing the extent of the profit shifting incentive for a
multinational affiliate than working with single tax rates. Quantitative interpretations
of purely tax rate coefficients have to be taken with care. Calculated tax rate effects on
pre-tax profits might not be confined solely to profit shifting activities, as the incentive
to invest in a given country also decreases with the corporate tax rate.18
Based on the main hypothesis from Equation (2.7) of the theoretical model19, the
estimation equation takes on the following form
PBTit = β0 + β1DIFFSTRit + β2Xit + ρt + φi + it (2.8)
with subscript i denoting the observational unit, i.e. a multinational subsidiary. Sub-
script t denotes the time period (year). The dependent variable PBTit is the profit
before taxation of a subsidiary. Xit stands for a vector of time-varying firm and coun-
try characteristics. These control variables on the micro level are the subsidiary’s fixed
assets as a proxy for the installed capital, the cost of employees as a proxy for the use of
labor, and in a last specification also the financial leverage ratio (see e.g. Huizinga and
Laeven, 2008, for a similar application of micro controls).20 However, the debt-to-assets
ratio is dependent on the tax rate and the tax differential as will be shown in Chapter
5 of this thesis, but its inclusion in the regressions does not really affect the coefficient
estimates. Nevertheless, my most preferred specification is without the leverage ratio.
All firm variables are calculated per employee to control for subsidiary size and to get a
comparable profitability measure which is, however, neither qualitatively nor quantita-
ward) profit shifting activities with own foreign subsidiaries and, thus, the tax rate difference to
the parent is an appropriate measure of the overall (upward) shifting incentive of the observational
units.
18By constructing the tax differential, the statutory tax rate is the relevant tax measure for an analysis
of profit shifting activities, in contrast to the effective (average or marginal) tax rate (see e.g.
Devereux and Maffini (2007) for an extensive commentary). Furthermore, a MNE can define its own
tax base by the shifting of profits. Thus, using effective tax rates instead of statutory rates would
be misleading in this application.
19Note, to confer the theoretical model on the empirical specification, the status of the parent and
of the subsidiary have to switch. Hence, from the perspective of the subsidiary, the cost of shifting
term is irrelevant which further simplifies the derivative in Equation (2.7).
20In line with previous studies, I am not too concerned about potential endogeneity problems with the
fixed assets and the cost of employees variables as I apply them as control variables whose inclusion
does not significantly affect the coefficient estimate of the tax differential, i.e. qualitatively equal
and quantitatively very similar tax effects are obtained if these micro controls are completely left
out. Additionally, as a robustness check, I alternatively apply the number of employees instead of
the cost of employees as a proxy for the labor input (cf. Section 2.4.3). Again, I find no change in
any of my qualitative and quantitative results.
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tively decisive for the results.21 All variables besides the tax variables and the leverage
ratio are transformed in logarithmic form to mitigate the potential effect of outliers.
The control variables on the macro level are GDP (as a proxy for the market size),
GDP per capita (as a proxy for the productivity growth of a country), the unem-
ployment rate (as a proxy for the economic situation), and an index for the degree
of corruption (as a proxy for the overall risk of a country). The variables will also
enter in logarithmic form which is again not crucial for the results. The explanatory
variable of central interest is DIFFSTRit which stands for the main tax measure, i.e.
the statutory tax rate difference of affiliate i to its foreign parent in year t. As this
differential is calculated by subtracting the parent tax rate from the subsidiary tax
rate, I expect β1 to have a significantly negative sign to get (indirect) evidence of profit
shifting. φi represent unobserved characteristics on the firm level and on the country
level. The error term is denoted by it. In the baseline panel regressions, I include year
dummy variables ρt to control for shocks over time common to all affiliates. Instead, in
the cross-section regressions of the robustness checks, I am able to additionally include
(time-constant) industry dummies and, when leaving out the macro control variables,
country dummies.
The panel structure of the sample allows the application of fixed-effects methods
on the micro level. This considerably alleviates the endogeneity problem of unobserv-
able, time-constant firm-specific factors φi in explaining variations in profits, e.g. man-
agement quality or product popularity. The fixed-effects model is also preferred to
a random-effects approach as suggested by a Hausman-Test. Potentially unobserved,
time-constant country characteristics are controlled for by the included fixed firm effects
because together the firm-specific fixed effects of all affiliates in one country perfectly
account also for all unobservable macro factors. Thus, I estimate Equation (2.8) by
OLS with subsidiary fixed effects.
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) likewise use the AMADEUS database but undertake a
cross-section analysis of the year 1999 without the possibility to control for fixed effects.
In addition, compared to Huizinga and Laeven (2008), as dependent variable I use the
balance sheet item Profit (Loss) before Taxation. Employing EBIT, which includes
interest payments, as dependent variable could blur the effect of the tax differential
as these payments may also serve as a profit shifting channel (see Chapter 5 of this
thesis).
To analyze the effect of the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary on the shifting
21See the robustness checks in Section 2.4.3 for different normalization strategies. Note that also
without any normalization of the firm variables the quantitative estimation results are almost equal.
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intensity between these two affiliates, in a cross-section analysis of the year 2004 in
Section 2.4.4, I interact DIFFSTRi2004 with the parent’s ownership share of the con-
sidered subsidiary i in 2004.22 For this, in Section 2.4.4, I will reduce the initial sample
requirement of the parent’s minimum ownership share of 90% to 25%. Finally, I expect
this interaction term to exhibit a negative coefficient estimate indicating an additional
negative impact of the tax differential on pre-tax profitability for a higher ownership
share, holding the tax differential fixed.
2.4.2 Baseline Estimation Results
The baseline results are shown in Table 2.3. I run panel estimations for the years 1995–
2005 and for up to 14, 077 subsidiaries applying OLS with fixed-effects. With at max-
imum 67, 804 observations, the regressions thus comprise on average 4.8 observations
per affiliate. All panel estimations include year dummy variables and heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters which are displayed in the tables in
parentheses.23 Cross-section estimations partly include industry and country dummies
and robust standard errors adjusted for country clusters.
Throughout all specifications of Table 2.3, the coefficient estimates of the firm con-
trols (fixed assets and cost of employees calculated per employee respectively) are pos-
itive and significant at the 1%-level. They remain quite stable and sum up to .65. The
contribution of labor to pre-tax profits is about four times higher than that of capital
and an increase in the cost per employee of 1% leads to a rise in pre-tax profits per
employee of .5%. The effect of the cost per employee variable can be better interpreted
as that part of labor productivity which is reflected in pre-tax profits. Controlling for
fixed firm effects, the estimations explain up to 75.4% of the variation in profits before
taxation.
As a first indication for the tax effect on profitability and to compare the tax effect
with the second robustness check in Section 2.4.3.2, I first regress each specification
22The advantage of the cross-section analysis for this issue is discussed in Section 2.4.3. The reason
are the data restrictions on historical ownership (share) information addressed in the data section.
23Since the tax rate varies between country-year cells and supposing autocorrelation, I alternatively
apply country-level clusters in the panel regressions as a sensitivity check (cf. Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan, 2004). However, applying heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for
country clusters does not change the significance levels of the firm and tax variable coefficients, but
slightly reduces the significance of the country controls which results in an insignificant coefficient
estimate of GDP.
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Table 2.3: Baseline Estimations – Profit Shifting Evidence
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.76∗∗∗ -1.89∗∗∗ -1.70∗∗∗
(.267) (.270) (.271)
Tax Difference to Parent -.750∗∗∗ -.735∗∗∗ -.715∗∗∗
(.157) (.157) (.157)
Log (Fixed Assets .119∗∗∗ .117∗∗∗ .118∗∗∗ .116∗∗∗ .135∗∗∗ .133∗∗∗
per Employee) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.011) (.011)
Log (Cost of Employees .508∗∗∗ .505∗∗∗ .511∗∗∗ .509∗∗∗ .519∗∗∗ .517∗∗∗
per Employee) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.022) (.023)
Leverage Ratio -1.35∗∗∗ -1.36∗∗∗
(.050) (.051)
Log GDP -.506∗∗∗ -.439∗∗∗ -.688∗∗∗ -.614∗∗∗
(.117) (.119) (.121) (.123)
Log GDP per Capita 1.15∗∗∗ .875∗∗∗ .885∗∗∗ .616∗∗∗
(.240) (.245) (.239) (.243)
Log Unemployment Rate .082 .150∗∗∗ .084 .143∗∗∗
(.056) (.056) (.057) (.058)
Log Corruption Index .201∗∗∗ .228∗∗∗ .309∗∗∗ .343∗∗∗
(.069) (.070) (.070) (.071)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 67,804 66,045 67,634 65,877 62,355 60,783
# Firms 14,077 13,741 14,067 13,731 13,515 13,198
Adjusted R2 .7369 .7371 .7374 .7376 .7535 .7539
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership
shares. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm (Log) of the subsidiary’s unconsolidated
pre-tax profit calculated per employee. An OLS model with fixed effects is estimated. Tax Difference
to Parent is defined as the statutory corporate tax rate of the considered subsidiary minus the
tax rate of the subsidiary‘s parent. All regressions include year dummies. Adjusted R2 values are
calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
with the single statutory tax rate separately. I find a strongly negative effect which is
significant at the 1%-level. However, more important, the coefficient estimate of the
statutory tax rate difference to the parent has the expected negative sign and is likewise
highly significant, indicating that affiliates with a lower tax rate relative to the parent
location observe a higher pre-tax profit per employee, and vice versa. This confirms
the theoretical expectations from Equation (2.7) and, thus, gives indirect evidence for
profit shifting activities. The size of the tax difference effect slightly decreases with
the inclusion of the macro controls in Column (4). Quantitatively, my most preferred
specification (Column (4) of Table 2.3) suggest an increase in pre-tax profits of 7.3%
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if the tax difference to the parent decreases by 10 percentage points.
This point semi-elasticity of −.73 is by about one fourth smaller than the analogous
one estimated in a recent study by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). They run cross-section
estimations for the year 1999, likewise with the AMADEUS database, and, with their
largest sample of 1, 218 observations, they find a coefficient estimate of the tax difference
to the parent of −.975. However, the panel regressions yielding the smaller coefficient
of −.73 simultaneously control for fixed effects at the firm level which is not feasible in
a cross-section analysis. For example, if low-tax (high-tax) affiliates more often exhibit
the more (less) efficient managers or engineers, resulting in higher (lower) profits, this
unobservable affiliate characteristic would be captured by the fixed-effects approach,
and thus a lower effect of the tax differential is estimated.
In Specification (5) and (6), the financial leverage ratio of a subsidiary is additionally
included and enters with a significant and large coefficient of −1.4. This is not surpris-
ing as the balance sheet item Profit (Loss) before Taxation is minus all deductible costs
which includes interest payments, in contrast to EBIT or EBITDA. The coefficients
of all other explanatory variables show no significant change and, furthermore, stay
statistically significant. But the effect of the tax difference to the parent slightly de-
creases with the inclusion of the leverage ratio. A smaller impact of the incentive to
shift profits (e.g. via classical transfer pricing manipulations) is consistent if I assume
larger leverage ratios in high-tax than in low-tax countries (for the purpose of legally
biasing the MNE’s different national tax bases, e.g. via larger debt financing of a high-
tax affiliate). However, the debt-to-assets ratio is dependent on the tax rate and the tax
differential, as is shown in Chapter 5 of this thesis, and may thus be a simultaneously
determined variable. Therefore, Column (4) is the most preferred specification.
To account for time-varying country effects, I include the set of macro control vari-
ables. This inclusion raises the adjusted R2 value only a little. The coefficient of GDP
turns out significantly negative. An explanation could be that big markets are char-
acterized by a high degree of competition which results in a lower profitability. The
results further indicate that wealthier countries, measured by GDP per capita, which
thus possess the more advanced technologies, yield a more profitable production. More-
over, a lower risk of a country, proxied by a higher level of the corruption index (i.e. a
lower degree of corruption), seems to impact pre-tax profits per employee positively.
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2.4.3 Robustness Checks
I first undertake some smaller sensitivity tests before I focus on two fundamental robust-
ness checks in Sections 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2. The results of these minor tests described
in the following two paragraphs are not presented in the paper but are available from
the author upon request.
At first, I check if the firm variables are robust against a variation in the method of
normalization. Instead of dividing by the number of employees, I alternatively calculate
the subsidiary variables in ratios of sales and additionally in ratios of total assets. Both
of these modifications yield almost equal quantitative results but a slightly smaller
coefficient of the tax differential. However, a firm’s number of employees is likely to
be less influenced by tax rates than monetary values which makes a division by the
number of employees a more suitable way to control for subsidiary size.24
The possibility that some subsidiaries in the sample share the same parent firm
could potentially bias the standard errors or overestimate the effect of the tax differ-
ential. To test the relevance of this problem, I randomly deleted observations with a
duplicated subsidiary-parent-connection to exclusively keep firms with unique parents
in the sample. Hence, the sample reduces to 6, 925 subsidiaries, i.e. almost the half of
the affiliates are now dropped. However, with this reduced sample, all specifications
of Table 2.3 yield very similar quantitative results. The coefficient estimate of the tax
differential turns out to be only slightly larger (−.75) in my preferred Specification (4)
of Table 2.3 and is again significant at the 1%-level. Furthermore, this quantitatively
almost equal effect of the tax difference to the parent with this reduced sample, com-
pered to the baseline estimations with the full sample, suggests that profits are shifted
mainly between the affiliate and the parent firm and not between the affiliate and other
subsidiaries of its parent.
2.4.3.1 Cross–section Analysis
Due to the data restrictions of the historical ownership information which is only
available in a cross-section for the last reported year as described in Section 2.3, one
fundamental qualitative sensitivity check of the results is thus to additionally run the
24Note that without any normalization the quantitative results again do not change significantly.
Furthermore, instead of using the cost of employees as a proxy for the labor input, I alternatively
apply the number of employees as an explanatory firm variable. Again, I find no significant change
in any of the qualitative and quantitative results.
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Table 2.4: Robustness Check I – Cross–section Analysis
OLS, Cross–section 2004
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory Tax Rate -3.32∗∗∗ -2.71∗∗∗ -2.28∗∗
(.739) (.969) (1.06)
Tax Difference to Parent -2.11∗∗∗ -1.55∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗
(.417) (.301) (.276)
Log (Fixed Assets .284∗∗∗ .283∗∗∗ .286∗∗∗ .286∗∗∗ .270∗∗∗ .269∗∗∗
per Employee) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.034) (.030) (.029)
Log (Cost of Employees .624∗∗∗ .594∗∗∗ .638∗∗∗ .641∗∗∗ .642∗∗∗ .645∗∗∗
per Employee) (.053) (.051) (.060) (.063) (.065) (.069)
Leverage Ratio -1.40∗∗∗ -1.41∗∗∗
(.179) (.170)
Log GDP .041 .029 .041 .031
(.028) (.028) (.031) (.031)
Log GDP per Capita -.444 -.807∗∗∗ -.105 -.431∗
(.307) (.218) (.306) (.233)
Log Unemployment Rate -.130 -.225∗ -.052 -.133
(.119) (.115) (.123) (.128)
Log Corruption Index .054 .194 -.201 -.073
(.162) (.139) (.196) (.165)
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 9,305 9,104 9,305 9,104 8,589 8,412
R2 .2611 .2619 .2621 .2641 .3087 .3107
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for country clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership
shares. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm (Log) of the subsidiary’s unconsolidated
pre-tax profit calculated per employee. An OLS model is estimated. Tax Difference to Parent is
defined as the statutory corporate tax rate of the considered subsidiary minus the tax rate of the
subsidiary‘s parent. All regressions include 59 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level).
regressions from Table 2.3 in a cross-section. I do this with OLS for the year 2004 as
this is the last reported date in most cases of the database version. The results are
presented in Table 2.4. In the cross-section regressions, it is now feasible to include 59
industry dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level).
However, with the cross-section analysis I cannot control for fixed firm effects which
consequently results in higher coefficient estimates and in a small R2 value of about .31,
which is less than half of the value from the fixed-effects panel regressions of Table 2.3.
Though, all decisive coefficients still exhibit the expected sign and are highly significant.
In particular, the tax difference to the parent has a significantly negative effect on a
subsidiary’s pre-tax profits (−1.55 in Column (4) of Table 2.4). This confirms the
(indirect) evidence of profit shifting and states that the qualitative results are robust
Chapter 2 – Profit Shifting & Ownership Share 27
to a cross-section analysis. This in turn mitigates the concerns about the restricted
ownership information.
2.4.3.2 Domestic Individual Firms
Another fundamental robustness check to confirm the profit shifting inference is to
compare the tax rate elasticities of MNEs with those of purely domestic companies (cf.
Mintz and Smart, 2004). In such an analysis, I obviously have to revert to the statu-
tory tax rate as differentials to a foreign parent do not exist for Non-MNEs. With the
AMADEUS database, I construct a separate sample of at maximum 114, 728 individual
domestic firms with no shareholders and no subsidiaries to compare these regressions
with those done with the initial MNE-sample. For the purpose of a qualitative ro-
bustness test, in this comparison, I focus on cross-section analysis for the year 2004
with OLS to get definite ownership information necessary for precisely separating a
multinational from a domestic company.25
The results are shown in Table 2.5. With this sample of solely domestic firms, I
cannot find any significantly negative effect of the statutory tax rate, in contrast to
the regressions with the MNE-sample in Table 2.4. Moreover, although insignificant
(besides a weak significance in Column (5)), the coefficient estimate of the tax rate in
Table 2.5 is positive. This underlines the relevance of the statutory tax rate for com-
panies with at least one connection to a foreign country via its parent firm (MNEs) in
explaining variations in pre-tax profits. This in turn supports the prior profit shifting
findings. In Specifications (2), (4) and (6), I leave out GDP because of a high corre-
lation between the statutory tax rate and GDP (86%) which could result in upwards
biased standard errors of the respective coefficients and thus in insignificance due to
multicollinearity problems.
25See Section 2.3 for a discussion on the ownership data restrictions.
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Table 2.5: Robustness Check II – Domestic Individual Firms
OLS, Cross–section 2004
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory Tax Rate 1.19 .645 .866 .443 2.50∗ 1.76
(1.10) (.903) (1.32) (1.23) (1.40) (1.47)
Log (Fixed Assets .329∗∗∗ .330∗∗∗ .289∗∗∗ .289∗∗∗ .259∗∗∗ .260∗∗∗
per Employee) (.045) (.045) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Log (Cost of Employees .843∗∗∗ .841∗∗∗ .804∗∗∗ .803∗∗∗ .794∗∗∗ .792∗∗∗
per Employee) (.039) (.039) (.033) (.033) (.042) (.041)
Leverage Ratio -1.61∗∗∗ -1.61∗∗∗
(.223) (.224)
Log GDP -.060 -.047 -.080
(.052) (.055) (.063)
Log GDP per Capita -.996∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗ -.724∗ -.961∗∗∗ -.040 -.445
(.314) (.282) (.373) (.325) (.508) (.433)
Log Unemployment Rate -.610∗∗∗ -.746∗∗∗ -.647∗∗∗ -.754∗∗∗ -.551∗∗ -.732∗∗∗
(.146) (.183) (.147) (.178) (.207) (.201)
Log Corruption Index .352∗∗∗ .427∗∗∗ .153 .214 -.267 -.163
(.119) (.128) (.197) (.203) (.212) (.229)
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 114,728 114,728 114,728 114,728 108,646 108,646
R2 .2987 .2985 .3462 .3460 .3871 .3867
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for country clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
domestic individual firms with no shareholders and no subsidiaries. The dependent variable is the
natural logarithm (Log) of a firms’s unconsolidated pre-tax profit calculated per employee. An OLS
model is estimated. 59 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) are includes where indicated.
The correlation between Statutory Tax Rate and Log GDP is 86.2% which could result in larger
standard errors and thus in an upwards biased P-value due to multicollinearity problems; therefore,
in Specification (2), (4), and (6), Log GDP is left out.
2.4.4 Parent’s Ownership Share and Profit Shifting
The positive effect of the parent’s ownership share of its subsidiary on the level of
shifting is described in the theory Section 2.2. An increase in the ownership share
leads to a boost in profit shifting activities via lower shifting costs as the feasibility of
implementing shifting strategies improves due to more management influence at the
subsidiary in general, or more share voting rights in particular (management effect).26
To test this hypothesis from Equation (2.6), I reduce the initial MNE-sample require-
ment of the parent’s minimum total ownership share of its foreign subsidiary of 90%
26See Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) and Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) for evidence of the positive
effect of the ownership share on the tax sensitivity of intra-company debt.
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(cf. Section 2.3) to a minimum direct ownership share requirement of 25%.27 All other
criteria from the baseline MNE-sample stay the same. Now, the average direct own-
ership share is 92.9% with a standard deviation of 16.1 percentage points. To capture
the additional effect of the ownership share, I generate an interaction term between the
tax differential and the parent’s direct ownership share. Based on the hypothesis from
Equation (2.6) in combination with the indirect approach of profit shifting evidence
from Equation (2.7), I expect a negative coefficient of this interaction term to represent
more shifting via an additional impact of the tax differential on pre-tax profits for a
higher ownership share.
The regression results of a cross-section analysis for the year 2004 with OLS are
shown in Table 2.6.28 Due to the large number of subsidiaries with a parent that
fully owns the affiliate (71.9% of the subsidiaries), the tax differential and the in-
teraction term between the tax differential and the parent’s direct ownership share
((TaxDiff.toParent)×(ParentShare)) are highly correlated (98.9%). This multicollinear-
ity is very likely to increase the standard errors of the estimated coefficients of the two
collinear variables which can result in insignificance (cf. Columns (5) and (6) in Table
2.6). The interpretation of such an interaction effect is also not straightforward (cf.
last paragraph of this section). For this reason, to get a more clear-cut interpretation,
I calculate the interaction term by multiplying the tax differential with the deviation
of the ownership share from its mean (centering). The correlation between this inter-
action term and the tax differential is at the moderate level of 13.0%. These results are
displayed in Column (1)–(4) of Table 2.6.
Basically, the coefficient of the tax differential alone describes the effect of the tax
difference on pre-tax profits for an average ownership share of 92.9%. For an ownership
share above this mean, an increase in the tax differential has a stronger negative impact
on pre-tax profits than for ownership shares below 92.9%.29 Thus, an increase in the
ownership share, holding the tax differential fixed, strengthens profit shifting in the
sense that the sum of both coefficients decreases further. This qualitative result is in
27To precisely test the hypothesis from Equation (2.6), I apply the parent’s direct ownership share
instead of the total share which is the sum of directly and indirectly held shares. In doing so, I
assure that no potentially opposed effects via the indirect holding of shares can emerge from other
affiliates’ management interests.
28The cross-section analysis for the year 2004 is again preferred to the fixed-effects panel study due
to the data restrictions on historical ownership (share) information addressed in Section 2.3.
29This results as the coefficient of the interaction term multiplied with the respective (positive or
negative) deviation from the mean ownership share has to be added to the original coefficient of the
tax differential.
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Table 2.6: Parent’s Ownership Share & Profit Shifting
OLS, Cross–section 2004
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation per Employee)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax Difference to Parent -1.33∗∗∗ -.848∗∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗ -1.11∗∗∗ 1.48 1.95
(.378) (.237) (.322) (.321) (1.17) (1.49)
(TaxDiff.toParent)×(Parent -3.03∗∗ -3.57∗∗∗ -3.05∗∗ -3.31∗∗
Share–MeanParentShare) (1.25) (1.26) (1.16) (1.52)
(TaxDiff.toParent)× -3.03∗∗ -3.31∗∗
(ParentShare) (1.25) (1.52)
Parent Share .038 -.119 .054 .108 .038 .108
(.102) (.106) (.105) (.096) (.102) (.096)
Log (Fixed Assets .267∗∗∗ .266∗∗∗ .274∗∗∗ .249∗∗∗ .267∗∗∗ .249∗∗∗
per Employee) (.026) (.026) (.032) (.026) (.026) (.026)
Log (Cost of Employees .793∗∗∗ .809∗∗∗ .659∗∗∗ .654∗∗∗ .793∗∗∗ .654∗∗∗
per Employee) (.069) (.075) (.065) (.068) (.069) (.068)
Leverage Ratio -1.48∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗
(.184) (.184)
Log GDP .018 .030 .026 .018 .026
(.040) (.036) (.038) (.040) (.038)
Log GDP per Capita -.938∗∗∗ -.698∗∗ -.206 -.938∗∗∗ -.206
(.332) (.312) (.325) (.332) (.325)
Log Unemployment Rate -.365∗∗ -.364∗∗∗ -.265∗ -.365∗∗ -.265∗
(.134) (.118) (.136) (.134) (.136)
Log Corruption Index .088 -.071 -.384∗∗ .088 -.384∗∗





# Observations 8,815 8,815 8,815 8,107 8,815 8,107
R2 .2254 .2326 .2674 .3176 .2254 .3176
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for country clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 25% of the direct
ownership shares. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm (Log) of the subsidiary’s
unconsolidated pre-tax profit calculated per employee. An OLS model is estimated. Tax Difference
to Parent is defined as the statutory corporate tax rate of the considered subsidiary minus the
tax rate of the subsidiary‘s parent. (TaxDiff.toParent)×(ParentShare–MeanParentShare) is the
interaction term between the statutory corporate tax rate difference to the parent and the deviation
of the parent’s direct ownership share from its mean (correlation between this interaction term
and the tax differential is 13.0%). (TaxDiff.toParent)×(ParentShare) is the interaction between the
tax differential and the parent’s direct ownership share (correlation between this term and the tax
differential is 98.9%). Parent Share is the parent’s direct ownership share in the considered subsidiary.
59 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) are includes where indicated. In Specification (2), a
full set of country dummies is included instead of the macro controls.
line with the expectations from Equations (2.6) and (2.7). In Specification (2), a full
set of country dummy variables is included instead of the macro controls which results
in an increased significance of the interaction term coefficient (1%-level). The inclusion
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of country dummies is feasible as the tax differential varies across subsidiaries. To
conclude, the results provide (indirect) evidence that firms which are owned by their
parent with a higher ownership share are engaged in a higher level of profit shifting.
However, robust results can also be inferred without centering the ownership share
in the interaction term (see Column (5) and (6) of Table 2.6). It is evident that with
this little modification all coefficients of Regressions (5) and (6) are equal to the re-
spective results in the similar Specifications (1) and (4), except for the tax differential.
As mentioned above, multicollinearity leads here to higher standard errors of the tax
differential’s coefficient estimates which strongly reduces the significance but leaves the
coefficients unbiased. Now, the coefficient of the tax differential alone generally repre-
sents the effect of the tax difference on pre-tax profits for an ownership share of zero.
Thus, with an increasing ownership share the total effect of the tax differential (the
sum of both coefficients) decreases, and gets negative at an ownership share of 49% (for
Regression (5)). Above this share, the effect of the tax differential on pre-tax profits
is negative. Focusing on this group, a further increase in the ownership share, holding
the tax differential fixed, intensifies profit shifting in the sense that the sum of both
coefficients decreases further.
Note that the result of this subsection can also be derived estimating separate samples
with different ownership thresholds. In doing so, the absolute values of the coefficient
estimates of the tax differential are continuously decreasing with a lower parent’s own-
ership share in its subsidiary. The coefficient for wholly owned subsidiaries is estimated
with −2.3. For example, for subsidiaries owned by the parent with less than 100%, less
than 75% and less than 66.67%, the tax differential coefficient is estimated with −1.9,
−1.6 and −1.2 respectively. Finally, for an ownership threshold of <51%, the coefficient
estimate of the tax rate difference to the parent is no longer significantly different from
zero.
In the end, one might raise potential endogeneity concerns on the ownership share
variable as the degree of ownership could be a choice parameter in the firm’s set of
strategic decisions and thus might not be exogenous to the profit shifting decision. To
alleviate this possible problem, the ownership share information in the cross-section
regressions could be lagged by one or two years, respectively. Alternatively, the owner-
ship share variable could also be instrumented by lagged values while applying a first-
difference approach as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). However, a proper
analysis of such robustness checks require ownership information of past years and
therefore has to be left for future research.
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2.5 Conclusions
This paper provides indirect evidence of profit shifting activities by multinational en-
terprises (MNEs) within the EU–25 applying a panel analysis with the European micro
database AMADEUS. In addition, the estimations show that a higher parent’s owner-
ship share of its subsidiary leads to an increase in the level of shifting activities between
these two affiliates, and vice versa. Robust empirical evidence for this positive impact
of the ownership share on the intensity of shifting is scarce in the existing literature.
I incorporate this ownership effect of enhanced or reduced shifting possibilities, re-
spectively, in a well-established simple theoretical model of profit shifting. The main
hypotheses for the econometric specifications are derived from this stylized model.
For identifying profit shifting behavior, I explain variations in pre-tax profitability of
profit-making multinational subsidiaries located in the EU–25 with the statutory tax
rate difference of these affiliates to their respective foreign parent firms, while control-
ling for a range of firm and country variables. I apply a panel analysis for the years
1995 to 2005 with OLS fixed-effects estimations controlling for unobservable subsidiary
characteristics. The regressions indicate a highly significant negative impact of the tax
differential on profits before taxation which is consistent with profit shifting behavior.
Quantitatively, the results suggest an increase in a subsidiary’s pre-tax profitability of
7.3% if the statutory tax rate difference (between the subsidiary and its foreign parent
firm) decreases by 10 percentage points. Several fundamental robustness checks con-
firm the profit shifting inference, e.g. a comparison of the tax rate effects of MNEs with
those of domestic individual companies.
A precise comparison of semi-elasticities of different empirical studies is complicated
in most cases as data structure and methodology, especially with respect to the tax
measure for identifying shifting activities, varies in the literature. However, in com-
parison to the overall empirical literature using U.S. data, my results suggest that the
supposition of more extensive profit shifting activities in Europe than in the U.S., due
to large tax rate differences between many neighboring states and the predominating
tax exemption system within the EU, cannot be confirmed. Even though e.g. Grubert
and Mutti (1991) or Hines and Rice (1994) apply cross-section estimations without
the feasibility to control for unobserved fixed firm effects which generally might yield
overestimated tax effects, their calculated semi-elasticities of reported profits with re-
spect to the statutory tax rate are still very large (−6.3 in the case of Hines and Rice,
1994; cf. my respective coefficient estimate of −1.9 in Column (3) of Table 2.3). Fur-
thermore, my semi-elasticity with respect to the tax differential of −.73 is by about
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one fourth smaller as the analogous one estimated in a recent study by Huizinga and
Laeven (2008) who undertake a cross-section analysis for the year 1999 also with the
AMADEUS database. If for instance better managers who yield higher profits are more
often located in a low-tax country, my study would capture this unobservable affiliate
characteristic by the fixed-effects approach and thus obtains smaller tax effects.
However, the robust empirical results of this paper indicate a statistically and also
an economically significant effect of corporate taxes on the location of profit. More pre-
cisely, the allocation of gross profits is distorted by the statutory tax rate differential
to the parent firm. Therefore, the shifting of profits from high-tax to low-tax countries
seems to be relevant and can result in a substantial bias of national tax revenues in
Europe. Hence, in the light of my results, concerning the advantage of abolishing trans-
fer pricing problems, there is an argument for the European Commission’s proposed
changeover from the current EU corporate tax principle of separate accounting to a
system of formula apportionment which substantially reduces the incentives for profit
shifting activities.
With respect to the estimated positive ownership effect on the shifting intensity,
under the principle of separate accounting, one policy implication for the tax audit by
national fiscal authorities might be to condition the investigation intensity of MNEs’
intra-company transactions with foreign affiliates on the level of the respective share-
holding. Due to the time-intensive and complex assessment of transfer pricing docu-
mentations, this selection could improve the efficiency of the auditing.
Chapter 3
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3.1 Introduction
In recent years, intangible assets have gained increasing importance in the corporate
production process (e.g. Hall, 2001). Since access to financial capital has been sub-
stantially improved, key physical assets are less scarce (Zingales, 2000) and intangible
factors related to product innovation and marketing are increasingly seen as the key
to competitive success (Edmans, 2007). Hence, intangibles like patents, trademarks,
customer lists and copyrights have become major determinants of firm value. This de-
velopment is especially significant in multinational enterprises (MNEs).1 While until
the early 1990ies, MNEs commonly raised little or no fee from their corporate affil-
iates for the use of patents or trademarks, owners of these intangibles have - in line
with updated legal regulations and accounting standards - started to charge for their
immaterial goods and, thus, intangibles-related intra-firm trade has surged.
Since then, an increasing number of anecdotes has reported that MNEs transfer
their valuable intangible property to low-tax jurisdictions. Famous examples are Pfizer,
Bristol-Myers Squibb and Microsoft which have relocated a considerable part of their
research and development (R&D) units and patents from their home countries to Ire-
land (see e.g. Simpson, 2005, on Microsoft’s R&D transfer). Others founded trademark
holding companies in tax havens that own and administer the group’s brands and li-
censes. E.g. Vodafone’s intangible properties are held by an Irish subsidiary, and Shell’s
central brand management is located at a Swiss affiliate from where it charges royalties
to operating subsidiaries worldwide. Moreover, an increasing number of financial con-
sultancies advocates multinational tax planning strategies that imply the relocation of
intangible property to low-tax affiliates.2
Governments and tax authorities have raised increasing concerns about these relo-
cation examples (Hejazi, 2006). They fear that the trend to fragment corporate pro-
duction by locating value-driving intangible intermediate goods in low-tax economies
diminishes the multinational corporate tax base in their countries. Moreover, arm’s
1Empirical evidence links the presence of intangible property to the emergence of MNEs. Intangibles
are perceived to foster FDI since they ”can be easily transferred back and forth and [...] enjoy a
public good nature which makes them available to additional production facilities at relatively low
costs” (Markusen, 1995; see also Gattai, 2005).
2Examples are the British brand valuation consultancy Brand Finance plc whose client list includes
world-wide operating MNEs like British American Tabacco, Danone, Shell or Foster’s (Brand Finance
plc, 2008) and the renowned U.S. law firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Morgan Lewis & Bockius
LLP, 2007).
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length prices for firm-specific intangibles are hard to determine (see e.g. Grubert, 2003;
Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006), which gives rise to the additional concern that MNEs
may shift profits earned at production affiliates in high-tax countries to the intangibles-
holding low-tax affiliate by overstating the true transfer price for royalties and license
fees.
Surprisingly though, it has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been clarified
within an empirical framework whether these relocation examples are individual cases
or represent a systematic multinational investment pattern. We investigate this ques-
tion using panel data on European MNEs and find evidence for a statistically significant
and quantitatively relevant bias of intangible property holdings towards affiliates with
a low corporate tax rate relative to other group locations.
To receive guidance for the specification of our estimation approach, the paper starts
out with a simple model of intangible asset location. We argue that MNEs have an
incentive to relocate intangible property to low-tax countries for two reasons. First,
intangible property is increasingly perceived to be the driver of (multinational) firm
profit. As immaterial goods may easily be locally separated from other production units
in the group, the MNE has an incentive to locate them at low-tax countries in order
to tax the accruing rents at a low rate. Second, MNEs may have an incentive to locate
their intangible property at a low-tax affiliate for profit shifting reasons. Conditional on
the assumption that intra-firm trade of intellectual property rights establishes increased
transfer pricing opportunities between the intangibles owner and the group’s production
affiliates, it pays to locate intangibles at a low-tax affiliate since this generates profit
shifting channels between the intangibles-holding tax haven and all other affiliates
located in countries with a higher corporate tax rate. In contrast, intangibles location
at one of the group’s high-tax affiliates generates shifting possibilities solely between
the tax haven and the intangibles-holding firm whereas other high-tax affiliates remain
without shifting link to a low-tax country. The paper argues that for both reasons,
the location of intangible property becomes more attractive the lower the subsidiary’s
corporate tax rate relative to other group locations.
In the empirical section, we employ the firm’s balance sheet item intangible as-
sets and therefore first provide a short overview on European accounting practices
with respect to intangible assets to obtain a clear identification strategy. For the re-
gression analysis, we use a large panel dataset of multinational affiliates within the
EU–25 which is available for the years 1995 to 2005. Our data is drawn from the micro
database AMADEUS that provides detailed accounting information at the affiliate level
and allows identification of a multinational group’s ownership structure. Following our
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theoretical considerations, we determine the effect of an affiliate’s average statutory
corporate tax rate difference to other group members on its level of intangible asset in-
vestment. Controlling for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity between subsidiaries,
year effects, country characteristics and affiliate size, the results confirm our expecta-
tions and point to a robust inverse relation between the subsidiary’s statutory tax rate
relative to other group affiliates and its intangibles holdings. The effect is statistically
and economically significant and appears across a range of specification and estimation
choices that address endogeneity issues and the dynamic nature of the intangible asset
investment. Quantitatively, the estimations suggest a semi-elasticity of around −1.4,
meaning that a decrease in the average tax differential to other group affiliates by 10
percentage points raises a subsidiary’s intangible property investment by around 14%
on average. Finally, we provide evidence that suggests more extensive profit shifting
activities of MNEs which possess a higher share of their intangible holdings at low-tax
affiliates within the multinational group.
The paper adds to the literature on corporate taxation and multinational firm be-
havior. In the last years, research in this area has largely focused on the investigation
of profit shifting activities. Various papers show that affiliate pre-tax profitability is in-
versely related to the statutory corporate tax rate and the tax rate differential to other
group members, respectively (see Huizinga and Laeven, 2008, for a recent paper). These
results are usually interpreted as indirect evidence for profit shifting activities through
the distortion of multinational transfer prices and/or the group’s equity-debt struc-
ture. Our paper suggests that this profitability pattern may be established by a third
mechanism which is the relocation of profit-driving intangible property to low-tax affil-
iates. Although these relocations may also be induced by the desire to optimize transfer
pricing opportunities (as described above), the relocation of value-driving assets itself
generates the respective profitability pattern even in the absence of shifting activities.
Our paper moreover relates to existing work that connects the presence of intangible
property holdings to multinational profit shifting behavior arguing that the true price
for firm-specific intangible property is hard to control for national tax authorities and
henceforth multinationals could easily engage in transfer pricing manipulations (e.g.
Grubert, 2003). Moreover, there is some evidence that MNEs adjust their organization
and investment structure to optimize profit shifting opportunities. For example, Gru-
bert and Slemrod (1998) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) find that parent firms with
high intangible asset investments and henceforth good opportunities to engage in profit
shifting activities are most likely to invest in tax havens. Analogously, Grubert (2003)
shows that R&D intensive MNEs engage in significantly larger volumes of intra-group
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transactions and thus create more opportunities for income shifting. However, none
of these papers considers the location of intangible property within the multinational
group to be a choice variable of the MNE. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to show in a systematic econometric approach that MNEs distort the location
of their value-driving and shifting-relevant intangibles towards low-tax affiliates in the
multinational group. The only exception we are aware of is a recent paper by Grubert
and Mutti (2007) who point out that U.S. parents’ R&D investment has become a
weak predictor for royalty payments from foreign subsidiaries to the U.S. parent but
simultaneously strongly enlarges the earnings of group affiliates located in tax havens.
They interpret their results to reflect the parents’ incentive to found hybrid entities in
tax havens and to reach favorable cost-sharing agreements on R&D investment with
them. The hybrids then sell patent licenses to high-tax production affiliates and receive
the corresponding royalty payments as earnings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents a simple
model to derive the hypothesis tested in the empirical part. We provide an overview
on European accounting rules for intangibles and our identification strategy in Section
3.3. In Section 3.4, we describe our data and the sample construction. Section 3.5 states
the different estimation methodologies. The estimation results are presented in Section
3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 A Simple Model of Intangible Asset Location
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate if corporate taxes distort the location
of intangible assets within MNEs as suggested by anecdotal evidence. In the following,
we illustrate the underlying rationale for this distortion in a simple theoretical model.
Precisely, we analyze the impact of corporate taxation on two multinational decision
margins: firstly, on the MNE’s choice at which of the multinational affiliates to create
an intangible asset and secondly, on the decision whether to transfer ownership of the
asset to another affiliate after creation.
We consider a MNE with n > 2 production affiliates. The MNE’s output production
requires an intangible input which is a common good created within the boundaries of
the MNE (e.g. to avoid knowledge dissipation, see Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Fosfuri,
2000; Markusen, 2001; Gattai and Molteni, 2007).3 For simplicity reasons, we assume
3Following previous papers, we consider the intangible to be a public good that is used as an intermedi-
ate input into production (see e.g. Eden, 1998). Pure public goods are both joint and non-excludable.
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that it is only feasible to create and administer the intangible at two out of the n
multinational affiliates which are located in countries ` and h.4 The corporate profit
earned at these affiliates is taxed at the rates t` and th whereas we assume without loss
of generality that the host country of affiliate h imposes the higher statutory corporate
tax rate than the host country of affiliate ` and consequently, th > t`.
The creation of the intangible asset incurs costs C. Its development is risky in the
sense that the gross value (before costs) P of the intangible capturing the sum of
the discounted royalty payments is determined by a random process.5 The intangible
is created at affiliate i ∈ {`, h}. After creation, the MNE has the option to retain
ownership of the asset at the production location or to transfer the asset to the other
affiliate. The location of (final) ownership is denoted by j ∈ {`, h}. If the asset is
transferred between the affiliates, a transfer price Ti,j is paid from the acquiring firm j
to the producer i.
We consider the true transfer price for this sale to be T˜ = α(P − C) + C, with
α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, in a comparable unrelated party transaction the selling party would
receive a share α of the asset return P − C. T˜ is assumed to be unobservable by the
national tax authorities and thus the MNE may choose a transfer price Ti,j that deviates
from T˜ to shift profits to low-tax locations (see e.g. Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000, for a
similar modeling strategy).6 It is widely acknowledged that transfer prices for intangible
goods are especially easy to distort as comparable unrelated party transactions often do
not exist and the intangibles value is more volatile and thus more difficult to determine
than the value of tangible goods. Nevertheless, deviations of the transfer price from T˜
plausibly incur costs which we denote by K. These costs can either be interpreted as
concealment effort undertaken by the firm to hide the transfer price distortion from
the tax authority or alternatively as expected fine payments if price deviations are
detected by the officials. Both explanations suggest that the costs K convexly increase
While jointness in consumption is decisive in our context (i.e. once produced, the intangible can be
provided to an additional production affiliate at zero costs), non-excludability is less important.
4The other affiliates may, for example, lack access to the necessary human capital which is required
to create and/or administer intangible property.
5In general, the value of an intangible asset can result from several sources: the intangible may for
example reduce the plants’ production costs, shift the demand curves upwards or make them less
elastic, or create a new product different from the existing one.
6The OECD transfer pricing guidelines explicitly suggest to determine the transfer price for intangible
assets according to comparable unrelated party transactions if this is feasible (see OECD, 2009).
Consequently, the true transfer price T˜ depends on the bargaining power of the acquiring and selling
parties in a comparable market transaction.
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in the difference between Ti,j and T˜ . Formally, K = K(Ti,j − T˜ ), with K(0) = 0,
sign(K ′) = sign(Ti,j − T˜ ) and K ′′ > 0.
The MNE’s after-tax profit pii,j thus depends on its location choice for the intangible
asset production (affiliate i) and the ultimate intangible ownership (affiliate j), with
i, j ∈ {`, h}. The MNE chooses between four location options: creating the intangible
at affiliate i and retaining ownership there (i = j) or creating it at affiliate i and selling
it to the other affiliate afterwards (i 6= j). Apart from the considerations laid out so
far, we assume that the MNE’s after-tax profit in the four location scenarios is affected
by a set of factors which are not explicitly modeled and which are subsumed in the
variables µi and δj for the production location and the ownership location, respectively,
with i, j ∈ {`, h}.7 Factors that may determine an affiliate’s suitability as production
and ownership location of the intangible and thus its after-tax profits are for example
differences in the access to technical equipment and human capital.
The MNE’s expected after-tax-profit in the four location scenarios is given by
E(pii,j) = (1− ti)(E(P )− C) + µi + δj if i = j (3.1)
E(pii,j) = (1− tj)(E(P )− Ti,j) + (1− ti)(Ti,j − C)−K + µi + δj if i 6= j (3.2)
with i, j ∈ {`, h}. Equation (3.1) captures scenarios in which the intangible asset
is created and owned at the same affiliate while Equation (3.2) depicts scenarios in
which the intangible is created and owned by different affiliates. The MNE is assumed
to organize its intangibles operation such that it maximizes its (expected) after-tax
profit. We consider a sequential decision process in three stages. In the first stage, the
MNE chooses at which of the affiliates to create the intangible. In the second stage,
the realization of the random intangibles value becomes observable to the MNE and
it decides whether to retain ownership with the affiliate which created the asset or
whether to transfer the ownership to the other firm. If the asset is transferred, then
the transfer price for the asset is chosen in the third stage. The model is solved by
backward induction.
In the second and third stage, the value P is known to the firm and its after-tax profit
functions henceforth become deterministic. Formally, this corresponds to Equations
(3.1) and (3.2) with E(pii,j) = pii,j and E(P ) = P . If intangibles production and
ownership are assigned to different affiliates in the first two stages, the MNE chooses the
transfer price Ti,j in the third stage by maximizing Equation (3.2) under consideration
7For simplicity reasons, we abstract from any tax-consequences of µi and δj . They may be considered
to reflect additional or reduced volumes of equity finance and henceforth non-tax-deductible capital
investments necessary to create and administer the intangible property.
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of E(pii,j) = pii,j and E(P ) = P . The associated first order condition reads
tj − ti = K ′(Ti,j), i, j ∈ {`, h} , i 6= j. (3.3)
If i = h and j = `, the asset is sold from the high-tax producer to the low-tax affiliate.
According to Equation (3.3), the MNE thus understates the transfer price Ti,j < T˜
in order to shift profits from h to `. Analogously, if i = ` and j = h, the scenario is
reversed and thus Ti,j > T˜ .
8
Conditional on the production location, the MNE decides in the second stage whether
to retain ownership of the asset with the production affiliate or whether to relocate it.
If the asset is produced in h, it is relocated after the creation to affiliate ` if φ1 = pih,`−
pih,h > 0. Plugging in Equations (3.1) and (3.2) under consideration of E(pii,j) = pii,j
and E(P ) = P reads
φ1 = pih,` − pih,h = (th − t`)(P − Th,`)−K(Th,`) + δ` − δh. (3.4)
The goal of our analysis is to determine whether corporate taxation exerts an impact
on the ownership of the intangible property. Making use of the envelope theorem and
Equation (3.3), comparative statics for Equation (3.4) derive ∂φ1/∂(th − t`) = P −
Th,` ≥ 0 (see also Footnote 8). Intuitively, a rise in the corporate tax rate differential
enhances the incentive to relocate the asset to the low-tax country as this ensures that
a fraction of the asset’s return is taxed at the low rate t`. Moreover, the incentive for
relocation in response to tax changes rises in the realization of the asset value. To
see this, assume that the MNE does not engage in profit shifting activities and thus,
Th,` = T˜ = C + α(P − C). It then follows that ∂2φ1/(∂(th − t`)∂P ) = 1 − α ≥ 0.
Consequently, the higher the intangible value, the larger is the incentive to transfer
the asset to the low-tax country. Furthermore, small marginal costs K ′ and hence a
low transfer price Th,` enhance the attractiveness of asset relocations in response to tax
rate differentials.
Analogously, if the asset is produced in `, it is retained at affiliate ` if
φ2 = pi`,` − pi`,h = (th − t`)(P − T`,h) +K(T`,h) + δ` − δh > 0. (3.5)
Comparative statics with respect to th−t` derive ∂φ2/∂(th−t`) = (P−T`,h) ≥ 0. Thus,
the probability of asset relocation to h decreases in the tax rate differential whereas
the marginal tax effect tends to be larger, the larger the asset value.9 This leads to the
following hypothesis.
8 For simplicity reasons, we assume P ≥ Ti,j ≥ C with i, j ∈ {`, h} as we consider this to reflect the
dominating real-world scenario which is relevant for our empirical analysis.
9Note that the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines suggest to take the intangibles’ costs as one reference
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Hypothesis 1.
The probability that the intangible asset is owned by the affiliate in the low-tax country
` increases in the tax rate difference between h and `.
In the first stage, the MNE chooses the production location, anticipating its optimal
ownership location and transfer price set at later stages. With ownership in `, the
production is equally undertaken in ` if
φ3 = E(pi`,`)− E(pih,`) = (th − t`)(Th,` − C) +K(Th,`) + µ` − µh > 0. (3.6)
Accounting for Equation (3.3), comparative statics derive ∂φ3/∂(th − t`) = Th,` −C ≥
0.10 Intuitively, the larger the tax rate differential, the higher is the incentive to produce
the asset in `. This effect becomes larger, the larger the value Th,`−C tied to the asset
creation. Consequently, increases in the tax differential enhance the probability that
the asset is self-produced by the intangibles-owning affiliate `. Note though that this
effect decreases with falling transfer pricing costs as a small K implies a low transfer
price Th,` which makes intangibles production in h less unattractive. Analogously, with
ownership of the asset at affiliate h, it is produced at affiliate ` if
φ4 = E(pi`,h)− E(pih,h) = (th − t`)(T`,h − C)−K(T`,h) + µ` − µh > 0. (3.7)
Again, we find ∂φ4/∂(th−t`) = (T`,h−C) ≥ 0 and thus a rise in the tax rate differential
enhances the probability of production at ` and hence lowers the probability of self-
creation in this scenario. This is captured by the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2.
With intangibles ownership in the low-tax (high-tax) country, increases in the tax rate
differential th − t` enhance (lower) the probability of self-creation.
Summing up, this section shows that MNEs have an incentive to bias the ownership
of intangible assets within the group towards low-tax affiliates as this ensures that
(part of) the asset return is taxed at a low rate. Moreover, it is shown that especially
value when determining the transfer price as they can be more easily determined than discounted
profits which arise from the asset, in particular as the latter are commonly earned with a time-lag
(see OECD, 2009). This would suggest that it is easier for an MNE to distort the transfer price
downwards in the direction of the costs C than upwards in the direction of P which makes asset sales
from high-tax to low-tax affiliates specially attractive. In this context also note that tax authorities
in the EU commonly refrain from strategies which imply readjustments of the asset value at later
points.
10Note that in our model the transfer price chosen is independent of the realized value of P but
depends on E(P ), costs K and the tax rate differential th − t` only.
Chapter 3 – Corporate Taxes & Location of Intangibles 43
high-value intangibles are located in low-tax economies and that the probability of self-
creation rises (falls) in the tax differential if the asset is held at the low-tax (high-tax)
affiliate. Our empirical analysis will test Hypothesis 1 and determine the sensitivity of
intangibles ownership to changes in the tax differential. Hypothesis 2 is important for
our empirical analysis since the decision whether to self-create or acquire the asset may
affect our estimation model as is described in the next section.
Note in this context that our model is stylized in the sense that we abstract from
any profit shifting benefits which are attached to intangibles ownership at the low
tax affiliate. Accounting for this enforces our model predictions. As laid out above,
intangible assets are often used as inputs for the production and sales process and
are commonly employed by several affiliates within the group. Thus, the intangibles-
owning firm receives royalty payments for the use of the intangible from several of
the n group members. As royalty prices or license fees for intangible property are
perceived to be easily distorted this opens up profit shifting opportunities between the
intangibles-owning affiliate and the other production affiliates in the corporate group.
Intuitively, holding intangibles at a low-tax affiliate generates a profit shifting link
between the intangibles-holding tax haven affiliate and all other group members. There-
fore, profit may be shifted from each high-tax affiliate to the intangibles-holding firm in
the low-tax country. In contrast, if the intangibles were located at one of the high-tax
affiliates, the MNE would gain only one profit shifting link to the tax haven affiliate
while all other affiliates in high-tax countries would lack shifting opportunities to a low-
tax country. This provides an additional incentive to locate the ownership of intangible
assets at affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate.
3.3 Accounting for Intangible Assets and
Identification Strategy
In the following sections, we will empirically test for Hypothesis 1 of Section 3.2 and de-
termine whether MNEs have a tendency to locate intangible assets at low-tax countries
in order to shift profits there. For this purpose, we employ information on corporate
accounts for a large set of subsidiaries in Europe and use the unconsolidated intangible
asset item on the firms’ balance sheet as a proxy for the intangible property located at
the affiliate.
As our identification strategy is affected by regulations of our European sample
countries for the capitalization of intangibles on the balance sheet, this section shortly
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describes the associated accounting rules.11 The company accounts in our sample are
filed on the basis of the local generally accepted accounting practices (local GAAP) in
the European host countries and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
do not play a role for our analysis.12 These local GAAP regulations allow for the
capitalization of various types of intangible assets on the balance sheet if three criteria
are fulfilled: first, the intangible has to be an identifiable nonmonetary asset without
physical substance, second, the asset has to be controlled by the enterprise as a result
of past events (e.g. purchase or self-creation) and third, the asset has to be related to
future economic benefits (inflow of cash or other assets).13 For our sample countries,
intangibles have to be capitalized irrespective of whether the asset is self-created by
the considered firm or bought from another party. Exceptions to the latter regulation
are the countries of Austria, Denmark and Germany which follow the U.S. in allowing
only acquired intangible property to be recognized on the balance sheet.14
This difference in the accounting rules may thus affect the level of intangible as-
sets captured on the balance sheet. However, it is unproblematic as our identification
strategy determines the semi-elasticity of a firm’s intangibles to changes in corporate
tax measures. The identification is affected only if the decision whether to buy or self-
create an intangible asset is dependent on corporate taxes. As shown in Hypothesis
2 of Section 3.2, an increase in the tax rate differential between high-tax and low-tax
affiliates enhances (lowers) the probability of self-creation if the asset is held at the
11For detailed information see e.g. Alexander and Nobes (1994), Alexander and Archer (1995), Nexia
International (1997), Jeny-Cazavan and Stolowy (2001), Alexander and Archer (2003), Alexander,
Nobes, and Ullathorne (2007), and the books from the European Commission’s series European
Financial Reporting which are available for a large set of European countries, e.g. Lefebvre and
Flower (1994) and Ghirri and Riccaboni (1995).
12In 1999, the European Union proposed that quoted firms within European borders should adopt
IFRS (including IAS 38 for the capitalization of intangible property) for their consolidated accounts.
The regulation became obligatory for quoted corporations in 2005. As our analysis however relies
on unconsolidated accounting data for the years 1995–2005 and the balance sheet information is
exclusively based on national accounting standards (local GAAP), IFRS accounting is not relevant
for our study.
13Examples for intangible assets are patents, licenses, copyrights, brands/trademarks, marketing
rights, computer software, customer lists, mortgage servicing rights, import quotas, franchises, cus-
tomer and supplier relationships, or motion picture films.
14Within these broad categories, the precise regulations may differ between countries. For example, in
Denmark development cost can as an exception be recognized on the balance sheet. In Ireland, Italy
and the UK the capitalization of research costs is not allowed (only of development costs) in the
contrary to other EU countries (apart from Austria, Denmark and Germany). In addition, France
does not allow for the capitalization of self-created brands.
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low-tax (high-tax) affiliate. This implies, that the decision margin whether to buy or
self-create the intangible biases our results against zero if self-created assets are not
capitalized on the balance sheet.15 Thus, our results should be considered as a lower
bound to the true effect.
Moreover, note that our theoretical model is stylized in the sense that we account for
the cases of self-production and acquisition of an asset by the intangibles-administering
affiliate only. In practice, MNEs are however also perceived to transfer profits related
to intangibles to low-tax affiliates by subcontracting, engaging in cost-sharing agree-
ments, or by sublicensing. First, subcontracting implies that a fraction of the R&D
or marketing department has to be located in the low-tax country. These low-tax
units then subcontract projects to affiliates in high-tax countries. The latter earn a
fixed margin on their costs (cost-plus method) while the low-tax affiliate bears the risk
of the project and consequently earns all residual profits. This scenario of ’contract
research’ is equivalent to our model case of self-production. Second, the MNE may
engage in cost-sharing contracts in which the costs and benefits of the intangible are
shared between the affiliates. Cost-sharing arrangements are particularly common in
U.S.-parented groups, due to specific U.S. tax rules relating to cost-sharing which can
make them advantageous from a U.S. federal tax perspective. In Europe, cost-sharing
agreements are less employed and are mainly used to split the costs and benefits of ad-
ministrative functions within MNEs (see e.g. Boone, Smits, and Verlinden, 2003). One
particularity of cost-sharing agreements is that if the affiliate buys into a cost-sharing
agreement after a part of the asset creation, then it has to make a buy-in payment
which has to be capitalized on the balance sheet in all our sample countries. Last, the
MNE may transfer profits by licensing the intangible to a low-tax affiliate which then
sub-licenses the asset to other group affiliates. Again, in this scenario the license is
recognized on the affiliate’s balance sheet in all our sample countries.
Hence, intangible assets are capitalized in most of our sample countries irrespective of
how the affiliate obtained intangibles ownership. We absorb any remaining heterogene-
ity in the local GAAP regulations by applying a firm fixed effects econometric approach.
In Austria, Denmark and Germany, self-created intangibles (including sub-contracting)
are not captured in the company accounts while acquired intangibles (including licenses
which allow for sub-licensing, and buy-in payments into cost-sharing agreements) are
15Strictly speaking, a similar although less pronounced pattern is expected for the other sample
countries besides Austria, Denmark and Germany, as bought intangibles are capitalized at the
acquisition price while self-created intangibles are capitalized at costs.
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capitalized.16 Therefore, in a sensitivity test to our empirical analysis, we exclude firms
located in these three countries and find no significant change in our quantitative re-
sults (see Table 3.6 in Section 3.6.4). In general, we consider the MNE’s decision how to
transfer intangible asset ownership to low-tax countries within the group to be strongly
firm-specific.17 As it affects the location choice of R&D and marketing units with core
functions for the MNE, we do not consider this decision margin to be very tax-sensitive.
However, if it is affected, it is likely to bias our results against zero as explained above,
as increases in the tax differential enhance the attractiveness of self-creation (which
may result in non-capitalization for some countries) at the low-tax affiliate opposed to
acquisition or licensing from a high-tax firm because the latter imply less value to be
transferred to the tax haven.18
Last, we have to account for the fact that the intangible asset item on the bal-
ance sheet may comprise goodwill defined as the price of a firm minus its book value.
While self-created goodwill (so-called original goodwill), e.g. training costs and ad-
vertising/promotional costs, is not allowed to be capitalized and must be charged to
expense, all countries included in our sample regulate goodwill to be included in the
balance sheet only if it has been acquired through purchase (so-called derivative good-
will). To avoid that our analysis is affected by a firm’s M&A activities, we drop all
firms that took over another company via a M&A (identified through Bureau van Dijk’s
ZEPHYR database) and thus avoid problems related to the capitalization of goodwill.
16Note however that even with self-creation, some costs related to the intangible asset project may
be capitalized on the balance sheets in these three countries, e.g. costs for law pursuits to secure a
patent. This implies that irrespective of the way in which the intangible ownership was obtained,
some costs may be recognized on the balance sheet. To exploit this possibility, we run some binary
specifications which account for non-zero values of the intangibles item on the balance sheet.
17MNEs may, for example, have a set of traditional intangibles (owned by the firm for a longer period)
that it may want to transfer to another affiliate which is possible by means of sale or licensing only.
Moreover, self-creation in low-tax countries may be unattractive as it implies the relocation of the
intangibles creating unit. This partly even applies if the project is launched by the low-tax affiliate
and subcontracted to the creation center in the high-tax affiliate as the decision-making research
and marketing management has to be located at the low-tax affiliate. In the latter case, the MNE
may also be prone to agency problems caused by the geographic distance between the risk-bearing
unit and the intangibles-creating unit (see e.g. Dischinger and Riedel, 2009, or Chapter 4 of this
thesis, respectively).
18Licensing agreements imply only restricted profit-transfers to low-tax countries as with sub-licensing
the low-tax affiliate can charge only a small mark-up on the original license fee (cost-plus method).
Chapter 3 – Corporate Taxes & Location of Intangibles 47
3.4 Data
Our empirical analysis employs the commercial database AMADEUS which is com-
piled by Bureau van Dijk. The version of the database available to us contains detailed
information on firm structure and accounting of 1.6 million national and multinational
corporations in 38 European countries from 1993 to 2006, but is unbalanced in struc-
ture.19 We focus on the EU–25 and on the time period of 1995–2005 as these countries
and years are sufficiently represented by the database. The observational units of our
analysis are multinational subsidiaries within the EU–25.20 Since our analysis also
requires data on the subsidiary’s parent company (e.g. the number and location of
the parent’s subsidiaries), we investigate only subsidiaries whose parents are likewise
located within the EU–25 and on which information is available in the AMADEUS
database.
Moreover, our analysis accounts only for industrial subsidiaries whose foreign parent
is likewise an industrial corporation and owns at least three subsidiaries (by more
than 90% of the ownership shares). The latter assumption ensures that the MNEs in
our sample exhibit a sufficient size so that strategical allocation of intangibles may
emerge. In addition, we restrict the sample to multinational groups that actually own
immaterial assets, i.e. either the parent or at least one of its subsidiaries has to hold
intangibles. Furthermore, we drop MNEs which observe a negative profit at all group
affiliates throughout the sample period since they are then not subject to positive tax
payments and profitability and/or profit shifting considerations are irrelevant. Last, we
drop firms that took over another firm via a M&A using the ZEPHYR database which
is equally provided by Bureau van Dijk. In doing this, we hedge against any effects
resulting from the mandatory recognition of purchased goodwill in the balance sheet
(as self-created goodwill is not allowed to activate in any country).
Our sample contains firms from all EU–25 countries except Cyprus and Malta. The
country statistics are presented in Table 3.1.21 The intangibles measure is the balance
19The AMADEUS database is also widely used outside the scientific community. For example, tax
authorities (e.g. in Germany and France) are known to rely on AMADEUS for their monitoring
activities. The same is true for tax consultancies (e.g. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and KPMG).
20Our criteria of being a MNE is the existence of a foreign immediate shareholder (parent) which
holds at least 90% of the affiliate’s ownership shares. The data restriction to firms which are owned
by 90% or more ensures that the potential location of profit and intangibles at this subsidiary is
relevant for the multinational group.
21Although it is a legal requirement for German and Austrian companies to file their accounts at the
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sheet item intangible fixed assets.22 Since many firms in the database report no in-
formation on this variable, our panel data consists of 44,739 observations from 6,619
multinational subsidiaries for the years 1995–2005. Hence, we observe each affiliate for
6.8 years on average.
The AMADEUS data has the drawback that information on the ownership structure
is available for the last reported date only which is the year 2004 for most observations
in our sample. Thus, in the context of our panel study, there exists some scope for
government registries which is the main source of the AMADEUS data, not all companies comply.
Consequently there are several German and Austrian companies on AMADEUS with limited or even
no financial information.
22All balance sheet and profit & loss account items in our analysis are exported from the AMADEUS
database in unconsolidated values. See Section 3.3 for an overview of European accounting rules for
intangible assets.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Subsidiary firms only:
Statutory Corporate Tax RateN 44,739 .3334 .345 .1 .5676
Avg. Tax Difference to All Other AffiliatesH 42,994 -.0071 -.0030 -.3817 .2865
Intangible Fixed AssetsF 44,739 3,303 3 0 1.03e+07
Dummy Intangible Assets 44,739 .5501 1 0 1
SalesF 37,112 76,107 13,076 1 1.58e+07
Ratio Intangible Assets to Sales 37,112 .022 .0006 0 .9284
Country R&D Expenditures (in % of GDP)I 42,215 1.767 1.833 .3637 4.251
Corruption IndexJ 42,215 7.11 7.10 2.70 10
Population (in million)• 42,215 35.45 39.64 .4336 82.54
GDP per Capita (in thousand Euro)• 42,215 21.93 23.63 2.485 60.31
Growth Rate GDP per Capita (in %)I 42,215 2.391 2.178 -1.496 11.19
Parent firms only:
Intangible Fixed AssetsF 35,554 65,390 583 0 1.98e+07
SalesF 35,554 1,697,070 96,330 1 7.78e+07
Ratio Intangible Assets to Sales 35,554 .0775 .0086 0 3.467
Number of Subsidiaries 35,554 80.4 29 3 752
Notes: Firm data is exported from the AMADEUS database, TOP-1.5-Million-Version, October 2006.
N Obtained from the European Commission (2006) and from KPMG International (2006).
H Average Tax Difference to All Other Affiliates calculated as: statutory corporate tax rate of the
considered subsidiary minus the unweighted average statutory corporate tax rate of all other group
members, comprising subsidiaries (owned with at least 90% of the ownership shares) and the parent
firm.
F Unconsolidated values, in thousand US dollars, current prices.
 Takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary owns intangible assets and 0 otherwise.
I Obtained from the World Development Indicators (June 2009) of the World Bank.
J From Transparency International (TI), ranks from 0 (extreme level of corruption) to 10 (free of
corruption).
• Taken from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat).
 Only subsidiaries owned with ≥ 90% of the ownership shares.
misclassifications of parent-subsidiary-connections since the ownership structure may
have changed over the sample period. However, in line with previous studies, we are
not too concerned about this issue since the described misclassifications introduce noise
to our estimations that will bias our results towards zero (see e.g. Budd, Konings, and
Slaughter, 2005).
Table 3.2 displays the sample statistics. The mean of the intangible asset variable is
calculated with 3.3 million US dollars at the subsidiary level (however with a median
value of 3 thousand) and with 65.4 million at the parent level (again with a much smaller
median of 583 thousand). To compare the intangible investment on the subsidiary and
on the parent level in relative terms, we calculate the ratio of intangible assets to
sales. The mean of this ratio is calculated with 2.2% for subsidiaries and with 7.8% for
Chapter 3 – Corporate Taxes & Location of Intangibles 50
parent firms. We moreover define a variable Dummy Intangible Assets which takes on
the value 1 if a subsidiary owns intangible assets and 0 otherwise. The sample average is
measured to be .5501 and hence 55% of the subsidiaries in our sample hold intangible
property. In addition, the affiliates in our data belong to multinational groups with
on average 80.4 subsidiaries that are owned by at least 90% of the ownership shares.
This rather high mean value is driven by a few very large MNEs, as the median of
the subsidiary number distribution is calculated with 29. Furthermore, on average, a
subsidiary observes sales of 76.1 million US dollars.
We additionally merge data on the statutory corporate tax rate at the subsidiary
and parent location, as well as basic country characteristics like GDP per capita (as
a proxy for the degree of development), population (as a proxy for the market size),
GDP per capita growth rate (as a proxy for the economic situation), R&D expenditures
in percentage of GDP (as a proxy for the research potential), and a corruption index
(as a proxy for the quality of the legal system or the intellectual property protection
respectively).23 For the subsidiaries in our sample, the statutory corporate tax rate
spreads from 10.0% to 56.8% whereas the mean is calculated with 33.3%. Our theo-
retical considerations presuppose that the level of intangible assets may moreover be
inversely related to an affiliate’s corporate tax rate relative to other group members.
We therefore define the average tax difference to all other affiliates which is the un-
weighted average statutory corporate tax rate difference between a subsidiary and all
other affiliates of the corporate group (including the parent) that are owned by at least
90% of the ownership shares. This tax difference spreads from −38.2% to 28.7% with
a mean of −.7%. Although our subsidiary sample comprises European firms only, the
calculation of the average tax difference to all other affiliates accounts for information
on the worldwide structure of the corporate group which is generally available with the
AMADEUS data. However, for non-European subsidiaries, this information comprises
only the subsidiaries’ names, hosting countries and ownership shares but no account-
ing information. Therefore, an appropriate weighting procedure for our tax difference
variable is not feasible and we employ an unweighted average tax measure.24
23The statutory tax rate data for the EU–25 is taken from the European Commission (2006). Our
analysis will moreover rely on tax rates for group affiliates outside the EU as will be explained
below. This data is obtained from KPMG International (2006). Country data for GDP per capita
and population size are taken from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), for GDP per capita
growth rate and R&D expenditures in percentage of GDP are obtained from the World Development
Indicators (June 2009) of the World Bank, and for the corruption index are from Transparency
International.
24We experimented with size-weighted equivalents of this average tax difference variable for European
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Figure 3.1: Parent Level Intangible Assets over Time
(Mean of all observations per year, in thousand US dollars, current prices)
Figure 3.2: Subsidiary Level Intangible Assets over Time
(Mean of all observations per year, in thousand US dollars, current prices)
Last, the descriptive statistics strongly confirm the increasing importance of intan-
gible property in corporate production over the last decade. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 report
the average level of intangible asset investment at parents and subsidiaries in our sam-
ple between 1995 and 2005. While the average parent firm owns substantially more
intangible property than the average subsidiary, the mean value steeply rises for both
types over the years which is in line with previous findings in the literature (e.g. Hall,
2001). Figures 3.3 and 3.4 display on a yearly basis the average ratio of intangible
assets to sales and to total assets, respectively. The picture of Figure 3.3, together with
affiliates. Since the application of a weighting scheme is only sensible if we observe information on
the subsidiaries’ size variable for all or at least the vast majority of the group affiliates, this leads
to a drastic reduction in sample size as the information on affiliate accounts is often not available
for a sufficient number of group subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we found the application of weighted
tax measures to lead to qualitatively comparable results which are available from the authors upon
request.
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Figure 3.3: Ratio Intangible Assets to Sales over Time
(Mean of all observations per year)
Figure 3.4: Ratio Intangible Assets to Total Assets over Time
(Mean of all observations per year)
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, suggests that sales at subsidiaries also significantly rises over the
sample years while sales at parent firms decrease or stay constant. Figure 3.4 shows
that intangibles relative to total assets likewise increase between 1995 and 2005 for
parents as well as for subsidiaries in an almost equal magnitude.
3.5 Econometric Approach
We employ different methodological approaches to test Hypothesis 1 formulated in
Section 3.2. The following subsections present our baseline estimation model and alter-
native model specifications that account for a binary dependent variable, endogeneity
issues, and a dynamic estimation model of intangible asset investment.
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3.5.1 Baseline Estimation Model
In our baseline regression, we estimate an OLS model of the following form
log(yit) = β1 + β2τit + β3Xit + β4log(ait) + ρt + φi + it (3.8)
with yit =(intangible assets +1). Since the distribution of intangible asset investment
of subsidiary i at time t is considerably skewed, we employ a logarithmic transforma-
tion of the level of intangible assets as dependent variable. Furthermore, a substantial
fraction (45%) of the subsidiaries in our dataset does not hold any intangible assets at
all and thus, we follow previous studies (e.g. Plassmann and Tideman, 2001; Alesina,
Barro, and Tenreyro, 2002; Hilary and Lennox, 2005; Weichenrieder, 2009) and add
a small constant (= 1) to our intangibles variable to avoid that zero-observations are
excluded from the estimation. The explanatory variable of central interest is τit which
stands the subsidiary’s statutory corporate tax rate difference to all other affiliates of
the multinational group (that are owned with at least 90% of the ownership shares)
including the parent. One might also consider to apply the effective marginal tax rate
differences to identify the subsidiary’s marginal intangibles investment (see also Dev-
ereux and Griffith, 1998). However, commonly available effective marginal (and aver-
age) tax rates usually refer to investment projects in the manufacturing industry and
do not appropriately reflect intangibles related investments. Since deductibility rules
may substantially differ between investment forms, we do not consider these effective
tax measures to suit well in our regression context and employ the statutory tax rate
as a proxy instead. Given the commonly reported high correlation between the effec-
tive marginal and the statutory corporate tax rates, we consider this approach to be
valid.25 Moreover, as suggested by the model in Section 3.2, the statutory corporate
tax rate difference simultaneously captures the incentive to locate intangible property
at low-tax countries for profit shifting purposes.
ait stands for the total sales of subsidiary i at time t. Thereby, we condition in-
tangible asset investments on affiliate size which may be decisive since otherwise our
tax measure might reflect the widely-tested negative impact of corporate taxation on
subsidiary size only. It is well-known that low corporate tax rates foster affiliate invest-
ment and vice versa. If large affiliates also tend to hold high investments in intangible
property, an estimated corporate tax effect without controlling for firm size could be
contaminated by the underlying negative relation between corporate taxes and affili-
25Nevertheless, we experimented with effective marginal corporate taxes and found qualitatively com-
parable effects on intangible asset investment.
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ate size.26 However, potential reverse causality problems may occur since intangibles
may well determine an affiliate’s volume of operating revenues as also argued by our
profit shifting reasoning for the relocation of intangibles to low-tax countries. This
endogeneity issue is addressed in Section 3.5.3 using instrumental variables techniques.
An alternative way to control for size is to apply the ratio of intangibles to sales as
the dependent variable. We rerun our estimations with this regressand and find very
similar results which are also shown in the result table. However, we choose to control
for size with the sales variable as a separate regressor in the following, as thereby,
we hedge against a possible complementary relationship between intangible assets and
sales and thus are able to exploit the maximum variation in intangible investments.
Furthermore, Xit comprises a vector of time-varying country control characteristics
like GDP per capita, population size, GDP per capita growth rate, R&D expenditures in
percentage of GDP, and a corruption index. These macro controls are included to ensure
that the results are not driven by an unobserved correlation between a country’s wealth,
market size, research potential, economic situation, and quality of intellectual property
protection (as proxied by the above variables) with corporate taxes and intangible
investment. Furthermore, a full set of year dummies ρt is included to capture shocks
over time common to all subsidiaries. it describes the error term. Since we apply panel
data, we are able to add subsidiary fixed effects to control for non-observable, time-
constant firm-specific characteristics φi. Using fixed-effects is reasonable and necessary
in our analysis since a firm’s level of intangible assets is likely to be driven by internal
firm-specific factors which are impossible to be captured by observable control variables
available in our data set. The fixed-effects model is also preferred to a random-effects
approach by a Hausman-Test.
Starting from this baseline approach, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to
alternative model specifications.
3.5.2 Binary Dependent Variable
In a first alternative approach, we take into account that 45% of the subsidiaries in
our data do not exhibit any intangible property holdings at all. This data structure
indicates it to be a relevant multinational choice whether or not to locate intangible
property at an affiliate at all and that a binary choice model might fit the data well.
26Our results are robust against the use of alternative proxies for subsidiary size, e.g. the subsidiaries’
total assets.
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Thus, the sensitivity check comprises a model of the following form
bit = γ1 + γ2τit + γ3Xit + γ4log(ait) + ρt + φi + vit (3.9)
where bit represents the binary intangible assets variable that takes on the value 1
if a subsidiary owns intangible property and the value 0 otherwise. The explanatory
variables are specified analogously to Equation (3.8). Again the regression includes
time-constant affiliate fixed effects and year dummies. In a first step, we determine
the coefficient estimates for Equation (3.9) based on maximum-likelihood techniques
by estimating a fixed-effect logit model. The model thereby critically relies on the
assumption that the error term vit follows a logistic distribution. As a sensitivity check
to our results, we thus re-estimate Equation (3.9) in a linear probability framework
based on the standard OLS assumptions.27
3.5.3 Instrumental Variables Approach
Since the level of intangible investment could well determine an affiliate’s volume of
operating revenues, in a second alternative model specification, we address this po-
tential reverse causality problem with instrumental variables techniques. We therefore
employ the levels estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) which suggests to
control for time constant affiliate effects by taking the first differences of the estimation
equation and to instrument for the difference in the endogenous variable (here: sales)
by employing lagged levels of this variable.28 Thus, we use a two-stage instrumental
variables approach (2SLS) to estimate the following model
∆ log(yit) = β2∆τit + β3∆Xit + β4∆log(ait) + ∆ρt + ∆it (3.10)
where all variables correspond to the variables defined in Section 3.5.1 and ∆ indicates
the first difference operator. Our result tables will report the F-statistic for the relevance
27The data structure suggests the estimation of a truncated regression model. However, truncated
models like tobit are not feasible with affiliate fixed effects. Since subsidiary fixed effect turn out to
be decisive in our empirical analysis, we consider the application of a binary fixed-effect logit and
an OLS model respectively to be an appropriate alternative.
28With panel data on more than two time periods, it is not equivalent to apply a fixed-effect and first-
differencing approach respectively. Both models give unbiased and consistent estimates although
the relative efficiency of the estimators may differ, depending on the model structure. Precisely,
the fixed-effect estimator is less sensitive against the violation of strict exogeneity of the regressors
while the first-differencing estimator is less sensitive against the violation of serially uncorrelated
error terms. In the result section, we will discuss the relation between the fixed-effects and first-
differencing results.
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of the instruments at the first stage of the regression model and a Sargan/Hansen-Test
of overidentifying restrictions which tests for the validity of the instruments employed,
i.e. for their exogeneity with respect to the error term ∆it.
3.5.4 Dynamic Estimation Model
Last, our estimation approach so far did not take into account that relocating intangible
property within the MNE might be associated with considerable positive adjustment
costs. For example, relocating corporate R&D units and/or the associated patent rights
from one affiliate to another is associated with a move of workers and tangible assets
and henceforth implies relocation costs. Thus, we expect a subsidiary’s intangibles
holdings in previous periods to be a predictor for intangible assets investment today and
include the first lag of a subsidiary’s intangible asset investment yi,t−1 as an additional
explanatory variable in our estimation equation.
The well-known dynamic panel bias implies that including the first lag of the depen-
dent variable as additional control in a fixed-effects framework leads to biased coefficient
estimates because the lagged dependent variable is endogenous to the fixed effects in
the error term. Thus, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) who build on the Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) framework applied in Section 3.5.3 and suggest to estimate a first-
difference generalized method of moments (GMM) model and instrument for the first
difference in the lagged dependent variable by deeper lags of the level of the dependent
variable.29 The estimation equation then takes on the following form
∆ log(yit) = β1∆ log(yi,t−1) + β2∆τit + β3∆Xit + β4∆log(ait) + ∆ρt + ∆it. (3.11)
The variable definitions correspond to the ones in the previous subsections. Because
the model is estimated in first-differences, the equation will be characterized by the
presence of first-order serial correlation. However, the validity of the GMM estimator
relies on the absence of second-order serial correlation. The Arellano/Bond-Test for
second-order serial correlation will be reported at the bottom of the result table. Again,
we check for the exogeneity of the instrument set by employing a Sargan/Hansen-Test.
29Note that the difference in the lagged dependent variable correlates with the differenced error term.
However, deeper lags (starting from the second lag) of the dependent variable (in levels) are available
as valid instruments as they are orthogonal to the error term.
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3.6 Estimation Results
This section presents our empirical results. Throughout all regressions, the observa-
tional units of our analysis are the multinational subsidiaries as explained in Sections
3.4 and 3.5. Additionally, in all upcoming estimations, a full set of year dummy variables
is included and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters are
calculated and displayed in the tables in parentheses. Section 3.6.1 presents the base-
line findings, Section 3.6.2 estimates a binary choice model, Section 3.6.3 displays the
results of an instrumental variables estimation, Section 3.6.4 comprises the dynamic
estimations, Section 3.6.5 describes undertaken robustness checks, and finally Section
3.6.6 presents evidence for more extensive profit shifting activities of MNEs that have
located their intangibles at low-tax affiliates within the corporate group.
3.6.1 Baseline Estimations
Table 3.3 presents our baseline estimation. Following the methodology described in
Section 3.5.1, Specification (1) regresses the logarithm of subsidiary intangible asset
investment on the firm’s statutory corporate tax rate, while controlling for fixed firm
and year effects. In line with our theoretical considerations, we find a statistically
significant negative influence that suggests high corporate tax rates at an affiliate to
be associated with low intangible asset investment and vice versa. The effect is robust
against the inclusion of time-varying country control characteristics in Specification (3)
and sales as a firm size control in Specification (5).
However, the subsidiaries’ statutory tax rate may be an imprecise measure for tax
incentives on intangible asset location since our hypothesis predicts intangibles to be
located in countries with a low tax rate relative to all other affiliates of the corporate
group. This is accounted for in Specifications (2), (4), and (6) which regress the level
of intangible assets on the average tax difference to all other affiliates. Confirming our
theoretical expectations of Section 3.2, the results indicate that the average statutory
corporate tax rate difference between a subsidiary and other group members exerts a
highly significant negative impact on the subsidiary’s intangibles holdings. Quantita-
tively, the estimations suggest that a decrease in the average tax difference to all other
affiliates by 1 percentage point raises the subsidiary’s level of intangible assets by 2.1%
(cf. Column (6) of Table 3.3).
In Columns (5) and (6), we additionally control for the subsidiary size by including
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Table 3.3: Baseline Estimations
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Depend. Variable Log Intangible Assets Log Int./Sales
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Statutory Tax Rate -2.44∗∗∗ -2.38∗∗∗ -2.50∗∗∗ -2.54∗∗∗
(.631) (.663) (.690) (.717)
Av.TaxDiff.toOthers -2.08∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗ -2.08∗∗∗ -2.27∗∗∗
(.559) (.584) (.606) (.627)
Log Sales .447∗∗∗ .453∗∗∗
(.026) (.026)
Country R&D Exp. .385∗∗∗ .325∗∗∗ .247∗ .178 .094 .041
(.132) (.132) (.140) (.139) (.144) (.143)
Corruption Index .007 -.001 .019 .008 .030 .019
(.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.030) (.030)
Population .013 .010 -.013 -.020 -.025 -.029
(.038) (.039) (.038) (.038) (.038) (.039)
GDP per Capita -.028∗∗ -.028∗∗ -.025∗ -.023 -.021 -.017
(.013) (.014) (.015) (.016) (.016) (.016)
Growth GDPp.Cap. .018 .017 -.000 -.003 -.020∗ -.021∗
(.011) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.012) (.012)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 44,739 42,994 42,215 40,574 37,112 35,666 37,112 35,666
# Firms 6,619 6,363 6,617 6,361 6,017 5,788 6,017 5,788
Adjusted R2 .7218 .7207 .7274 .7262 .7538 .7531 .7195 .7194
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational
subsidiaries, i.e. firms that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership shares.
Additionally, to be included in the sample, at least one affiliate of the corporate group has to own
intangible assets and at least one has to make positive profits. In (1)–(6), the dependent variable
is the natural logarithm (Log) of the level of intangible assets. In (7)–(8), the dependent variable
is the log of the ratio intangible assets to sales (Log (Int./Sales)). In both cases, we add a small
constant to the initial level of intangible assets to avoid losing observations with zero intangibles by
taking the log. An OLS model with fixed firm effects is estimated. Av.TaxDiff.toOthers is defined
as the unweighted average statutory tax rate difference between the considered subsidiary and all
other affiliates of the corporate group including the parent. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a
dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
the affiliate’s sales as a regressor. The coefficient estimate suggests that size positively
affects the reported intangible assets where the tax effect on the intangibles variable
remains largely unchanged. In Columns (7) and (8), we moreover rerun our baseline
model using the ratio of intangible assets to sales as regressand and find comparable
results.
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3.6.2 Binary Dependent Variable
In this section, we estimate Equation (3.9) and thus focus on the binary multinational
choice whether to locate intangible property at a certain affiliate or not. The results are
displayed in Table 3.4. Specifications (1) to (4) thereby present maximum-likelihood
estimations of a fixed-effect logit model. The dependent variable is the Dummy Intan-
gible Assets which is set to 1 if a subsidiary owns intangible assets and 0 otherwise.
Since the logit estimation controls for subsidiary fixed effects, many subsidiaries drop
out of the estimation since they observe no variation in the status of intangibles-holding
vs. non-holding during the observation period. Nevertheless, the estimations still com-
prises an adequate number of about 2, 000 firms for which information is available for
7.3 years on average.
In Specifications (1) and (3), we regress the binary dependent variable on the sub-
sidiary’s statutory tax rate. The coefficient estimate is negative and highly significant
and thus confirms the presumption that a subsidiary’s probability of holding intangi-
ble property decreases in the location’s statutory tax rate. Moreover, Specifications (2)
and (4) estimate the relation using the average tax difference to all other affiliates as
explanatory tax variable. Again, we find a negative effect on intangibles holdings which
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, conditioning on country characteristics
and firm size, the lower a subsidiary’s statutory corporate tax rate compared to all
other affiliates of the same multinational group (including the parent), the higher is its
probability of holding intangible assets.30
Nevertheless, the estimation of the fixed-effect logit model critically depends on the
assumption of a logistic distribution of the error term. Thus, as a sensitivity check,
we moreover estimate a linear probability model with subsidiary fixed effects. The
application of an OLS framework thereby has the additional advantage that we make
use of all information in our dataset and do not confine the sample to subsidiaries
which observe a change over the sample period in the status of intangibles-holding vs.
non-holding. The results are displayed in Specifications (5) to (8) of Table 3.4 and are
qualitatively equal to the results of the logit model. Ceteris paribus, a reduction of
the average tax difference to all other affiliates by 10 percentage points is suggested to
raise the subsidiary’s probability of holding intangible assets by 2.1 percentage points
on average (cf. Column (8)). As the mean probability of holding intangibles is 55.0%,
30The coefficient estimates of a logit estimation cannot be interpreted quantitatively. Moreover, ap-
plying a logit model with fixed effects makes the calculation of marginal effects impracticable as it
requires specifying a distribution for the fixed effects.
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Table 3.4: Binary Dependent Variable
Logit & OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Dummy Intangible Assets
Model Logit Fixed-Effects OLS Fixed-Effects
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Statutory Tax Rate -3.36∗∗∗ -4.31∗∗∗ -.271∗∗∗ -.309∗∗∗
(1.14) (1.26) (.102) (.117)
Av.TaxDiff.toOthers -2.71∗∗∗ -2.82∗∗∗ -.218∗∗ -.208∗∗
(1.04) (1.14) (.104)
Log Sales .583∗∗∗ .575∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .054∗∗∗
(.048) (.048) (.004) (.004)
Country R&D Exp. .323 .122 .051∗∗ .039
(.298) (.298) (.025) (.024)
Corruption Index .085 .047 .006 .004
(.067) (.068) (.005) (.005)
Population -.259∗∗∗ -.287∗∗∗ -.016∗∗∗ -.017∗∗∗
(.082) (.083) (.007) (.007)
GDP per Capita -.008 -.015 -.001 -.001
(.039) (.038) (.002) (.003)
Growth GDPp.Cap. -.001 -.009 .002 .001
(.029) (.029) (.002) (.002)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 16,734 16,151 13,164 12,726 44,719 42,974 37,102 35,656
# Firms 2,227 2,150 1,884 1,822 6,619 6,363 6,017 5,788
Pseudo or Adj. R2 .0198 .0197 .0596 .0584 .6724 .6709 .6786 .6763
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational
subsidiaries, i.e. firms that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership shares.
Additionally, to be included in the sample, at least one affiliate of the corporate group has to own
intangible assets and at least one has to make positive profits. Dependent variable (Dummy Intangible
Assets) is set to 1 if a subsidiary owns intangible assets and is 0 if not. In (1)–(4), a logit model with
fixed firm effects is estimated while in (5)–(8) a linear OLS model with fixed firm effects is applied.
Av.TaxDiff.toOthers is defined as the unweighted average statutory tax rate difference between the
considered subsidiary and all other affiliates of the corporate group including the parent. Adjusted
R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
this corresponds to an average increase of 3.8%.
3.6.3 Instrumental Variables Estimations
In this section, we account for potential reverse causality with respect to sales and
intangible investment levels as described in Section 3.5.3. Accordingly, we estimate the
equation in first differences and employ the lagged levels of sales as instruments for the
first differences in sales (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).
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Table 3.5: Instrumental Variables Estimations
OLS & IV First–Differences, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Intangible Assets
Model OLS First Differences IV First Differences
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.23∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗ -3.15∗∗∗ -3.00∗∗∗
(.419) (.446) (.994) (1.03)
Av.TaxDiff.toOthers -.972∗∗∗ -.961∗∗ -2.31∗∗∗ -2.33∗∗∗
(.390) (.411) (.844) (.880)
Log Sales .318∗∗∗ .320∗∗∗ .333∗∗∗ .337∗∗∗ -.338 -.361 -.233 -.266
(.025) (.025) (.027) (.027) (.256) (.265) (.232) (.245)
Country R&D Exp. .109 .090 .472∗∗∗ .421∗∗
(.122) (.124) (.192) (.195)
Corruption Index .019 .010 -.007 -.017
(.018) (.018) (.038) (.039)
Population -.021 -.024 -.106∗∗ -.121∗∗∗
(.036) (.036) (.046) (.047)
GDP per Capita -.019∗ -.017 .014 .016
(.012) (.012) (.020) (.020)
Growth GDPp.Cap. -.018∗∗∗ -.019∗∗∗ -.012 -.013
(.007) (.007) (.016) (.016)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 32,187 30,917 29,204 28,049 16,424 15,752 15,553 14,912
# Firms 5,709 5,491 5,656 5,439 4,080 3,920 4,048 3,888
1st-stage F-Test of 24.28 22.49 25.35 22.70
excl. instr. (F-stat.)
Hansen J-Test .7108 .5267 .5933 .3864
(P-value)
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational
subsidiaries, i.e. firms that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership shares.
Additionally, to be included in the sample, at least one affiliate of the corporate group has to own
intangible assets and at least one has to make positive profits. Dependent variable is the natural
logarithm (Log) of the level of intangible assets; we add a small constant to the initial level of
intangible assets to avoid losing observations with zero intangibles by taking the log. In (1)–(4), an
OLS model in first differences is estimated. In (5)–(8), a first-differenced instrumental variables (IV)
approach in two stages (2SLS) is applied, with the 1st difference of Log Sales being instrumented
with the 2nd–4th lag of the level of Log Sales (cf. Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). Av.TaxDiff.toOthers
is defined as the unweighted average statutory tax rate difference between the considered subsidiary
and all other affiliates of the corporate group including the parent. Note, unobserved time-constant
heterogeneity between subsidiaries is controlled for by first-differencing.
To do so, we first compare the results of a first-differencing approach to the fixed-
effects model and re-estimate our specifications of Table 3.3 using first differences
instead of fixed effects. The comparable coefficient estimates are displayed in Columns
(3) and (4) of Table 3.5. While the qualitative effect of both, the statutory tax rate
and the average tax difference to all other affiliates, on the level of intangible asset in-
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vestment remains unchanged, the point estimates are substantially smaller than for the
fixed-effect regressions (−1.14 and −.96, respectively) although they do not statistically
differ from each other. Since we consider unobserved heterogeneity in the subsidiary
characteristics to be a major issue in our regression context, we generally presume the
fixed-effects approach to deliver the more efficient estimates. Nevertheless, since the
qualitative results are independent of the model employed and first-differencing deliv-
ers smaller coefficient estimates than the fixed-effect approach, we feel confident that a
qualitative and a quantitative interpretation of the first-differencing model’s coefficient
estimates (as a lower bound) is valid. The coefficient estimate of sales is positive and
statistically significant suggesting that larger affiliates tend to hold more intangible
property. However, since the specifications in Column (1) to (4) do not control for
potential reverse causality, the coefficient estimates may be biased.
In Specifications (5) to (8) of Table 3.5, we address this endogeneity problem and
instrument the first difference of sales with lagged levels of the variable.31 This mod-
ification of the estimation model increases the coefficient estimates of our tax mea-
sures which remain statistically significant. Interestingly though, instrumenting for
sales erases the positive effect of affiliate size on intangible asset holdings now suggest-
ing that intangible asset investment is independent of affiliate size. Moreover, the usual
test statistics claim our specification to be valid since the F-test for the instruments at
the first stage is highly significant indicating our instruments to be relevant. Further-
more, the null-hypothesis of the Hansen J-Test is accepted stating that the instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term and henceforth valid.
3.6.4 Dynamic Estimations
Last, we determine the relation between corporate taxes and intangible asset investment
in a dynamic model which additionally accounts for positive adjustment and relocation
costs of intangible property. We follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and employ a one-step
linear GMM estimator in first differences which implies that the endogenous differenced
lag of intangible assets investments is instrumented with the second and all deeper lags
31Precisely, we employ the second to fourth lag of the logarithm of sales as instruments. We consider
this to be an appropriate model specification since with the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator,
the gained information from including additional lags as instruments has to be weighted against the
loss in sample size due to missing values implied by including additional lags.
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of the level of intangible asset investments as explained in Section 3.5.4.32 The results
are presented in Table 3.6 and point to a dynamic nature of intangible asset investment
since lagged intangible property holdings indeed show a significant and quantitatively
relevant impact on current intangibles investments.
Our corporate tax effects on intangible asset investment are largely unaffected by the
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and are quantitatively smaller compared to
the estimations in the non-dynamic case presented in Table 3.5. Specifications (1) to
(4) of Table 3.6 document a negative and significant effect of the subsidiary’s statutory
tax rate and of the tax differential variable on intangible asset investment. In Specifi-
cations (5) and (6), we again include subsidiary sales as size control whereas we treat
the variable as endogenous and instrument it with the second and all deeper lags of its
level. The results show a similar picture as in the previous subsection. While the coef-
ficient estimates for the corporate tax measures are unaffected by the inclusion of the
size control and remain statistically significant and of quantitatively relevant size, the
sales variable itself does not exert any statistically significant effect on intangible asset
holdings. Moreover, the test statistics confirm our dynamic specifications to be valid.
The Arellano/Bond-Test accepts the null-hypothesis that there is no second-order au-
tocorrelation in the error term and likewise the Sargan/Hansen-Test of overidentifying
restrictions accepts the null-hypothesis that the set of instruments is exogenous to the
error term.
As a sensitivity check, in Specifications (7) and (8), we exclude subsidiaries located
in Austria (AT), Denmark (DK) and Germany (DE). These countries do not allow for
capitalization of self-created intangibles on the balance sheet as described in Section 3.3.
Since our quantitative tax results show no major change without the three countries,
this suggests that the difference in national accounting standards does not play an
important role for our study.
32Note that with the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, we do not face the trade-off of the Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) estimator that the gained information from including additional lags as instruments
has to be weighted against the loss in sample size due to missing values. This applies since the
Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology sets missing values to 0 and still derives a meaningful set of
moments conditions. Nevertheless, we additionally reestimated all specifications of Table 3.6 in an
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) framework and found qualitative and quantitative comparable results.
Here, the F-statistic of the first-stage regression also indicates a strong relevance of the instrument
set used.
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Table 3.6: Dynamic Estimations
Difference GMM, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Intangible Assets
Sample Full Sample No AT,DE,DK
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1st Lag Log Int.As. .889∗∗∗ .873∗∗∗ .870∗∗∗ .866∗∗∗ .871∗∗∗ .867∗∗∗ .895∗∗∗ .889∗∗∗
(.036) (.036) (.032) (.033) (.026) (.027) (.029) (.029)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.08∗∗ -1.23∗∗ -1.51∗∗ -1.56∗∗∗
(.547) (.584) (.639) (.626)
Av.TaxDiff.toOthers -1.37∗∗∗ -1.47∗∗∗ -1.38∗∗ -1.18∗∗
(.559) (.581) (.611) (.583)
Log Sales -.031 -.001 -.422∗∗ -.351
(.220) (.232) (.210) (.221)
Country R&D Exp. .501∗∗∗ .464∗∗∗ .551∗∗∗ .506∗∗∗ .511∗∗∗ .462∗∗
(.181) (.185) (.195) (.199) (.201) (.204)
Corruption Index -.002 -.007 -.014 -.021 .004 -.004
(.031) (.032) (.032) (.033) (.034) (.035)
Population -.122∗∗∗ -.116∗∗∗ -.139∗∗∗ -.142∗∗∗ -.076∗ -.090∗∗
(.035) (.035) (.040) (.041) (.040) (.040)
GDP per Capita .007 .014 .005 .014 .018 .026
(.010) (.009) (.014) (.016) (.015) (.016)
Growth GDPp.Cap. .003 .004 .001 .002 .005 .004
(.011) (.011) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.013)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 29,730 28,556 27,950 26,832 24,792 23,792 23,729 22,759
# Firms 5,790 5,570 5,745 5,527 5,128 4,932 4,721 4,535
# Instruments 18 18 23 23 32 32 32 32
Arellano-Bond-Test .213 .180 .222 .194 .342 .327 .364 .366
AR(2) (P-value)
Hansen-Test .480 .624 .438 .533 .448 .448 .604 .569
(P-value)
Notes: Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within firms are reported
in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are
multinational subsidiaries, i.e. firms that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the
ownership shares. Additionally, to be included in the sample, at least one affiliate of the corporate
group has to own intangible assets and at least one has to make positive profits. Dependent variable
is the natural logarithm (Log) of the level of intangible assets; we add a small constant to the initial
level of intangible assets to avoid losing observations with zero intangibles by taking the log. A one-
step linear GMM dynamic panel-data estimation in first differences is applied. Following Arellano and
Bond (1991), we instrument the 1st difference of the 1st Lag of Log Intangible Assets with the 2nd
and all deeper lags of the level of Log Intangible Assets. In (5)–(8), we additionally instrument the 1st
difference of Log Sales with the 2nd and all deeper lags of Log Sales levels. In (7)–(8), subsidiaries
located in Austria (AT), Germany (DE) and Denmark (DK) are excluded. Av.TaxDiff.toOthers is
defined as the unweighted average statutory tax rate difference between the considered subsidiary
and all other affiliates of the corporate group including the parent. Note, unobserved time-constant
heterogeneity between subsidiaries is controlled for by first-differencing.
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3.6.5 Robustness Checks
First, we rerun all our specifications with the additional inclusion of a full set of 110 one-
digit NACE code industry-year dummies (not reported). This add-on does not change
any of our qualitative and quantitative results. In addition, we checked if our results
are driven by a pure Eastern European effect. We thus defined a dummy variable that
takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary is located in one of the Eastern European countries
(comprising the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia) and generated interaction terms of the East European dummy with the
set of year effects. Including these in our regression analysis does not alter any of the
qualitative and quantitative results.
Furthermore, we re-estimate our regressions employing the statutory corporate tax
rate difference between a subsidiary and its parent firm as explanatory variable (instead
of the average tax difference to all other group affiliates, including the parent). This
model specification accounts for the fact that a large fraction of intangible property
is traditionally held by the multinational parent firms (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) and
parents are perceived to be the natural and classic owners and administrators of in-
tangible property since they host the MNEs’ relevant management and administration
departments. Regressing intangible asset investment on the tax difference to the parent
captures the incentive to relocate intangibles from the parent to the considered sub-
sidiary for tax purposes. We hence re-estimate all specifications presented in this paper
(including the alternative model specifications) using the tax difference to the parent
as the relevant tax measure. This modification leads to the same qualitative results
(not reported) as the models accounting for the tax structure of the whole MNE and
supports the notion that taxes impact on the location of intangibles within a MNE.33
Summing up, we present empirical evidence that the lower the corporate tax rate of
a subsidiary relative to all other affiliates of the multinational group the higher is its
level of intangible assets. This result turns out to be robust against a set of alternative
model specifications and robustness checks.
33The results of these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
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3.6.6 Location of Intangible Assets and Profit Shifting
The previous subsections presented evidence that the location of intangible assets is
distorted towards affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate. Our theoretical
motivation predicts that this distortion roots in the incentive to transfer profits to the
low-tax affiliate, for example by distorting the transfer price for royalty payments and
thus to shift profits from worldwide production affiliates to the low-tax economy. This
implies that profitability rates observed at multinational low-tax affiliates are predicted
to exceed the profitability at high-tax affiliates.
A series of previous papers brought forward empirical evidence for a negative re-
lationship between corporate taxes and firm profitability which is in line with this
prediction.34 In our analysis, we apply this indirect approach of providing evidence of
profit shifting (which is well established in the empirical literature, see e.g. Devereux
and Maffini, 2007, for an overview) by regressing affiliate pre-tax profits on various firm
and country control variables and additionally on corporate tax rate differentials.35 Pro-
vided our previous analysis, it is of interest to understand whether a relevant fraction
of profit relocations in the wake of tax rate differentials is related to intangibles.
In line with the argumentation above, we presume that the average statutory cor-
porate tax rate difference between a considered subsidiary and all other affiliates of
the corporate group including the parent (Av.TaxDiff.toOthers) exerts a negative ef-
fect on the company’s reported (unconsolidated) pre-tax profits while controlling for
input factors and firm fixed effects, and that this effect is especially strong if intan-
gible assets play a prominent role in the firm. In Specifications (1) and (2) of Table
3.7, we run the regression separately for subsidiaries which belong to MNEs with a
below average intangibles intensity (sub-sample LowIA) and for subsidiaries with an
above average intensity (sub-sample HighIA). The intangibles intensity is determined
as the mean over all years of the intangible assets to sales ratio of all group affiliates on
which information is available. Both specifications suggest a negative effect of the tax
differential on pre-tax profits whereas the effect is quantitatively almost twice as large
34Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998) and Dischinger (2008) (or Chapter 2 of this thesis) present
evidence that the statutory corporate tax rate difference between a subsidiary and its parent firm
negatively affects the subsidiary’s productivity. Analogously, Hines and Rice (1994) or Huizinga and
Laeven (2008) provide evidence that affiliate productivity falls in the average tax rate difference to
all other affiliates of the multinational group.
35See Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2 for the estimation equation and a more detailed description of the
econometric approach.
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Table 3.7: Location of Intangible Assets and Profit Shifting
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation)
Sample LowIA HighIA IAHighTax IALowTax All Subsidiaries
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Av.TaxDiff.toOthers -2.078∗∗∗ -3.970∗∗∗ -1.958∗∗∗ -3.777∗∗∗ -1.894∗∗∗ 1.327





Log FixedAssets .017 .088∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗ .008 .047∗∗ .047∗∗
(.021) (.033) (.026) (.033) (.020) (.021)
Log CostEmployees .523∗∗∗ .564∗∗∗ .498∗∗∗ .561∗∗∗ .524∗∗∗ .525∗∗∗
(.048) (.062) (.057) (.065) (.043) (.044)
Country R&D Exp. .279∗∗∗ .396∗ .432∗∗∗ .032 .256∗∗∗ .255∗∗∗
(.110) (.209) (.156) (.160) (.112) (.112)
Corruption Index .056∗∗∗ .074∗ .052∗ .086∗∗ .071∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗
(.024) (.043) (.030) (.036) (.023) (.023)
Population .415∗ .775 .934∗∗ .562 .749∗∗∗ .749∗∗∗
(.287) (.536) (.040) (.424) (.291) (.291)
GDP per Capita .254∗∗∗ .498∗∗∗ .229∗∗∗ .285∗∗∗ .251∗∗∗ .025∗∗∗
(.074) (.147) (.010) (.113) (.074) (.007)
Growth GDPp.Cap. .062∗∗∗ .078∗∗∗ .071∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗
(.012) (.024) (.015) (.020) (.012) (.012)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 15,034 4,634 7,847 6,348 14,195 14,195
# Firms 3,269 1,079 1,653 1,284 2,937 2,937
Adjusted R2 .7762 .7861 .7604 .7954 .7793 .7790
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational
subsidiaries, i.e. firms that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership shares.
Additionally, to be included in the sample, at least one affiliate of the group has to own intangibles
and at least one has to make profits. Dependent variable is the logarithm (Log) of subsidiary’s
pre-tax profits. Av.TaxDiff.toOthers is defined as the unweighted average statutory corporate tax rate
difference between the considered subsidiary and all other affiliates of the corporate group including
the parent. In (1), the sample is restricted to groups which exhibit below average levels of intangible
assets per sales while in (2), the sample is restricted to groups which exhibit above average levels of
intangibles per sales. In (3), the sample is restricted to subsidiaries of MNEs which observe a larger
intangible intensity (measured as intangibles over sales) at high-tax affiliates than at low-tax affiliates
while in the contrary, in (4) the sample is restricted to subsidiaries of MNEs which observe a larger
intangible intensity at low-tax than at high-tax affiliates. In (5)–(6), the full sample of all subsidiaries
is applied. In (5), we interact Av.TaxDiff.toOthers with the dummy D.IALowTax that is set to 1 if
the intangible intensity at low-tax affiliates in the group is larger than at high-tax affiliates in the
group, and 0 otherwise. In (6), we interact Av.TaxDiff.toOthers with the variable IntensityDiffer-
ence which captures the difference between the intangibles intensity at low-tax affiliates within the
group and high-tax affiliates within the group and which is transformed to exhibit only positive values.
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for the sub-sample of intangibles intensive groups (Column (2)).36 This is in line with
results reported by Grubert (2003) who equally finds that the reported pre-tax profits
of MNEs whose parent firm reports high R&D expenditures react more sensitive to
changes in the corporate tax rate.
However, our theoretical presumptions even more precisely suggest that multina-
tional groups whose intangible assets are biased towards low-tax economies should
engage in larger profit shifting activities as they can distort transfer prices for royalty
payments between the intangibles owner and other group affiliates located in countries
with a higher tax rate and henceforth shift profits from a large number of intangibles
users to the intangibles-holding low-tax affiliate. Moreover, if the MNE already ob-
serves a bias in favor of low-tax economies, it is equally more likely to react according
to the pattern proposed in this paper and relocate intangibles in the wake of tax rate
differentials. To investigate this, we split our original subsidiary dataset in two sub-
groups: first, a group of subsidiaries of MNEs in which the intangibles intensity (i.e.
intangible assets per sales) is larger for affiliates in high-tax countries than for affiliates
in low-tax countries (sub-sample IAHighTax ), and a second group of subsidiaries of
MNEs for which the intangibles intensity at low-tax affiliates is larger than at high-tax
affiliates (sub-sample IALowTax ).37 The results are reported in Specifications (3) and
(4) of Table 3.7 and indicate that profit shifting activities prevail in both groups but
that they are quantitatively twice as large in MNEs with an over-proportional fraction
of their intangible assets located at low-tax affiliates (Column (4)).
Specification (5) reruns the same estimation in the full sample, interacting the tax
differential with a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the low-tax affiliates
in the multinational group on average observe a larger intangibles intensity than the
high-tax affiliates (analogue to the definition of the sub-sample IALowTax in Column
(4)). This derives quantitatively comparable results. In Specification (6) of Table 3.7,
we define the variable IntensityDifference which measures the difference between the
intangibles intensities of the low-tax affiliates and the high-tax affiliates within the
MNE. We define this variable to be positive by moving the distribution of the variable
upwards so that the smallest value is just above zero (to avoid complications when
interacting the variable with the tax differential that can take on positive and negative
values). Interacting IntensityDifference with Av.TaxDiff.toOthers indicates that the
36Note that the respective coefficient estimates of the tax differential just fail to be statistically different
from each other on the 15% significance level.
37High-tax (low-tax) affiliates are affiliates with a statutory corporate tax rate which is larger (smaller)
than the average tax rate of all other group affiliates.
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sensitivity of pre-tax profits to the tax differential is larger the stronger the MNE’s
intangible assets distribution is biased in favor of low-tax affiliates.38
Summarizing, this section provides evidence that suggests a link between intangible
assets and their location within the multinational group and profit shifting opportuni-
ties. Note, however, that all the above specifications have to be understood as suggestive
evidence as we face some important data restrictions. The main issue here is that we
do not necessarily observe detailed accounting data on all (majority-owned) affiliates
within MNEs (see also Section 3.4 on data description) and henceforth cannot clearly
determine the entire intangible asset distribution across the MNE.
3.7 Conclusions
The last years have witnessed an increasing importance of intangible assets (patents,
copyrights, brand names, etc.) in the corporate production process of MNEs (see Fig-
ures 3.1 – 3.4 in Section 3.4). Anecdotal evidence thereby suggests that these intangibles
are often located at low-tax affiliates. For example, Nestle, Vodafone and British Amer-
ican Tabacco have created brand management units in countries with a relatively low
corporate tax rate that charge royalties to operating subsidiaries worldwide. Our pa-
per argues that these relocation tendencies are driven by two motivations. Firstly, by
the incentive to save taxes through the relocation of highly profitable intangible assets
to low-tax countries. Secondly, by the incentive to optimize profit shifting strategies
through the distortion of transfer prices for intangible property traded within the firm.
Intangibles are usually firm-specific goods for which arm’s length prices can hardly be
determined by tax authorities. Hence, MNEs may overstate the transfer price for the
intermediate immaterial good at relatively low expected costs and thus shift profits
from high-tax production affiliates to the intangibles-holding affiliate in the low-tax
country.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the first systematic empirical
evidence that the location of intangible assets within MNEs is indeed distorted towards
low-tax affiliates. Based on a rich data set of European MNEs during the years 1995 to
2005, we show that the lower the statutory corporate tax rate of a subsidiary relative
to all other affiliates of the multinational group, the higher is the level of intangible
38Note that the average of the IntensityDifference variable is calculated with .174. Consequently,
evaluated at the sample mean the semi-elasticity of pre-tax profit with respect to the tax differential
is determined with −4.97.
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assets at this location. This result turns out to be robust against various specifications
and robustness checks. Thus, the evidence suggests that MNEs exploit the enhanced
importance of intellectual property in the production process by distorting its location
within the corporate group to minimize their overall tax liabilities. Quantitatively,
we find a semi-elasticity of around −1.4, meaning that a decrease in the average tax
difference to all other group affiliates by 10 percentage points raises a subsidiary’s stock
of intangibles by around 14% on average.
These behavioral adjustments have profound consequences for international corpo-
rate tax competition. First, the relocation of intangible assets to tax havens facilitates
income shifting and enlarges the streams of multinational profit transferred to countries
with a low tax rate. This increases the governmental incentive to lower its corporate
tax rate and aggravates the race-to-the-bottom in corporate taxes. Second, it is im-
portant to stress that the creation and administration of intangible assets is related
to real corporate activity. To relocate patents and trademark rights to low-tax coun-
tries, MNEs have to transfer part of their R&D departments and their administration
and marketing units with them. Obviously, these multinational service units comprise
high-skilled workers who represent part of the decisive corporate human capital (see
e.g. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002). Thus, countries which attract intangible
investment by lowering their corporate tax rate do not only gain higher pre-tax profits
but may also win additional jobs and knowledge capital that may spill over and in-
crease the productivity of local firms. According to this, the gains from lowering the
corporate tax rate surge along a second line and enforce tax competition behavior.
Currently, the regulations on intangibles relocation within MNEs are rather lax in
many OECD countries. For example, rules with respect to cost sharing agreements
between multinational affiliates are loose in the U.S. and other OECD countries (see
also Grubert and Mutti, 2007) and thus tend to foster the shift of patent rights from
parent R&D departments to R&D units at low-tax affiliates. Additionally, in most
OECD countries (part of) the intangible property can be relocated across borders at
rather low costs. For example, if an MNE moves a production center from a high-tax
country to a tax-haven, it usually has to calculate transfer prices for all tangible assets
transferred while intangible goods like e.g. production plans and knowledge capital is
not accounted for.
Many governments have identified these hidden intangible asset relocations from their
countries as one major source of corporate tax revenue losses. For example, Germany
has recently come forward with an unilateral attempt to restrict the relocation of
(intellectual property owning) production units from its borders. In January 2008,
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a new legislation was introduced that regulates transfer prices to be charged on the
whole relocated multinational affiliate. This implies that MNEs must calculate transfer
prices not only on their tangible production units but equally have to account for the
intangible value, the profit potential, of the firm. Other countries are expected to follow
the German advance with the introduction of similar regulations. In the light of our
paper, this tightening on relocation possibilities of intangible assets across borders
should be appreciated as it reduces the potential for tax competition behavior.
Chapter 4
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4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare the profitability of corporate activities at
multinational headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries. Although the emergence and
investment behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are well studied (see e.g.
Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 2006; Brakman and Garretsen, 2008), the literature
has so far largely neglected to investigate the profit distribution within multinational
groups. Exceptions are recent public finance papers which suggest that multinational
profits tend to be distorted towards affiliates with a low corporate tax rate as MNEs
shift paper profits from high-tax to low-tax entities and tend to bias the location of
profitable investment projects in favor of low-tax affiliates (e.g. Devereux and Maffini,
2007; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Dischinger and Riedel, 2008 or Chapter 3 of this
thesis, respectively; Becker, Fuest, and Riedel, 2009).
Our paper adds to this literature by testing whether the profitability of headquarters
activities statistically differs from activities undertaken at foreign subsidiaries. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first study to empirically investigate this question
although a set of existing theoretical papers (implicitly) suggests that headquarters
activities exhibit a higher profitability than operations located at multinational sub-
sidiaries. One strand of papers which is related to the notion of “vertical” foreign direct
investment (FDI) proposes that this pattern arises due to agency costs faced by the
headquarters management if valuable assets and functions are located with geograph-
ically separated subsidiaries (see e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Hamilton and Kashlak,
1999; O’Donnell, 2000). An alternative explanation for the headquarters bias is brought
forward by the theoretical literature on “horizontal” FDI which suggests that invest-
ments at the parent location may exhibit a higher profitability because MNEs have
advantages when operating in their home market as they know the language, culture
and customs better than foreign competitors (see e.g. Dunning, 1977; Brakman and
Garretsen, 2008).
To test for the profitability gap between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries,
we exploit a large European firm data set which is available for the years 1999 to 2006.
Our results indicate that the profitability of headquarters investments indeed largely
outweighs the profitability of investments at foreign subsidiaries. Our most conservative
estimates quantify the profitability gap with around 30%. The results turn out to be
robust against the use of different profitability measures and the inclusion of a large set
of control variables: multinational group fixed effects (to account for unobserved het-
erogeneity between MNEs), country fixed effects (to control for productivity differences
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between countries), industry fixed effects, the size of the input factors, the corporate
leverage and firm age (to account for set up costs faced by young corporations).
Moreover, we test how the profit gap has evolved over time. If profitability differ-
ences between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries were driven by agency costs,
one would presume that the profitability gap has declined in the last decade as new
technological developments, like the invention of the internet and mobile phone, have
led to reductions in communication and monitoring costs. Although the predictions for
the home market effect are less clear cut, a similar pattern might arise. Interestingly,
our data indeed suggests a significant drop in the parent bias by at least 1.5 percentage
points per year, implying that the profitability gap has closed by at least 15% over our
sample period (1999–2006) whereas some specifications point to a closure of the gap
by more than 30%.
Following these baseline estimates, we additionally assess whether and to what ex-
tent agency costs and the home market effect contribute to the profitability gap. To
do so, we distinguish between “vertical” and “horizontal” FDI as the agency costs
argument is mainly tied to the former while the home market advantage argument
is largely tied to the latter. Thus, we divide the sample in two subgroups, the first
comprising multinationals where the parent firm and the observed subsidiary operate
in the same 4-digit NACE industry (proxying for horizontal FDI) and the second com-
prising multinationals where the parent firm and the observed subsidiary operate in
different 4-digit NACE industries (proxying for vertical FDI). The profitability gap
between parents and subsidiaries prevails in both groups suggesting that agency costs
and the home market effect play a role in driving the results. Moreover, we find that
the profitability gap closes over time in the vertical FDI group (in line with the notion
of falling communication and agency costs) while the effect remains constant in the
horizontal FDI-group.
Furthermore, we run a large set of robustness checks. Most importantly, we assess
whether the profitability gap derived in this paper is unique to the international con-
text or whether it prevails in national groups. Our estimations indicate a statistically
significant profitability gap between headquarters and their domestic subsidiaries that
is measured to be around one third of the gap derived in our baseline specifications.
In additional sensitivity checks, the paper among others shows that the derived prof-
itability pattern is not driven by mergers & acquisitions (M&A) and does not reflect
avoidance of dividend withholding taxes.
In a last step, we discuss potential implications of the presented parent bias for eco-
nomic welfare and public economic policy. Profitability is expected to affect a country’s
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welfare along several lines. It for example determines the size of the firm’s corporate
tax payments and thus, our analysis suggests that parent firms pay higher taxes on
their corporate activity than subsidiaries. This presumption is confirmed in our data.
Conditioning on affiliate size and the host country’s corporate tax rate, tax payments
at multinational headquarters are found to be 60% larger than the tax payment at their
multinational subsidiaries. Additionally, affiliate profitability is well known to positively
affect local wage bargaining outcomes and consequently, workers at the headquarters
firm are predicted to earn higher wages than their colleagues at the subsidiary level
(see e.g. Budd, Konings, and Slaughter, 2005).
In addition, we present empirical evidence that profit shifting activities of MNEs
critically depend on the groups’ organizational structure, precisely on the multina-
tional headquarters location. Particularly, we show that, on the one hand, MNEs are
reluctant to shift profits away from high-tax headquarters to low-tax subsidiaries and,
vice versa, that MNEs are eager to shift profits from high-tax subsidiaries to low-tax
headquarters. Although the economic literature has brought forward comprehensive
empirical evidence for quantitatively relevant shifting behavior (see e.g. Chapter 2 of
this thesis, or Clausing, 2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; for a comprehensive survey,
see Devereux and Maffini, 2007), not much is known about which type of firm engages
in shifting activities. A few papers link a R&D intensive production process and the
ownership of intangible assets to enhanced profit shifting activities (see Chapter 3 of
this thesis, and Grubert, 2003; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006). However, the existing
literature neglects the heterogeneity in MNEs’ organizational structure and its impact
on the location of profits across affiliates. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is
thereby the first to provide evidence that the profit distribution within a MNE is bi-
ased towards the parent company and that, correspondingly, the bulk of profit shifting
activities between parent firms and their subsidiaries takes place if the multinational
headquarters are located at a low-tax economy.
Thus, our paper suggests that countries tend to profit more from hosting a multina-
tional headquarters firm than from hosting a multinational subsidiary. This may, for
example, rationalize government policies to create national champions by intervening
in international M&A activities. But our results also in a broader sense suggest that it
is in the national interest of economic policy to strengthen the domestic parent firms
rather than trying to attract subsidiaries from abroad.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide a theoretical motivation
for our analysis, Section 4.3 describes our data set. In Section 4.4, we present our
estimation methodology and in Section 4.5 the estimation results. Section 4.6 discusses
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relevant implications of our findings for public economics and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Considerations
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the profit distribution of multinational
firms is skewed in favor of the headquarters location. There are two strings of the
literature which suggest a positive profitability gap between parent firms and their
subsidiaries: the first proposes agency costs to give rise to a higher profitability of
headquarters investment, while the second suggests that the same pattern is induced
by home market advantages.
The agency cost theory is related to the notion of “vertical” FDI, i.e. the presumption
that value chains comprising various functions like manufacturing, logistics, marketing
and R&D are geographically separated across borders. Recent contributions brought
forward empirical evidence for this kind of vertical fragmentation (see Campa and Gold-
berg, 1997; Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi, 1998; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001; Hanson,
R. J. Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2001; Hanson, R. J. Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2005).
Assuming that the profitability of functions within the value chain differs, the MNE
may strategically choose the location of profit-driving operations.1 Several papers in
the business economics literature suggest that MNEs have a tendency to keep valu-
able functions with the head office as physical distance hampers communication and
the headquarters management thus faces agency and information costs if these opera-
tions are run abroad (see e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Hamilton and Kashlak, 1999;
O’Donnell, 2000).2 Nevertheless, the last decade was also characterized by the devel-
opment of new technologies like the internet and the mobile phone which have lowered
communication costs and might henceforth have dampened agency problems caused
by geographic separation (see e.g. Freund and Weinhold, 2002, Blinder, 2006). This
suggests that the profitability gap is not constant over time but might have declined
in recent years.
A second literature strand proposes that the profitability gap between headquarters
and their foreign subsidiaries may be induced by a different mechanism which is related
to the notion of “horizontal” FDI. Precisely, the papers suggest that exporting the
1Some contributions suggest that the functions which drive the corporate profit are knowledge and
marketing related, like R&D and advertisement (see e.g. Zingales, 2000).
2Furthermore, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), analyze the widespread organizational form
of corporate pyramids which are strongly associated with agency problems.
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MNE’s business model and products to foreign countries by setting up production
and sales units there may result in lower profitability rates since these units may for
example have less knowledge about language, customs and consumer behavior than
their domestic competitors or since the MNE’s products might have been developed
to fit domestic not foreign consumer preferences (e.g. Dunning, 1977; Brakman and
Garretsen, 2008).3
In the following, we will bring these hypotheses to the data and test whether op-
erations located at the headquarters firm are indeed more profitable than operations
located at foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, we will assess the role of agency costs and
the home market effect in generating this profitability pattern.
4.3 Data
Our empirical analysis relies on the commercial database AMADEUS which is com-
piled by Bureau van Dijk. The version of the database available to us contains detailed
information on firm structure and accounting of national and multinational corpora-
tions in Europe. We focus on 27 European countries4 and on the time period of 1999
to 2006 as these countries and years are sufficiently represented by the database. One
major advantage of AMADEUS is that it allows to link accounting information for
parent firms and their corporate subsidiaries which makes the data set ideal for our
purpose.
For an observation to be included in the sample, it has to belong to an MNE. The
parent firms in our sample are the global ultimate owner of a multinational group and
own at least one subsidiary in a foreign country with an ownership share of 100%. The
3Note that two other mechanisms may give rise to a profitability bias in favor of the parent firm.
Firstly, Betrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) show that business groups expropriate minority
shareholders by tunneling profits from firms where they have low cash flow rights (e.g. subsidiaries
owned by less than 100% of the ownership shares) to firms where they have high cash flow rights (e.g.
the headquarters firm). However, as our empirical analysis compares parent firms and their wholly-
owned subsidiaries, this motive is not considered in our empirical analysis. Secondly, MNEs may
have an incentive to bias the location of profits towards the parent firm in order to save withholding
taxes on dividend payments which become due upon repatriation. As withholding taxes on dividends
are however low within the European Union, we consider this to be unlikely which is empirically
confirmed in a robustness check.
4Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine.
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Table 4.1: Country Statistics
Country All Affiliates Parent Firms Subsidiaries
Austria 271 135 136
Belgium 2,092 1,123 969
Bulgaria 78 5 73
Croatia 186 57 129
Czech Republic 519 77 442
Denmark 1,724 828 896
Estonia 240 24 216
Finland 537 14 523
France 2,838 1,283 1,555
Germany 1,395 731 664
Great Britain 3,175 960 2,215
Hungary 34 9 25
Ireland 30 30 0
Italy 2,339 1,418 921
Latvia 10 0 10
Luxembourg 23 14 9
Netherlands 2,068 1,404 664
Norway 1,112 365 747
Poland 738 44 694
Portugal 273 82 191
Romania 512 12 500
Serbia 69 2 67
Slovakia 82 5 77
Spain 2,644 1,231 1,413
Sweden 2,226 1,392 834
Switzerland 138 138 0
Ukraine 40 2 38
Sum 25,393 11,385 14,008
subsidiaries in our sample likewise belong to a multinational group in the sense that
they are wholly owned by a parent corporation in a foreign country. The subsidiaries
may own (further) subsidiaries themselves but this is not decisive for our qualitative
results. The country statistics for the parent and subsidiary sample are presented in
Table 4.1.
Moreover, in our baseline regressions we restrict the sample to firms which earn a
positive pre-tax profit since our theoretical considerations apply particularly well to
firms with a positive profit and this allows us to abstract from loss-offset regulations.
Additionally, it enables us to take the logarithm of the pre-tax profitability as the
dependent variable which is suggested since the variable exhibits a rather skewed dis-
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Dummy Parent Firm 107,930 .4912 0 0 1
Profit before Tax (PBT)F 107,930 18,623 884 1 1.67e+07
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 107,930 14,857 850 1 1.52e+07
Gross Profit Margin (PBT per Sales) 100,181 2.32 .0585 1.73e-05 26,393
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 100,181 .1024 .0576 1.73e-05 295
SalesF 100,181 191,893 16,151 1 1.46e+08
Fixed AssetsF 107,930 154,263 2,486 1 1.04e+08
Cost of Employees 107,930 26,530 2,183 1 2.26e+07
Number of Employees 107,930 565 44 1 99,837
Financial Leverage Ratio 102,227 .5937 .6209 0 1
GDPN 107,864 932.1 610.7 5.63 2,915
GDP per CapitaJ 107,864 28,778 27,892 633 74,471
Corruption IndexI 107,864 7.34 7.4 1.5 10
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 107,864 .3251 .3399 .1 .523
Parent firms only:
Profit before Tax (PBT)F 53,011 32,967 1,683 1 1.67e+07
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 53,011 26,711 1,538 1 1.52e+07
Gross Profit Margin (PBT per Sales) 48,650 3.53 .0639 1.73e-05 26,393
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 48,650 .1214 .0605 3.22e-05 295
Fixed AssetsF 53,011 285,419 8,612 1 1.04e+08
Cost of Employees 53,011 46,423 3,921 1 2.26e+07
Number of Employees 53,011 990 83 1 99,837
Subsidiary firms only:
Profit before Tax (PBT)F 54,919 4,778 520 1 8.06e+06
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 54,919 3,878 528 1 2.64e+06
Gross Profit Margin (PBT per Sales) 51,531 1.18 .0543 2.71e-05 23,304
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 51,531 .0852 .0549 1.73e-05 64.7
Fixed AssetsF 54,919 27,664 599 1 3.76e+07
Cost of Employees 54,919 7,328 1,391 1 6.33e+06
Number of Employees 54,919 156 29 1 80,146
Notes: Firm data is exported from the AMADEUS database, full version, October 2008.
F Unconsolidated values, in thousand US dollars, current prices.
 = (total liabilities / total assets).
N In billion US dollars, current prices, data from IMF WEO Database October 2008.
J In US dollars, current prices, data from IMF WEO Database October 2008.
I Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI), ranks from 0 (extreme
level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
tribution. However, in robustness checks we reran our regressions including firms with
negative pre-tax profits and did not find qualitatively different results.
The observational unit in our analysis is the multinational affiliate, i.e. the parent or
subsidiary firm per year. In total, our baseline sample comprises 107, 930 observations
from 25, 393 affiliates for the years 1999 to 2006 belonging to 18, 531 multinational
groups. 49.1% of the observations are parent firms. This number may seem surprisingly
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high but simply reflects the fact that our data does not only comprise corporate groups
for which both, the parent firm and at least one corporate subsidiary, are available but
also MNEs for which either one or the other is observed. Since many firms in our
data are parents with subsidiaries outside of Europe (which then are not covered by
AMADEUS), the fraction of parent firms in our sample is quite large.
As our analysis will include fixed effects for the multinational group, the parent bias
is identified via the former set of groups only which accounts for 57, 261 observations.
The rationale for equally keeping the other firms in the sample is that the coefficient
estimates of all other control variables are predicted to be econometrically more precise.
However, as a robustness check, we reran our regressions on the sub-sample of firms
for which parent and subsidiary information is available and found our qualitative
and quantitative results to be confirmed. Note moreover that in this sub-sample of
multinational groups the fraction of parent firms is estimated to be a moderate 23.5%.
Furthermore, to control for country characteristics, we merge data on GDP, GDP per
capita, a corruption index and the statutory corporate tax rate to the firm accounting
data.5 Table 4.2 displays basic descriptive sample statistics.
On average, the affiliates in our sample observe a pre-tax profit of 18.6 million US
dollars, fixed asset investments of 154.3 million and sales of 191.9 million US dollars.
The average firm employs 565 workers. The median of the distributions is substantially
smaller for all three variables. The median for the profitability measures gross profit
margin (i.e. pre-tax profit over sales) and EBIT margin (i.e. earnings before interest
and tax over sales) is estimated with 5.85% and 5.76% respectively. Note, moreover that
the sample characteristics substantially differ between parent firms and subsidiaries.
First, parent firms tend to be larger than their subsidiaries with an average fixed assets
stock of 285.4 million US dollars and a median of 8.61 million versus an average fixed
asset stock of 27.7 million and a median of 0.60 million US dollars at the subsidiary
level. Additionally, the descriptive statistics already suggest a profitability gap between
parents and their subsidiaries as the median of the gross profit margin and EBIT margin
at the parent level is 6.39% and 6.05% respectively, while the median of these ratios at
the subsidiary level is calculated with 5.43% and 5.49% respectively. The next section
will investigate whether these descriptive patterns prevail in an econometric framework.
5The statutory tax rate data is taken from the European Commission. Country data for GDP and
GDP per capita are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2008. The
Corruption Perceptions Index is taken from Transparency International and ranks from 0 (extreme
level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
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4.4 Econometric Approach
Following our theoretical considerations in Section 4.2, we estimate an empirical model
of the following form
log piijt = β0 + β1PARENTijt + β2Xijt + φj + ρt + ijt (4.1)
where piijt represents the profitability measure of affiliate i belonging to multinational
group j at time t. We employ two profit variables which are taken from the firms’
unconsolidated balance sheet information: profit before tax (PBT) and earning before
interest and tax (EBIT). While PBT captures the overall affiliate profit (comprising
operating and financial profits), the EBIT measure depicts the firm’s operating profit.
In the following, we will determine the profitability gap between parents and their
subsidiaries in terms of both variables. Moreover, since the profit variables exhibit a
rather skewed distribution (cf. e.g. the divergence of mean and median in Table 4.2),
we employ a logarithmic transformation.
The explanatory variable of central interest is PARENTijt which depicts a dummy
that takes on the value 1 if the considered affiliate is an independent parent firm and
the value 0 if it is a dependent subsidiary. Our theoretical considerations suggest that
the profitability of assets at the parent firm exceeds the profitability of assets at the
subsidiary and henceforth, β1 > 0. In the contrary, if neither agency costs nor the home
market effect play a decisive role, we expect β1 = 0. Our regressions moreover control
for a set of subsidiary and country characteristics depicted by the vector Xijt. Precisely,
we condition on the size of the multinational affiliate by including the entity’s capital
investment and payroll costs6 and furthermore account for affiliate age to acknowledge
that young firms entering a market may face additional costs.
Moreover, we include a full set of fixed effects for the multinational group to control
for non-observable, MNE specific characteristics φj which may determine the prof-
itability of all affiliates within the group. While the use of a group fixed-effects model
is generally suggestive in our context, it is also preferred to a random effects model by a
Hausman-Test. Furthermore, year dummies ρt are included to capture shocks over time
which are common to all affiliates. Additionally, we account for a full set of country
6Note that including the affiliate’s payroll bill as an explanatory variable controls for both differences
in the wage rate as well as differences in the skill level and productivity of the affiliates’ workers.
Note moreover that we also re-estimate Equation (4.1) accounting for an additional size control by
normalizing on a sales factor, i.e. by employing the affiliate’s gross profit margin (=PBT per sales)
and EBIT margin (=EBIT per sales) as dependent variables.
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dummies. These absorb time-constant country characteristics, for example, differences
in the education and skill level or differences in accounting laws which may translate
into differing reported profitability levels. Apart from that, we also include different
time-varying macro controls which may exert an impact on affiliate profitability (GDP
as a proxy for the market size, GDP per capita as a proxy for the degree of development
of a country, an index of corruption as a proxy for the overall risk of a country and the
statutory corporate tax rate as a proxy for the corporate tax burden). ijt describes
the error term.
4.5 Estimation Results
The following section presents the results for the estimation model specified above.
Section 4.5.1 discusses our baseline regressions. Section 4.5.2 investigates the develop-
ment of the profitability gap over time. Section 4.5.3 assesses the role of agency costs
and the home market effect in driving the results and Section 4.5.4 discusses various
robustness checks. Throughout the analysis, the observational unit is the multinational
affiliate per year. All regressions include a full set of group fixed effects and year fixed
effects. The result tables display the coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, het-
eroscedasticity robust standard errors which are adjusted for clustering at the level of
the multinational group.
4.5.1 Baseline Estimations
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present our baseline estimations. In Table 4.3, we estimate Equation
(4.1) employing the affiliate’s pre-tax profit and EBIT measure as dependent variable.
In Specification (1), we regress the affiliate’s pre-tax profit on a parent dummy and con-
trol variables for the input factors, a full set of group fixed effects and year fixed effects.
As predicted by our theoretical considerations, the coefficient estimate for the parent
dummy exhibits a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Quanti-
tatively, multinational parent firms are suggested to observe a level of pre-tax profits
which is by 88% larger than the pre-tax profits of their subsidiaries. This qualitative
result is robust against the inclusion of a full set of country fixed effects and time-
varying country characteristics (GDP, GDP per capita, corruption index and statutory
corporate tax rate) in Specification (2), the affiliate’s debt-to-assets ratio in Specifica-
tion (3) and a set of two-digit NACE code industry dummy variables in Specification
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Table 4.3: Baseline Estimations I – Higher Parent Profits
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dep. Variable Log (Profit before Tax) Log EBIT
Expl. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .877∗∗∗ .858∗∗∗ .697∗∗∗ .650∗∗∗ .547∗∗∗ .497∗∗∗ .398∗∗∗ .429∗∗∗
(.044) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.043) (.044) (.045) (.045)
Log FixedAssets .231∗∗∗ .227∗∗∗ .216∗∗∗ .214∗∗∗ .148∗∗∗ .141∗∗∗ .136∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007)
Log CostEmpl. .464∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .488∗∗∗ .505∗∗∗ .606∗∗∗ .167∗∗∗ .634∗∗∗ .633∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Leverage Ratio -1.26∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -.720∗∗∗ -.726∗∗∗
(.043) (.043) (.040) (.039)
Log GDP -.238 -.222 -.172 -.209∗∗∗ -.199∗∗∗ -.189∗∗
(.148) (.143) (.184) (.066) (.061) (.079)
Log GDPp.Cap. .609∗∗∗ .414∗∗∗ .339∗ .315∗∗∗ .212∗∗ .203∗
(.169) (.165) (.201) (.101) (.098) (.110)
Log Corruption .231∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .296∗∗∗ .138∗∗ .177∗∗∗ .166∗∗
(.079) (.079) (.079) (.068) (.069) (.069)
Corp. Tax Rate -.962∗∗∗ -.754∗∗∗ -.784∗∗∗ -.609∗∗∗ -.407∗ -.418∗
(.239) (.235) (.236) (.215) (.220) (.220)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dumm.
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dumm.
√ √
# Observations 107,930 107,864 102,227 101,828 107,106 107,046 100,973 100,567
# MNE-Groups 18,531 18,531 18,007 17,923 18,067 18,066 17,514 17,433
Adjusted R2 .7928 .7940 .8033 .8041 .8117 .8140 .8192 .8204
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational parent firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group-fixed-effect is set for belonging
to a MNE-group. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent
firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log CostEmpl. is the natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of
employees. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) and 27 country dummies are included
where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to
the fixed-effects model.
(4). Adding these additional control variables reduces the size of the coefficient esti-
mates for the parent dummy. Specification (4) suggests that (conditioning on the input
factors and the other control variables) parent firms observe pre-tax profits which are
by 65% larger than profits at their corporate subsidiaries.7
In a second step, we re-estimate the regressions presented in Columns (1) to (4)
using EBIT as the dependent variable and thus determining differences in the operat-
ing profitability between parents and their subsidiaries. The results are presented in
7Note moreover that the adjusted R2 in all specifications is high, between 79.3% and 80.4%, increasing
with the set of additional control variables.
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Columns (5) to (8) and qualitatively resemble the results for the pre-tax profit measure
although the point estimates of the parent effect are quantitatively smaller. Column
(8) suggests that (conditioning on the input factors and all other control variables) op-
erating profits at the parent firm are on average by 43% larger than operating profits
at its subsidiaries.
Note that in all specifications the coefficient estimates for the control variables ex-
hibit the expected sign. The corporate input factors, fixed assets investments and cost
of employees, enter positively and are statistically significant suggesting that the pro-
duction displays decreasing returns to scale as the coefficient estimates add up to less
than 1. The leverage ratio has a significant and negative effect on the affiliate’s profit
level which reflects that highly leveraged firms are more dependent on creditors and are
therefore restricted with respect to the riskiness of their projects which results in lower
expected profitability rates. Moreover, the host country’s GDP per capita impacts pos-
itively on firm profits as does a low level of corruption (note that a high corruption
index stands for a low level of corruption). The coefficient estimate for the statutory
corporate tax rate exhibits a negative sign which is commonly interpreted to reflect
profit shifting activities from high-tax to low-tax locations. A country’s GDP exerts a
significantly negative impact in the EBIT specifications which may reflect that a higher
degree of competition in larger consumer markets depresses operating profits.
In Table 4.4, we re-estimate the specifications presented in Table 4.3 adding another
size control by normalizing the specifications on affiliate sales. Thus, we regress the gross
profit margin (= pre-tax-profit/sales) and the EBIT margin(=EBIT/sales) on a set of
control variables comprising the input factors per sales and a size control. The results
are depicted in Table 4.4 and confirm our previous findings as they indicate a large and
statistically significant parent bias. Column (4) suggests that after controlling for input
factors, the firm leverage, macro characteristics and fixed year, country, industry and
MNE-group effects, parent firms are by 65% more profitable than their subsidiaries in
terms of the gross profit margin. Column (5) to (8) re-estimate the specifications using
the EBIT margin as the dependent variable and find comparable, although somewhat
smaller, coefficient estimates. The most conservative estimate in Column (8) suggests
a profitability gap of about 30%.
Note that we additionally experimented with other profitability measures which
imply the normalization of the estimation Equation (4.1) on an affiliate’s to-
tal assets (PBT/TotalAssets, EBIT/TotalAssets) and its number of employees
(PBT/NumberEmplyees, EBIT/NumberEmployees), respectively. These regressions
show comparable results which are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4.4: Baseline Estimations II – Higher Parent Profitability
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dep. Variable Log (Profit b. Tax per Sales) Log (EBIT per Sales)
Expl. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .930∗∗∗ .927∗∗∗ .746∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .443∗∗∗ .299∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
(.046) (.048) (.048) (.047) (.038) (.039) (.039) (.039)
Log (FixedAssets .444∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .407∗∗∗ .369∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .183∗∗∗ .145∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗
per Sales) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.014) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Log (CostEmpl. .043∗∗∗ .032∗ .014 .016 -.054∗∗∗ -.039∗∗ -.061∗∗∗ -.068∗∗∗
per Sales) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Log FixedAssets -.243∗∗∗ -.255∗∗∗ -.222∗∗∗ -.200∗∗∗ -.120∗∗∗ -.112∗∗∗ -.087∗∗∗ -.089∗∗∗
(.009) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Leverage Ratio -1.57∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗
(.044) (.043) (.035) (.035)
Log GDP -.217 -.193 -.141 -.182∗∗∗ -.165∗∗∗ -.148∗∗
(.148) (.143) (.183) (.064) (.061) (.071)
Log GDPp.Cap. .568∗∗∗ .322∗∗ .231 .169∗ -.012 -.025
(.167) (.162) (.198) (.093) (.090) (.097)
Log Corruption .170∗∗ .274∗∗∗ .275∗∗∗ .105∗ .190∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗
(.079) (.077) (.077) (.065) (.064) (.064)
Corp. Tax Rate -.652∗∗∗ -.351 -.362 -.311 .033 .016
(.231) (.226) (.227) (.197) (.199) (.200)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dumm.
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dumm.
√ √
# Observations 100,181 100,117 94,893 94,525 99,846 99,786 94,143 93,766
# MNE-Groups 17,191 17,191 16,702 16,624 16,846 16,845 16,337 16,261
Adjusted R2 .5987 .6003 .6303 .6340 .4662 .4698 .4976 .5010
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational parent firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group-fixed-effect is set for belonging to
a MNE-group. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm
and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log (CostEmpl. per Sales) is the natural logarithm (Log) of the cost
of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) and 27 country dummies
are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression
equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
4.5.2 Development over Time
Thus, our baseline analysis provides evidence for a significant and quantitatively rel-
evant parent bias in the location of profitable operations across multinational affili-
ates. As discussed above, this effect is however not necessarily constant over time. If
agency costs contribute to the profitability gap between parents and their corporate
subsidiaries, one might presume that the profitability gap has declined in the past
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Table 4.5: Extension I – Development over Time
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dep. Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT/Sales) Log(EBIT/Sales)
Expl. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .968∗∗∗ .714∗∗∗ .635∗∗∗ .503∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ .702∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .360∗∗∗
(.047) (.049) (.045) (.047) (.049) (.049) (.040) (.041)
Parent×Time -.024∗∗∗ -.017∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗ -.020∗∗∗ -.025∗∗∗ -.015∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗ -.019∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Time .062∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .031∗∗∗ .026∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗
(.003) (.007) (.003) (.006) (.003) (.007) (.003) (.006)
Log FixedAss. .233∗∗∗ .216∗∗∗ .151∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ -.243∗∗∗ -.199∗∗∗ -.119∗∗∗ -.088∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.007) (.008)
Log CostEmpl. .463∗∗∗ .504∗∗∗ .604∗∗∗ .632∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.011) (.012)
Log (FixedAss. .446∗∗∗ .370∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗ .138∗∗∗
per Sales) (.015) (.014) (.010) (.010)
Log (CostEmpl. .041∗∗ .015 -.056∗∗∗ -.069∗∗∗
per Sales) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.019)
Leverage Ratio -1.26∗∗∗ -.722∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
(.042) (.039) (.043) (.035)
Log GDP -.163 -.171∗∗ -.134 -.133∗∗
(.181) (.073) (.181) (.066)
Log GDPp.Cap. .263 .106 .167 -.113
(.199) (.107) (.198) (.095)
Log Corruption .296∗∗∗ .166∗∗ .273∗∗∗ .183∗∗∗
(.079) (.069) (.077) (.064)
Corp. Tax Rate -.781∗∗∗ -.414∗ -.350 .033
(.236) (.220) (.227) (.200)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dumm.
√ √ √ √
Industry Dumm.
√ √ √ √
# Observations 107,930 101,828 107,106 100,567 100,181 94,525 99,846 93,766
# MNE-Groups 18,531 17,923 18,067 17,433 17,191 16,624 16,846 16,261
Adjusted R2 .7930 .8042 .8119 .8205 .5990 .6341 .4668 .5013
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational parent firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group-fixed-effect is set for belonging
to a MNE-group. The abbreviation PBT stands for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy
variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Time is set
to 0 for the year 1999, 1 for 2000, 2 for 2001,... and 7 for 2006, with a mean of 3.5. Parent×Time
is the interaction term between Parent Dummy and Time. Log (Cost Employees per Sales) is the
natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit
level) and 27 country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from
a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
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decade since the rise of new technologies has facilitated communication and informa-
tion exchange and has consequently lowered agency costs for monitoring operations at
geographically separated affiliates. The same pattern might to some extent also prevail
if the home market effect drives the profitability gap since markets in the EU have
become more open and a proceeding integration may have enlarged the knowledge of
local customs and consumption behavior.
To empirically assess this hypothesis, we interact our parent dummy variable with a
linear time trend.8 The results are presented in Table 4.5. In Column (1), we regress
the pre-tax profit measure on the parent dummy and the time trend interaction. In line
with our presumption, the coefficient estimate for the parent dummy exhibits a positive
sign and is statistically significant while the coefficient estimate for the interaction term
between the parent dummy and the time trend exhibits a significantly negative sign.
Consequently, while in our first sample year 1999 parents observe a pre-tax profit
(conditioned on the input factors) which is about twice as large as the pre-tax profit
at their subsidiaries, this profitability gap closes by around 2.4 percentage points in
each of the successive years. This corresponds to a closure of the profitability gap
by 17% in our 7-year sample period. This result is confirmed when we account for
additional control variables in Specification (2) or alternative profitability measures
in Specifications (3) to (8). Note that in terms of the EBIT margin (Column (7) and
(8)), the decline in the profitability gap is reported to be quantitatively even more
pronounced since the profitability gap between the parent and the subsidiary closes by
37% or 13.3 percentage points from its initial level of 36%.9
4.5.3 A Closer Look: Agency Costs and Home Market Effect
As described in Section 4.2, we presume that the profitability gap between headquarters
and their subsidiaries may be driven by agency costs or home market advantages. The
aim of the following section is to get an idea whether and to what extent the two
mechanisms contribute to the profitability gap.
To disentangle the role of agency costs and the home market effect, we split the sam-
8The linear time trend variable takes on the value 0 for our first sample year 1999, the value 1 for the
second sample year and so on.
9As a sensitivity check, we interacted the parent dummy variable with a dummy for each sample year.
All coefficient estimates exhibit a negative sign and smoothly grow in absolute size over time which
suggests a steady decline of the profitability gap in our sample period. The results are available from
the authors upon request.
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ple in “horizontal” and “vertical” foreign direct investments. As explained in Section
4.2, the agency costs theory largely relates to the notion of “vertical” FDI as the argu-
ment refers to the location choice of different operations in the multinational value chain
that may vary in their corporate profitability. In the contrary, the home market effect
largely relates to the notion of “horizontal” FDI as it discusses potential profitability
differences in selling the same product on different markets. To identify “horizontal”
and “vertical” investment in our sample, we exploit four-digit NACE industry informa-
tion on the parent and its corporate subsidiaries. Precisely, if the subsidiary operates
in the same four-digit NACE industry as the parent firm, it is classified as “horizon-
tal” FDI whereas it is considered “vertical” FDI if it operates in a different four-digit
industry. Consequently, we run two sets of regressions: one, in which we include only
subsidiaries that observe the same four-digit NACE industry as their parent, and a
second, in which we include only subsidiaries that observe a different four-digit indus-
try than their parent. The results are presented in Table 4.6. Specifications (1) and (2)
re-estimate our baseline regressions for the two sub-groups employing the profit before
taxation (PBT) measure as dependent variable. The coefficient estimate for the par-
ent dummy variable is positive and statistically significant in both samples indicating
that the profitability gap between headquarters firms and their subsidiaries prevails in
horizontal investment settings as well as in vertical investment settings. Thus, we may
conclude that our sample indicates that both, home market advantages and agency
costs drive a wedge between the profitability of headquarters and subsidiaries (where
the impact of the former appears to be quantitatively larger).
In Specifications (3) and (4) of Table 4.6, we interact the parent dummy with a linear
time trend following our analysis in the previous section. Interestingly, we find that the
size of the profitability gap between headquarters and subsidiaries remains constant
over time in the sample accounting for horizontal subsidiaries (and the home market
effect respectively) while it significantly declines in the sample accounting for vertical
subsidiaries (and the agency costs theory respectively). In the context of our theoretical
presumptions, this suggests that technological advances have indeed induced a fall in
agency costs over the last decade while advantages of operating in home markets have
remained largely unchanged.10 Finally, we re-estimate the presented PBT-regressions
10A third mechanism which may drive the profitability gap between parents and their subsidiaries and
has not yet been discussed in the paper is that MNEs potentially bias the distribution of their profits
in favor of the headquarters firm to save withholding taxes on dividend payments from subsidiaries
to their parent. However, as the withholding taxes on dividends have been low between EU countries
over the last decades and were abolished through the EU’s Parent-Subsidiary Directive in 2004, we
consider this to be an unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we reran our regressions
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Table 4.6: Extension II – Vertical & Horizontal FDI
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dep. Variable Log PBT Log PBT Log EBIT Log EBIT
Expl. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .917∗∗∗ .608∗∗∗ .917∗∗∗ .677∗∗∗ .630∗∗∗ .368∗∗∗ .686∗∗∗ .437∗∗∗
(.092) (.060) (.119) (.066) (.097) (.059) (.118) (.064)
Parent×Time -.000 -.018∗∗∗ -.014 -.018∗∗∗
(.016) (.007) (.016) (.006)
Time .038∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ .045∗∗ .025∗∗∗
(.020) (.012) (.019) (.011)
Log FixedAssets .164∗∗∗ .240∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .241∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ .158∗∗∗ .131∗∗∗ .160∗∗∗
(.012) (.011) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.010) (.012) (.010)
Log CostEmpl. .466∗∗∗ .472∗∗∗ .466∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .611∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .610∗∗∗
(.018) (.016) (.018) (.016) (.020) (.017) (.020) (.017)
Leverage Ratio -1.172∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -1.172∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -.607∗∗∗ -.656∗∗∗ -.607∗∗∗ -.655∗∗∗
(.061) (.062) (.061) (.062) (.058) (.054) (.058) (.054)
Log GDP -.238∗ -.251∗ -.238∗ -.244∗ -.108∗∗ -.157∗∗ -.106∗∗ -.148∗∗
(.137) (.137) (.137) (.136) (.052) (.066) (.052) (.063)
Log GDPp.Cap. .166 .514∗∗∗ .166 .453∗∗ -.125 .161 -.142 .094
(.213) (.196) (.214) (.195) (.155) (.140) (.156) (.138)
Log Corruption .431∗∗∗ .399∗∗∗ .431∗∗∗ .387∗∗ .260∗∗∗ .226∗∗∗ .260∗∗∗ .215∗∗∗
(.112) (.102) (.112) (.102) (.098) (.087) (.098) (.088)
Corp. Tax Rate -.425 -.800∗∗∗ -.425 -.767∗∗ -.000 -.541∗ .006 -.505∗
(.338) (.318) (.338) (.317) (.326) (.299) (.327) (.298)
Investment Type H V H V H V H V
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dumm.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dumm.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 53,071 62,441 53,071 62,441 51,437 60,854 51,437 60,854
# MNE-Groups 11,187 17,923 11,187 17,923 10,652 10,854 10,652 10,854
Adjusted R2 .6037 .6416 .6037 .6419 .6637 .6762 .6644 .6766
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational parent firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group-fixed-effect is set for belonging
to a MNE-group. The abbreviation PBT stands for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy
variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Time is set
to 0 for the year 1999, 1 for 2000, 2 for 2001,..., and 7 for 2006, with a mean of 3.5. Parent×Time
is the interaction term between Parent Dummy and Time. Log CostEmpl. is the natural logarithm
(Log) of the cost of employees. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) and 27 country
dummies are included in all regressions. Moreover, the investment type “H” indicates horizontal FDI,
i.e. the corresponding regressions in Column (1), (3), (5) and (7) include only subsidiaries for which
the subsidiary observes the same four-digit NACE code industry as the parent firm. Analogously, the
investment type “V” indicates vertical FDI, i.e. the corresponding regressions in Column (2), (4), (6)
and (8) include only subsidiaries for which the subsidiary operates in a different four-digit NACE
code industry than the parent firm. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables
regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
excluding all subsidiary-year combinations from our sample which face a non-zero withholding tax
rate on dividends. As this sample restriction does neither qualitatively nor quantitatively change
our findings, we are confident that withholding taxes are not a major driver of our results.
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using EBIT as the dependent variable and find comparable results (see Specifications
(5) to (8) of Table 4.6).
4.5.4 Robustness Checks
Last, we ran a set of sensitivity checks. Due to space restrictions, many of the robustness
checks are only sketched in the text whereas the detailed results are available from the
authors upon request.
First, we hedge against the possibility that our parent dummy estimate picks up
a firm age effect. Younger corporations are often perceived to be less profitable than
more established firms since they e.g. still have to engage in upfront investments. As
parent firms are commonly older than their subsidiaries, the observed profitability gap
may simply reflect this age difference. Thus, we rerun our baseline specifications and
additionally include the firm age as a control variable. The results are presented in Table
4.7 and indicate that the profitability gap is robust against controlling for firm age.11
The coefficient estimates for the parent dummy is almost unchanged in size compared
to the specifications without the age control variable. Moreover, the coefficient estimate
for the age variable exhibits the expected positive sign, suggesting that more established
firms earn higher returns on their input factors. Since the information on the date of
incorporation is not available for all firms in the database, the number of observations
drops by around 20%.
In a second step, we furthermore investigate whether our results are unique to the
international context or whether the profitability gap prevails on a domestic scale. To
assess the profitability gap within national groups, we use a sample of domestic enter-
prises, i.e. parent firms and their domestic subsidiaries, drawn from the AMADEUS
data base for the same countries and years as our baseline sample.12 The regressions
include around 450, 000 observations from about 80, 000 affiliates. The results are pre-
sented in Table 4.8 and show qualitatively the same picture as our baseline regressions
11The specifications presented in Table 4.7 use the logarithm of firm age as explanatory variable since
the firm age distribution is considerably skewed. Alternatively, taking no logarithmic transformation
of the age variable and additionally including the quadratic transformation yields the same estima-
tions results. Then, the coefficient estimate for the age variable turns out to be positive while the
coefficient estimate for the age-squared variable is significantly negative.
12The parents in this new sample are domestic ultimate owners of their subsidiaries, i.e. some of the
parent firms may observe a foreign shareholder implying that they operate on an international scale.
In a sensitivity check, we restricted the sample to purely national groups without any international
ownership connections and found comparable results.
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Table 4.7: Robustness Check I – Control for Firm Age
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dep. Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT/Sales) Log(EBIT/Sales)
Expl. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .923∗∗∗ .729∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .467∗∗∗ .963∗∗∗ .740∗∗∗ .446∗∗∗ .295∗∗∗
(.058) (.061) (.058) (.060) (.063) (.062) (.055) (.054)
Log Age .117∗∗∗ .067∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .046∗∗ .097∗∗∗ .045∗∗ .025 .012
(.020) (.021) (.019) (.020) (.022) (.021) (.016) (.016)
Log FixedAssets .214∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ -.286∗∗∗ -.235∗∗∗ -.119∗∗∗ -.087∗∗∗
(.011) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.013) (.014) (.011) (.011)
Log CostEmpl. .427∗∗∗ .478∗∗∗ .577∗∗∗ .607∗∗∗
(.015) (.017) (.015) (.016)
Log (FixedAss. .471∗∗∗ .392∗∗∗ .172∗∗∗ .121∗∗∗
per Sales) (.019) (.019) (.013) (.013)
Log (CostEmpl. .017 .008 -.116∗∗∗ -.115∗∗∗
per Sales) (.020) (.021) (.019) (.020)
Leverage Ratio -1.22∗∗∗ -.642∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗
(.053) (.048) (.054) (.042)
Log GDP -.130 -.135∗∗ -.109 -.116∗
(.170) (.060) (.176) (.062)
Log GDPp.Cap. .201 .006 .206 -.079
(.206) (.116) (.208) (.106)
Log Corruption .312∗∗∗ .199∗∗ .272∗∗∗ .185∗∗
(.093) (.082) (.092) (.076)
Corp. Tax Rate -.842∗∗∗ -.298 -.487∗ .037
(.281) (.265) (.275) (.243)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dumm.
√ √ √ √
Industry Dumm.
√ √ √ √
# Observations 78,012 74,272 76,706 72,696 72,121 68,707 71,242 67,564
# MNE-Groups 14,785 14,368 14,303 13,855 13,607 13,239 13,240 12,843
Adjusted R2 .8161 .8248 .8359 .8422 .6596 .6858 .5182 .5442
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational parent firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group-fixed-effect is set for belonging
to a MNE-group. The abbreviation PBT stands for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy
variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age
is the natural logarithm (Log) of the firm age in years. Log (CostEmpl. per Sales) is the natural
logarithm of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) and
27 country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy
variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
for MNEs whereas the estimated profitability gap is however - as expected - quantita-
tively smaller (roughly one third of the profitability gap in the baseline specifications).13
13Note that the coefficient estimates for the parent dummy in the multinational baseline and the
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Table 4.8: Robustness Check II – Parents vs. Domestic Subsidiaries
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dep. Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT/Sales) Log(EBIT/Sales)
Expl. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .360∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .084∗∗∗ .252∗∗∗ .463∗∗∗ .229∗∗∗ .189∗∗∗ .128∗∗∗
(.011) (.023) (.012) (.022) (.011) (.022) (.010) (.019)
Log FixedAss. .253∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗ .222∗∗∗ .220∗∗∗ -.290∗∗∗ -.229∗∗∗ -.172∗∗∗ -.136∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Log CostEmpl. .362∗∗∗ .376∗∗∗ .460∗∗∗ .443∗∗∗
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Log (FixedAss. .488∗∗∗ .408∗∗∗ .295∗∗∗ .242∗∗∗
per Sales) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005)
Log (CostEmpl. -.042∗∗∗ -.055∗∗∗ -.161∗∗∗ -.168∗∗∗
per Sales) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006)
Leverage Ratio -1.19∗∗∗ -.499∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗ -.961∗∗∗
(.022) (.021) (.021) (.019)
Log Age .074∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗ .015∗∗ -.019∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005)
Log GDP -.075∗∗∗ -.065∗∗∗ -.058∗∗ -.040∗
(.025) (.024) (.025) (.023)
Log GDPp.Cap. -.026 -.095 .004 -.061
(.065) (.059) (.061) (.052)
Log Corruption -.196∗∗∗ -.192∗∗∗ -.265∗∗∗ -.253∗∗∗
(.052) (.047) (.051) (.043)
Corp. Tax Rate -.607∗∗∗ -.439∗∗∗ -.281∗ -.265∗∗
(.159) (.145) (.156) (.131)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dumm.
√ √ √ √
# Observations 519,915 466,129 508,344 453,835 454,167 405,509 453,271 403,135
# Firm-Groups 89,241 84,105 85,856 80,617 74,266 69,995 72,938 68,526
Adjusted R2 .7729 .7838 .7931 .8012 .6013 .6357 .5136 .5405
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
domestic parent firms and domestic subsidiaries. A group-fixed-effect is set for belonging to a
firm-group. The abbreviation PBT stands for Profit before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable
set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the natural
logarithm (Log) of the firm age in years. Log (CostEmpl. per Sales) is the natural logarithm of the
cost of employees per sales. 88 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) are included where
indicated. Country dummies are not included due to no variation in the country of a parent and their
subsidiary(ies) which is a condition in a fixed-effects model. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from
a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
domestic sensitivity regression are statistically different at the 99% confidence level. Moreover, in
the latter regressions the corruption index enters negatively suggesting a risk premium required by
domestic corporations doing business (that mostly have no international location opportunity like
MNEs) if corruption is high and property rights are less protected (represented by a low index).
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Moreover, we hedge against potential reverse causality problems which may arise
if highly profitable firms are more likely to be a multinational parent. This might be
problematic, especially as in mergers & acquisition the more profitable firm is perceived
to commonly take over the less profitable one. To account for this possibility, we run
a robustness check identifying corporate affiliates which were either acquired by a
corporate group in the past or which took over a foreign subsidiary through an M&A
by using Bureau van Dijk’s ZEPHYR database which contains M&A back until 1997.
Excluding these affiliates from the data does neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
change our results.14
In further robustness checks, we reran our regressions including only subsidiaries that
do not own any further subsidiaries themselves which slightly increased the quantitative
coefficient estimates of the parent dummy. Moreover, we excluded holding companies
from our baseline MNE-sample which likewise strengthened the profitability bias. Ad-
ditionally, we repeated the regression analysis including affiliates with negative profits
which leaves our qualitative results unaffected. Last, we split our baseline MNE-sample
into ten industry groups (at the NACE 1-digit level) and found the profitability gap
between parent firms and their foreign subsidiaries to be rather homogeneous across
the industries.
4.6 Implications for Public Economics
Our analysis finds robust evidence for a profitability bias in the location of valuable
operations and projects in favor of the parent firm. Although the documented prof-
itability gap between parent and subsidiary firms has declined over the recent years,
we still find it to be sizable. Our results have implications for several areas of public
economics and policy making.
Firstly, several papers in the literature have suggested that the wages bargained for
workers at a multinational affiliate are strongly dependent on the affiliate’s profitability
14Note, however, that the data indeed indicates that in M&A more profitable firms on average take
over less profitable ones. Moreover, since there is some (weak) positive correlation between the parent
dummy variable and the size of the input factors, we account for potential reverse causality between
the profitability measure and the input factors by rerunning our equations and instrumenting for the
input factor variables fixed assets (per sales) and cost of employees (per sales) and for the leverage
ratio through lagged values of these variables. The regressions show neither a qualitative nor a
quantitative change in our parent dummy effect and thus suggest no serious endogeneity problems
with these firm variables.
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(see e.g. Budd, Konings, and Slaughter, 2005). In the context of our paper, this would
suggest that workers at multinational headquarters firms earn higher wages than com-
parable workers at the subsidiary level. Our data is unfortunately not well suited to
investigate this question as we do not observe information on the employees’ skill level.
Thus, although preliminary estimates show a positive correlation between the parent
dummy and workers’ wages, we cannot exclude that this correlation is driven by an
unobservable variable bias. Thus, we have to delegate this question to future research.
4.6.1 Higher Parent Tax Payments
Furthermore, our results imply that headquarters firms pay higher taxes on their cor-
porate activity than subsidiaries, simply because headquarters activities are more prof-
itable. To test this implication empirically, we use our baseline sample and regress an
affiliate’s unconsolidated (actual) tax payments on the parent dummy and on a set of
control variables (size controls, a full set of group fixed effects, country fixed effects, in-
dustry fixed effects and time-varying country characteristics). The results are depicted
in Table 4.9. While the specifications presented in Columns (1) to (4) use the level
of an affiliate’s tax payments as the dependent variable, the specifications in Columns
(5) to (8) are normalized on the affiliate’s sales variable and thus the regressand is tax
payments per sales. In all specifications, the coefficient estimate for the parent dummy
exhibits a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Quantitatively,
parent firms pay by 61% higher tax payments on their corporate activity compared to
their subsidiaries (cf. Column (8) of Table 4.9).
There may be concerns that the gap in tax payments between headquarters and
their subsidiaries is driven by residence based taxation in the MNE’s home country
which may enhance the MNE’s tax bill at the headquarters location. As this argument
refers to a relatively small number of European countries with residence based taxation
according to a credit system (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Great Britain, Greece,
Ireland, Poland, Romania), we reran our regressions excluding all groups that are
headquartered in a country with a credit system and found our results qualitatively
and quantitatively unchanged. The results are available from the authors upon request.
Note furthermore that we observe the same qualitative results of the parent dummy on
tax payments for our sample of parent firms and their domestic subsidiaries. However,
to a lesser extent as also the profitability gap is smaller for this sample.
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Table 4.9: Implication I – Higher Parent Tax Payments
OLS Group–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Depend. Variable Log (Tax Payments) Log (Tax Payments per Sales)
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .874∗∗∗ .802∗∗∗ .656∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .875∗∗∗ .812∗∗∗ .637∗∗∗ .614∗∗∗
(.081) (.081) (.082) (.083) (.087) (.088) (.088) (.085)
Log FixedAssets .119∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗ .107∗∗∗ .109∗∗∗ -.242∗∗∗ -.253∗∗∗ -.230∗∗∗ -.228∗∗∗
(.013) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.016) (.017) (.017) (.018)
Log CostEmployees .562∗∗∗ .553∗∗∗ .581∗∗∗ .577∗∗∗
(.019) (.020) (.021) (.022)
Log (FixedAssets .325∗∗ .341∗∗∗ .301∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
per Sales) (.022) (.023) (.024) (.023)
Log (CostEmployees .061∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗ .055∗∗ .048∗
per Sales) (.025) (.027) (.027) (.029)
Leverage Ratio -1.08∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -1.41∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗
(.067) (.068) (.064) (.065)
Log Age .119∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗
(.026) (.026)
Log GDP -2.30∗∗∗ -2.13∗∗∗ -1.89∗∗ -2.16∗∗∗ -1.99∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗
(.822) (.823) (.833) (.799) (.790) (.800)
Log GDPp.Cap. 2.52∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗
(.844) (.841) (.857) (.817) (.804) (.819)
Log Corruption .079 .122 .122 .034 .090 .107
(.128) (.127) (.127) (.129) (.126) (.127)
Corp. Tax Rate 2.14∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗
(.431) (.430) (.432) (.433) (.429) (.433)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √
# Observations 51,878 51,851 48,949 47,640 48,262 48,235 45,516 44,291
# MNE-Groups 9,406 9,405 9,118 8,923 8,698 8,697 8,439 8,269
Adjusted R2 .7692 .7758 .7831 .7839 .5392 .5500 .5676 .5749
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are profit-making
multinational parent firms and multinational subsidiaries. A group-fixed-effect is set for belonging to
a MNE-group. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent firm
and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the natural logarithm (Log) of the firm age in years. Log
(CostEmployees per Sales) is the natural logarithm of the cost of employees per sales. 53 industry
dummies (NACE Rev.1 2-digit level) and 27 country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted
R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
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4.6.2 Effect on Profit Shifting Behavior
Along the same lines, the documented profitability bias between parents and sub-
sidiaries might well influence multinational profit shifting behavior in response to cor-
porate tax rate differentials.15 Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, as well as a large literature
(e.g. Clausing, 2003, or Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) show that MNEs engage in profit
shifting activities from high-tax to low-tax countries in order to reduce their corpo-
rate tax burden. If MNEs are however reluctant to relocate profitable operations and
profitable assets away from the headquarters firm then they might as well respond less
to tax rate differentials between the headquarters and the corporate subsidiaries if the
head office is located in a high-tax country. In the contrary, if the headquarters firm
is located in a low-tax country and consequently profit shifting activities run from the
subsidiaries towards the headquarters location, profit shifting is expected to be strongly
responsive to tax rate differentials. We will investigate this notion in the following.
As argued by our theoretical considerations in Section 4.2, the location of profitable
functions and projects away from the headquarters firm may be costly for the central
management since this involves to monitor functions across physical distances. More-
over, the central management may have an incentive to locate profits at the parent
firm to exert direct control over their use. For example, a comprehensive literature on
the funding of corporate investment activities documents a pecking order with respect
to financing modes for new investment projects which is led by funding via retained
earnings (see Majluf and Myers, 1984). Last, several papers report a positive causal
effect of affiliate profitability on the wage level of workers. Consequently, the central
management may have an incentive to locate a high fraction of profits at the headquar-
ters to justify high wages for themselves and their co-workers. These arguments predict
that the profit shifting activities are not homogeneous across multinational affiliates
but decisively depend on the location of the headquarters.
Table 4.10 displays the results of our OLS regression analysis including subsidiary
firm fixed effects. In line with Chapter 2 and 3, as well as with previous studies, we give
indirect evidence for profit shifting behavior by regressing subsidiary pre-tax profits on
various firm and country control variables and additionally on the tax rate differential
between the subsidiary and the headquarters.16 This tax measure captures the direct
15This subsection is based on a companion paper (Dischinger and Riedel, 2010) and is not included
in the working paper version of Dischinger and Riedel (2009).
16See Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2 for the estimation equation and a detailed description of the econo-
metric approach.
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incentive to relocate profits between the two affiliates. However, in contrast to existing
work, we account for a potential heterogeneity in profit shifting activities between
parent and subsidiary firms depending on the shifting direction and hence on whether
the parent is located in a country with a higher or lower corporate tax rate than the
subsidiary. To investigate this effect, we focus solely on the sub-sample of subsidiaries
and define the dummy variable High-Tax-Subs which takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary
is located in a country with a higher statutory corporate tax rate than its parent and
the value 0 otherwise. Interacting this dummy with the tax rate difference between the
subsidiary and the parent should capture the potential heterogeneity in the effect.
The results are presented in Column (1) and (2) of Table 4.10. In line with our
theoretical considerations, we find that the coefficient estimate for the tax difference
to the parent is negative but small and not statistically significant while the coefficient
of the interaction term (TaxDiff)×(High-Tax-Subs) suggests a large and significantly
negative effect. The regression result thus shows that profits before taxation are very
sensitive to tax rate differences if profit is shifted from the subsidiary towards the
headquarters location but are not sensitive to tax differentials if profit shifting flows
away from the headquarters. This effect is in line with our observed parent bias of
profitability in Section 4.5. The effect turns out to be robust against the inclusion of
industry-year dummy variables and the financial leverage ratio in Specification (2) of
Table 4.10.
For a more rigorous econometric identification of this asymmetric profit shifting
behavior, we split the sample of subsidiaries into the two subgroups of subsidiaries
that exhibit a larger (High–Tax–Subs) and a smaller corporate tax rate (Low–Tax–
Subs) than the parent. In addition, this allows for differing coefficient estimates for the
control variables in the two subgroups and should improve our estimates. The results are
presented in Columns (3) to (6) of Table 4.10. In line with the pooled specifications, we
again find evidence for substantial profit shifting activities from subsidiaries in high-tax
countries towards the (low-tax) headquarters location (cf. Columns (3) and (4)) while
no shifting seems to take place in the other direction from high-tax parents towards
their low-tax subsidiaries (cf. Columns (5) and (6)). Note that the respective coefficient
estimates of the tax differential for these two subgroups are statistically different from
each other at the 5% significance level.
As a test of robustness, we additionally analyze the other endpoint of the profit
shifting linkage and therefore focus solely on the sub-sample of parents undertaking a
corresponding estimation method.17 In this analysis, we expect inverse effects compared
17Note that in this parent firm sub-sample, we only account for parents with at least 100 employees
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Table 4.10: Implication IIa – Effect on Profit Shifting – Subsidiary Sample
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation)
Sub–sample All Subsidiaries High–Tax–Subs Low–Tax–Subs
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax Difference to Parent -.036 -.168 -1.23∗∗ -1.31∗∗ .208 .149
(.186) (.190) (.583) (.588) (.210) (.219)
(TaxDiff)×(High-Tax-Subs) -.905∗ -.885∗
(.538) (.542)
High-Tax-Subs Dummy .061∗∗ .049∗∗
(.025) (.025)
Log FixedAssets .098∗∗∗ .115∗∗∗ .091∗∗∗ .100∗∗∗ .106∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.019) (.019) (.011) (.012)
Log Employees .375∗∗∗ .396∗∗∗ .355∗∗∗ .371∗∗∗ .366∗∗∗ .388∗∗∗
(.016) (.017) (.035) (.036) (.020) (.021)
Leverage Ratio -1.09∗∗∗ -.872∗∗∗ -1.16∗∗∗
(.045) (.095) (.055)
Log GDP -3.73∗∗∗ -3.84∗∗∗ -3.54∗∗∗ -3.59∗∗∗ -5.96∗∗∗ -6.21∗∗∗
(.680) (.717) (1.29) (1.32) (.969) (1.04)
Log GDP per Capita 3.83∗∗∗ 3.72∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 5.86∗∗∗ 5.84∗∗∗
(.643) (.681) (1.29) (1.32) (.913) (.982)
Log Corruption -.142 -.122 .144 .111 -.262∗ -.195
(.099) (.103) (.179) (.183) (.147) (.155)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √ √
# Observations 61,535 55,254 17,682 16,280 39,608 35,024
# Subsidiary Firms 17,482 15,979 5,963 5,533 12,664 11,472
Adjusted R2 .8177 .8278 .7964 .8042 .8295 .8411
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are profit-making
multinational subsidiaries that have no further subsidiaries. A fixed-effect is set for each observational
unit. Sub-sample High(Low)–Tax–Subs consists solely of subsidiaries that exhibit a higher (lower)
statutory corporate tax rate than their parent firm. Tax Difference to Parent equals the subsidiary
tax rate minus the parent tax rate. High-Tax-Subs Dummy is set to 1 if an observational unit
exhibit a higher tax rate than the parent and set to 0 otherwise. (TaxDiff)×(High-Tax-Subs) is the
interaction term between Tax Difference to Parent and High-Tax-Subs Dummy. Log Employees is
the natural logarithm (Log) of the number of employees. 130 industry-year dummies (NACE Rev.1
1-digit level) are included where indicated.
to the results of Table 4.10, meaning that in the subgroup of High–Tax–Parents, pre-tax
profits should show no sensitivity to tax differentials while in the subgroup of Low–
Tax–Parents we should find a significant effect. The regression results are displayed in
Table 4.11.
The sub-sample of High(Low)–Tax–Parents consists solely of parents that have at
as small parent firms seems not to be engaged in such tax planning strategies.
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Table 4.11: Implication IIb – Effect on Profit Shifting – Parent Sample
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation)
Sub–sample High–Tax–Parents Low–Tax–Parents
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Av.TaxDiff to All Subs -.137 -.078 -.364 -1.03∗∗ -1.03∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗
(.479) (.503) (.499) (.477) (.476) (.479)
Log FixedAssets .097∗∗ .096∗∗ .106∗∗ .142∗∗∗ .133∗∗∗ .144∗∗∗
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.032) (.031) (.032)
Log Employees .281∗∗∗ .285∗∗∗ .274∗∗∗ .339∗∗∗ .348∗∗∗ .385∗∗∗
(.046) (.046) (.047) (.066) (.065) (.067)
Leverage Ratio -1.39∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗
(.164) (.145)
Log GDP -2.30 -2.67∗ -.091 -.104
(1.63) (1.57) (.095) (.103)
Log GDP per Capita 2.48 3.04∗ .562∗ .428
(1.83) (1.76) (.323) (.325)
Log Corruption .122 .131 -.028 -.184
(.211) (.214) (.331) (.344)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √
# Observations 10,957 10,957 10,795 9,864 9,864 9,678
# Parent Firms 3,162 3,162 3,123 2,784 2,784 2,741
Adjusted R2 .8313 .8314 .8380 .8495 .8495 .8538
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are profit-making
multinational parent firms with at least 100 employees. A fixed-effect is set for each observational
unit. Sub-sample High(Low)–Tax–Parents consists of solely parents that have at least 2/3 of
their wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in low(high)-tax countries, relative to the parent tax rate.
Av.TaxDiff to All Subs is the average statutory corporate tax rate difference of the parent to all its
wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, i.e. the parent tax rate minus the unweighted average tax rate
of all wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. Log Employees is the natural logarithm (Log) of the num-
ber of employees. 130 industry-year dummies (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level) are included where indicated.
least 2/3 of their wholly owned foreign subsidiaries located in a country with a lower
(higher) tax rate than the parent. To capture the precise incentive to relocate prof-
its between the parent and all its subsidiaries, the proper tax measure in this parent
firm analysis is the average statutory corporate tax rate difference of the parent to
all its wholly owned foreign subsidiaries (Av.TaxDiff to All Subs), which is calculated
as the parent tax rate minus the (unweighted) average tax rate of all wholly owned
foreign subsidiaries. Finally, the estimations in Table 4.11 suggest that pre-tax profits
of parents that have the bulk of their subsidiaries located in a low-tax country do not
react sensitive to the average tax differential to all subsidiaries (cf. Columns (1)–(3)).
On the contrary, the average tax differential obtains a significantly negative effects on
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pre-tax profits of parents that exhibit the bulk of their subsidiaries in a high-tax coun-
try (cf. Columns (4)–(6)). Thus, for these low-tax parents, a lower tax rate relative to
their subsidiaries leads to a higher level of profits before taxation, all else kept equal.
Summing up, we find evidence that low-tax parents receive shifted profits from their
(high-tax) subsidiaries but we find no evidence for high-tax parents shifting profits to
their (low-tax) subsidiaries. This result is in line with the observed profit shifting pat-
tern of the corresponding subsidiary firm analysis in Table 4.10. Finally, both findings
are consistent with our main analysis of a profitability gap between headquarters and
their foreign subsidiaries.
4.7 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that the location of profits within multinational enter-
prises is biased toward the headquarters firm. Using a large panel of European MNEs
and conditioning on input factors employed, our most conservative estimates suggest
that headquarters exhibit a 30% higher profitability than their foreign subsidiaries.
In line with previous theoretical contributions, the paper discusses that this pattern
might be driven by two effects: firstly, MNEs may prefer to keep their value-driving
functions at the headquarters location as physical distance to foreign subsidiaries gives
rise to agency problems; and secondly, MNEs may have advantages from operating in
home markets as they commonly know local customs and consumer behavior better
than foreign competitors. We present suggestive evidence which proposes a role for
both mechanisms in driving the profitability gap.
However, our results also indicate some cracks in the notion and status of the par-
ent company as profit center of the multinational group. Precisely, we find that the
profitability gap between parents and their subsidiaries decreases over time. Quantita-
tively, the decrease is sizable, pointing to a decline of the gap by up to around 30% in
seven years. This result is in line with the widespread perception of an increased frag-
mentation of the production process across international borders which today does not
only comprise of standard operating functions like manufacturing and sales but equally
includes value-driving units like R&D and licensing departments (see Dischinger and
Riedel, 2008 or Chapter 3 of this thesis, respectively). This especially applies as our
results suggest that the closure of the profitability gap is related to the agency cost
argument and not to the home market effect.
The results have various implications for public economic policy. Our analysis for
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example shows that headquarters firms pay higher taxes on their corporate activity
than subsidiaries. Moreover, we find that MNEs are reluctant to shift profits away from
corporate headquarters in response to tax rate differentials but, vice versa, are eager
to shift profits from high-tax subsidiaries to low-tax headquarters. Additionally, higher
profitability rates at the multinational headquarters firms are expected to translate into
a wage premium for the parent firm’s workers. Consequently, our findings suggests that
countries experience larger welfare gains from hosting a multinational parent firm than
from hosting a multinational subsidiary. This implies that governments in general have
a higher incentive to support and develop their multinational headquarters firms than to
attract foreign subsidiaries. In this context, the profitability gap between headquarters
and subsidiaries may also rationalize recent government actions to avoid the take-over
of national firms by foreign companies and the associated attempt to create national
champions.
Chapter 5
Leverage, Corporate Taxes and
Debt Shifting of Multinationals:
The Impact of Firm-specific Risk
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5.1 Introduction
The deduction of interest expenses from the corporate tax base is allowed by the
majority of current corporate tax systems. However, the equity returns to investors
are not tax-deductible. Because of this asymmetric treatment of alternative means of
financing investment corporations exhibit a fundamental incentive to raise their reliance
on debt finance. Therefore, firms will trade-off the tax gain of debt against its costs.
These costs arise mainly from a higher risk of financial distress and the resulting agency
costs due to potentially opposed interests between debt and equity owners (cf. Myers,
2001).
Only in recent years, the straightforward hypothesis that higher corporate statu-
tory tax rates lead firms to adopt higher financial debt ratios could be confirmed by
robust empirical evidence. For example, Gordon and Lee (2001) provide quantitative
results for domestically organized corporations. Furthermore, concerning multinational
enterprises (MNEs), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b) show for U.S.-based MNEs that
a 10% higher corporate tax rate in the host country of a foreign subsidiary is related
to a raise in the total debt-to-assets ratio of this affiliate by about 4.5%. Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2005) and Bu¨ttner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser (2006) provide
quantitatively similar results for German owned MNEs. Over and above, Huizinga,
Laeven, and Nicode`me (2008) show that the capital structure of European MNEs is
systematically installed in a tax-minimizing way to international differences in statu-
tory corporate tax rates and tax systems.
Thus, MNEs can reduce their tax liability abroad by granting internal loans to their
foreign subsidiaries. Furthermore, Mintz and Smart (2004) argue that a strategic allo-
cation of debt and equity within the multinational group by borrowing from low-tax
affiliates and lending to high-tax affiliates allow the latter to deduct interest payments
from the tax base and, consequently, overall the MNE saves taxes. Ramb and Weichen-
rieder (2005), Overesch and Wamser (2006), and Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) provide
evidence that this behavior of tax-minimizing debt shifting is done by German MNEs
to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries.
By the intra-company shifting of debt to locations with a relatively high tax rate,
these countries observe lower levels of corporate tax revenues as more interest expenses
are deducted from the tax bases of MNEs than without such tax avoidance strategies. In
contrast, multinational affiliates at locations with a relatively low tax rate exhibit lower
debt levels. Hence, these countries benefit from international debt shifting activities of
MNEs by receiving higher tax revenue from multinational corporate profits. In addition,
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MNEs have to bear costs of implementing debt shifting strategies and also efficiency
costs with respect to deviations from the optimal financial structure that would be
installed without any tax saving opportunities of debt shifting.
In a first step, this paper provides evidence for the positive effect of statutory cor-
porate tax rates on a multinational affiliate’s debt-to-assets ratio using a large panel
database (AMADEUS) of European MNEs. Thereby, we focus on 30 European coun-
tries and on the time period of 1998 to 2006. At maximum, our regressions include
248,859 observations of 44,875 affiliates. Furthermore, we show that multinational sub-
sidiaries use external debt to react on tax rate changes and additionally are engaged in
internal debt shifting with the parent. We conclude this from our indirect econometric
identification strategy by finding a significantly positive impact of the tax rate as well
as of the asset weighted tax rate difference to the parent on the debt-to-assets ratio
of a subsidiary, while controlling for firm size, profitability, age, various country char-
acteristics, time fixed effects and subsidiary fixed effects. Profit shifting by means of
internal debt shifting should not be sensitive to the corporate tax rate but to the tax
rate difference between the lending and the borrowing multinational affiliate (cf. Mintz
and Smart, 2004). Thus, if the tax differential is included in the regressions, changes
in the statutory corporate tax rate capture the incentive for adjusting external debt.
In a second step, we apply two firm-specific risk proxy variables and provide (indi-
rect) evidence that subsidiaries with an above average risk are more involved in debt
shifting than subsidiaries with a below average risk. Vice-versa, our estimations sug-
gest that low-risk subsidiaries use external debt significantly more to get advantage of
the depreciation tax shield than high-risk subsidiaries. We explain this with a higher
probability for high-risk firms of obtaining no external debt (because of a larger default
risk) or of achieving external debt only at too high costs. In addition, the parent firm
can charge lower interest rates for internal loans to its subsidiary as external creditors
demand because the parent faces a lower information asymmetry as compared to these
external creditors and thus can claim a lower risk premium.1 In this analysis, as a
proxy for firm-specific risk of financial distress, we first employ the standard deviation
of the affiliate’s EBIT margin, i.e. the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to
sales, over the sample period 1998–2006. Alternatively, we use the affiliate’s ratio of
intangible assets to sales as a risk proxy variable. Due to endogeneity and misidenti-
fication concerns on the two risk proxies, in a robustness test, we apply an exogenous
1These considerations are supported by evidence of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b) and Bu¨ttner,
Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser (2006) who show that external and internal debt financing of
multinational affiliates are substitutes.
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proxy variable that measures R&D expenditures relative to sales in German industries
resulting from a large survey analysis. Thereby, we do a sectoral analysis comparing
high-risk with low-risk industries and find a similar, even more extreme pattern. In
high-risk sectors like the electronics or the consultancy industry, we find a significant
impact of the tax differential on the debt ratio but no effect of the tax rate. In contrast,
in low-risk sectors like the transport or the trade industry we observe a significant and
also large impact of the tax rate but no effect of the tax differential. This confirms our
theoretical considerations.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper so far that analyzes the response of
MNEs’ debt ratios to tax incentives depending on the firm-specific risk and likewise
on the industry sector. In addition, in contrast to Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) or
Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicode`me (2008) who apply fixed effects on the multinational
group level, we use affiliate fixed effects and are thus able to control for any time-
constant unobservable characteristic of the affiliate that might affect its leverage.2
Thereby, we additionally can control for institutional heterogeneity of countries with
respect to deduction allowances of interest expenses which is not possible with group
fixed effects. Accordingly, our coefficient estimates of the tax differential are smaller
compared to the existing literature, suggesting an about 1% increase in the subsidiary’s
debt-to-assets ratio if the tax rate difference to the parent rises by 10 percentage
points. Referring to the tax rate, controlling for internal debt shifting incentives, a
10 percentage points rise in the tax rate increases the subsidiary’s leverage ratio by
5%, everything else being equal.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we present a literature review on
debt shifting including a systematic comparison of selected empirical papers and their
quantitative results. In Section 5.3, we discuss theoretical considerations and formulate
hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Section 5.4 describes the dataset and our firm-
specific risk proxies. The estimation method and identification strategy is documented
in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 presents the empirical results and a robustness check with
an industry analysis. Section 5.7 concludes.
2In general, an affiliate faces different and complex incentives for financial decisions that are likely to
be to a significant extent unobserved which makes the application of a fixed effects approach essential.
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5.2 Literature Review on Debt Shifting
While the theoretical literature on the impact of taxes on debt financing is comprehen-
sive and well established (see e.g. Auerbach, 2002, for a review) the empirical literature
is less extensive and still developing. With respect to the quality of identifying debt
shifting the recent empirical literature can be classified in five categories (see Table
5.1). The studies in the first category of Table 5.1 estimate the effect of corporate tax
rates on a firm’s total debt-to-assets ratio.3 However, while explaining the variation
in leverage ratios of multinational affiliates, tax rate changes represent the incentive
for external debt, for internal debt and for debt shifting adjustments together. Thus,
working with tax rates cannot identify debt shifting directly.
The only paper treating foreign plant ownership as endogenous when analyzing tax
rate effects on MNE’s leverage is Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2010). They
use domestic firms as a reference group applying propensity score matching techniques
and provide evidence that foreign-owned firms have on average 1.7 percentage points
higher debt-to-assets ratios than domestically-owned firms. In addition, they show
that debt finance of multinational subsidiaries react more elastic to corporate tax rate
changes than debt finance of domestic subsidiaries. They interpret this as a hint for
the important role of debt shifting for MNEs.4
The empirical literature that explicitly deals with debt shifting is scarce. The second
and third categories of Table 5.1 display the different effects of the tax rate on the
ratio of external vs. internal debt, estimated separately. Overall, internal debt seems
to react more elastically to tax rate changes than external debt (average semi-elasticity
of about 8% vs. 6%) which is an indirect hint for debt shifting activities. However, the
econometric strategy still lacks in a distinction of the proper tax incentive for shifting
debt within the multinational group. For example, in response to a tax rate increase
an affiliate can raise internal borrowing from the parent without any shifting activities
of debt (and finally of profit), i.e. without symmetrically lowering debt at the parent
3Note that specially the first category of Table 5.1 is of course not a complete list. Earlier empirical
studies using U.S. data are undertaken e.g. by Collins and Shackelford (1992), and Froot and Hines
(1995).
4However, this larger elasticity for MNEs could likewise be a result of the more intensive use of
solely external debt finance without any debt shifting activities. Multinational subsidiaries exhibit
on average larger and more profitable parents than domestic subsidiaries and thus have better access
to collateral, which results in lower interest rates. Over and above, our dataset shows that the larger
the debt-to-assets ratio of a firm the more pronounced are tax effects in general.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Existing Literature
Corporate Tax Effects on Firms’ Leverage
– selected empirical papers –
Estimated Effect %-points change of % change of
dep. var. if tax var. dep. var. if tax var.
rises by 10%-points rises by 10%-points
(Semi-Elasticity)
1. Effect of corporate tax rate on total debt-to-assets ratio:
Gordon and Lee (2001) 3.6 3.5
Jog and Tang (2001) 5.3 -
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) 3.9 7.3
Desai et. al (2004) 2.5 4.5
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) 3.0 5.4
Bu¨ttner et. al (2006) 3.4 5.6
Overesch and Schreiber (2008) 2.4 3.9
This study 1.1N / 3.1H 1.8N / 5.0H
2. Effect of corporate tax rate on external debt-to-assets ratio:
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) 3.3 7.6
Desai et. al (2004) 2.3 5.2
Bu¨ttner et. al (2006) 1.9 5.1
(This study, indirectly) (2.6)
3. Effect of corporate tax rate on internal debt-to-assets ratio:
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) .65 5.9
Desai et. al (2004) .83 10.4
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) 1.5 -
Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) 1.4 7.0
Bu¨ttner et. al (2006) 1.5 6.2
Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) .65 6.1
Bu¨ttner et. al (2008) 2.0 7.9
Overesch and Schreiber (2008) 2.9 11.3
4. Effect of corporate tax rate differential on total debt-to-assets ratio:
Jog and Tang (2001) 3.5 -
Huizinga et. al (2008) 1.2 1.9
This study .55 .88
5. Effect of corporate tax rate differential on internal debt-to-assets ratio:
Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) .21F 3.2F
Overesch and Wamser (2006) 1.9 6.8
Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) .68 6.4
(This study, indirectly) (.55)
Notes: Most semi-elasticities based on own calculations, however, a dash indicates that the value
could not be calculated due to missing descriptive statistics in the respective paper.
N The tax rate effect of 1.1 (or 1.8, respectively) is estimated with the sample of multinational
parent firms and subsidiaries (Table 5.4) without controlling for debt shifting incentives with the tax
differential (cf. Column (3) of Table 5.4). Note that if we estimate this effect for subsidiary firms only
the tax effect rises to 1.5 and the semi-elasticity to 2.4. These regressions are not shown in the paper
but are available from the authors upon request.
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H The tax rate effect of 3.1 (or 5.0, respectively) is estimated with the sample of solely subsidiary
firms (Table 5.5) controlling additionally for internal debt shifting incentives with the asset weighted
tax rate difference to the parent (cf. Column (3) of Table 5.5). The effect results adding up the
coefficient estimates of the tax rate and the tax differential.
F Note that the coefficient estimate of the tax differential in Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) relates
only to indirectly held German affiliates of foreign MNEs, i.e. a German subsidiary is held by a
German company that in turn is owned by a foreign parent firm, whereas they find no effect for
directly held affiliates, i.e. the German subsidiary is directly owned by a foreign parent.
location or adjusting the equity allocation of the MNE.
Only a few papers directly capture the incentive for shifting one monetary unit of debt
from a low-tax to a high-tax location by applying tax rate differentials (see fourth and
fifth category of Table 5.1). But, the tax differentials are calculated differently which, in
addition to deviating country coverages, further handicaps the comparability of the co-
efficient estimates. For example, Jog and Tang (2001) apply the difference of the average
industry corporate tax rates between Canada and the U.S. by analyzing multinational
affiliates located in these two counties. Furthermore, Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) cal-
culate the unweighted tax rate difference of German-owned foreign subsidiaries relative
to the lowest tax rate observed among all affiliates of the MNE. Overesch and Wamser
(2006) however use the unweighted tax rate difference between a foreign-owned Ger-
man subsidiary and its foreign parent.5 In contrast, Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicode`me
(2008) construct for European MNEs the sum of tax differences to all other majority
owned affiliates of the group, weighted by total asset shares, taking withholding taxes
and the international tax system into account.
But, overall, tax differential effects on internal leverage seems to be almost as large
as tax rate effects indicating that shifting of debt is a relevant strategy for MNEs. Note
that the papers in the fifth category of Table 5.1 provide the most direct empirical
identification of debt shifting by analyzing the impact of tax differentials on inter-
company loans. However, the datasets of these papers (MiDi database of the German
Bundesbank) include either German MNEs and their foreign subsidiaries or German
subsidiaries of foreign MNEs, which limits the transferability of the quantitative results
to other countries.
In general, a proper comparison of the estimated tax effects even within a category
of Table 5.1 is difficult. Although most studies use micro-level panel data, the papers
deviate in almost all other dimensions: the ownership share threshold to define a firm as
an affiliate of the group,6 the country coverage, the calculation of tax rates (additionally
5For the reason of different firm samples and calculations of the tax differential the coefficient estimates
of Overesch and Wamser (2006) and Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) deviate much (1.9 vs. .68). However,
the semi-elasticities are almost equal (6.8 vs. 6.4).
6Note that the results of Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) suggest that partly-owned multinational
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accounting for dividend taxes, withholding taxes, depreciation allowances and/or the
international tax system) and tax differentials (difference to the parent and/or to other
affiliates, unweighted or weighted), and the estimation method (affiliate vs. group fixed
effects, set of control variables). Therefore, a comparison of different tax effects in the
empirical literature has to be taken with care.
5.3 Theoretical Considerations
Corporate taxation affects a firm’s optimal mix of debt and equity independent if the
firm is multinational or solely domestically structured. Basically, the higher the statu-
tory corporate tax rate a firm has to bear the larger the incentive for debt financing,
as the value of the interest deduction from the tax base increases with the tax rate and
thus the amount of tax savings is larger. Initially, we will empirically test this baseline
mechanism (cf. Section 5.6, Table 5.4).
Hypothesis 1.
The debt-to-assets ratio of a firm is increasing in the statutory corporate tax rate.
The existing literature hardly describes the exact mechanism of international debt
shifting or detailed strategies of applying it by MNEs. Moreover, the literature likewise
lacks in a common and clear-cut definition of debt shifting. Therefore, we want to define
debt shifting by a tax-minimizing strategy of a MNE in which a low-tax affiliate act
as a lender to a high-tax affiliate to shift profits from a high-tax to a low-tax location.
Thereby, as interest paid to an internal lender of a corporate group is also deductible
from the tax base, the MNE benefits from the enhanced deduction of interest at the
location where profits are subject to the higher tax rate and, thus, the MNE’s global
tax liability is reduced. In this debt shifting process, the lender simultaneously reduces
its own external debt by the same magnitude as the credit he gives out, so that the
global debt-to-asset ratio of the MNE stays constant but the respective ratios of the
two affiliates are changed inversely, everything else being equal. Note that equity might
subsidiaries show significantly smaller tax effects on borrowing than wholly-owned affiliates. One
explanation is that partly-owned firms may suffer from ambiguous strategies for the financial struc-
ture due to potentially opposed tax incentives from other management parties involved. Likewise,
Dischinger (2008) or Chapter 2 of this thesis, respectively, provide evidence that profit shifting activi-
ties of subsidiaries are reduced with a decreasing ownership share of the parent. Therefore, differently
constructed samples of multinational affiliates with respect to the ownership share threshold (e.g. ≥
51% vs. 100% ownership to be considered as a foreign subsidiary) might as well affect the difference
in the results of empirical studies and thus additionally complicate their comparability.
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not be rearranged so that equity levels at the two affiliates can stay unchanged and
total assets at the borrower location can be increased.7 We are aware that there exists
a range of more complex strategies, e.g. debt shifting chains between several affiliates
of a MNE or the simultaneous use of equity rearrangements.8
For our theoretical considerations, we assume a MNE that consists of a parent firm
and one wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. With respect to the subsidiary’s debt financ-
ing, the MNE has the choice between external debt, i.e. outside capital coming from a
bank or lender that does not belong to the corporate group, and internal debt shifting,
i.e. outside capital received from the parent. The use of external debt leads to the trade-
off between generating new capital and the price of increasing the indebtedness of the
whole corporate group which results in a higher overall probability of financial distress.
Vice-versa, the use of internal debt shifting, on the one hand, leads to the trade-off
between the advantage of keeping the overall leverage and thus the bankruptcy risk
of the group unchanged and the disadvantage of generating no additional capital.9 On
the other hand, statutory corporate tax rate differences between the subsidiary and
the parent are relevant. If the subsidiary exhibits a higher (lower) tax rate than the
parent, the MNE faces an additional gain (loss) by the internal shifting of debt from
the parent to the subsidiary via a shift of income from the high-tax (low-tax) subsidiary
to the low-tax (high-tax) parent.10 Finally, a potential tax gain from the shifting of
debt must be traded-off against agency costs that might arise because tax authorities
try to curb profit shifting and thus MNEs have to spend effort to rationalize the use
of internal borrowing. In addition, efficiency cost of deviating from the optimal finan-
7However, if e.g. a low-tax subsidiary acts as a lender to a high-tax parent solely for debt shifting
purposes, equity (to the same magnitude as the reduced debt) could be transformed from the parent
to the subsidiary so that total assets can stay constant at both affiliates.
8See Mintz (2004) for a theoretical analysis of different debt shifting strategies considering institutional
aspects like conduit entities of MNEs.
9We disregard the fact that internal debt is much more restricted than external debt due to thin
capitalization rules by assuming that the subsidiary has not reached this quota yet.
10In general, higher debt cost of a firm also reduce its dividends. However, since most MNEs to a
large extent defer the repatriation of dividends to retain profits at the subsidiary location for tax
reasons or for investments (see e.g. Altshuler and Grubert, 2003, for an analysis how MNEs can use
various strategies to avoid home country repatriation taxes), we abstract from dividend taxes and
withholding taxes on dividend payments which become due upon repatriation. Grubert (2001) and
Grubert and Mutti (2001) provide evidence for the U.S. that taxes on dividend repatriations are
very modest, even from low-tax countries. Moreover, withholding taxes on dividends are relatively
low within the EU and thus play a minor role.
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cial structure may occur, e.g. with respect to manager incentives.11 Finally, we assume
that multinational subsidiaries find an optimal mix of external debt and internal debt
shifting resulting in the following testable hypothesis (cf. Section 5.6, Table 5.5).
Hypothesis 2.
A multinational subsidiary uses external debt as well as internal debt shifting with the
parent firm to get advantage of the depreciation tax shield.
For including firm-specific risk in these considerations, we make two assumptions.
First, we assume that the parent firm can charge a lower interest rate for the internal
credit to its subsidiary than external creditors charge because the parent faces a lower
information asymmetry with its (wholly-owned) subsidiary and thus can claim a lower
risk premium.12 Second, we assume that subsidiaries with a higher firm-specific risk
exhibit a higher probability of obtaining no external debt (because of a larger default
risk) or of achieving external debt only at a very high interest rate that is too costly.
Hence, as external debt is more restricted for high-risk subsidiaries, they rely more
often on internal debt as a substitute.13 We conclude with our final hypothesis (cf.
Section 5.6, Table 5.6 and 5.7).
Hypothesis 3.
It is more likely that a multinational subsidiary with a high firm-specific risk uses
internal debt and thus debt shifting with the parent than a low-risk subsidiary and,
vice-versa, it is more likely that a low-risk subsidiary uses external debt than a high-
risk subsidiary to minimize taxes.
11See Mintz and Smart (2004), Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007), Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicode`me (2008) or
Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2010) for a theoretical analysis of MNEs’ capital structure
choice that explicitly account for internal borrowing and lending for profit shifting purposes.
12In addition, we assume that the parent exhibits a lower firm-specific risk than the subsidiary (e.g.
due to a bigger size) and thus also pays a lower interest rate for its external debt so that, in the
case of a low-tax parent, the debt shifting strategy really results for the MNE in overall lower tax
payments and hence a shift of income to the low-tax location.
13This is supported by Bu¨ttner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser (2006) who provide evidence that
external and internal debt financing of multinational affiliates are substitutes. Likewise, Desai, Foley,
and Hines (2004b) show that internal debt is employed by MNEs to overcome imperfections in
external capital markets.
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5.4 Data
We use the commercial database AMADEUS (full version, October 2008) which is
provided by Bureau van Dijk and includes detailed information on firm structure and
accounting of about 11 million domestic and multinational corporations in 41 European
countries from 1993 to 2007, but is unbalanced in structure. We focus on 30 European
countries (see Table 5.2 for country statistics) and on the time period of 1998 to
2006 as these countries and years are sufficiently represented by the database. The
observational units of our panel analysis are, on a yearly basis, multinational parents
(i.e. a firm that exhibits at least one wholly-owned foreign subsidiary) and multinational
subsidiaries (i.e. a firm that is owned by a foreign immediate shareholder with 100%14
of the ownership shares).15 Although our sample is restricted to firms located in 30
European countries, we observe basic information on worldwide parents of these firms
(country, total assets, ownership share) which is of importance for the calculation of
the tax differential (see Section 5.5). As they are not subject to positive tax payments,
we drop affiliates with losses during the whole sample period.
5.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 5.3 displays descriptive sample statistics, separately for the large sample of parent
firms and subsidiaries (applied in the tax rate estimations of Table 5.4) and for the
sample of only subsidiaries (applied in the estimations with the tax differential to the
parent of Table 5.5–5.7). All firm data is exported from AMADEUS in unconsolidated
values and current prices. In total, our data comprises 248,859 observations from 44,875
multinational affiliates, hence, on average, we observe each affiliate 5.5 times. We obtain
an almost equal mean value if we consider only subsidiaries as our regressions then
include 78,337 observations from 14,332 multinational subsidiaries.
The debt-to-assets ratio is defined as the sum of total current and total non-current
14By considering only wholly-owned subsidiaries we hedge against potential opposed interests of other
management parties involved concerning debt shifting strategies. In contrast, Huizinga, Laeven, and
Nicode`me (2008) define a firm to be a multinational subsidiary if at least 50% of the shares are
owned by another, foreign firm.
15If both criteria apply, the firm is nevertheless labeled as a subsidiary. However, the inclusion of these
intermediate parents do not affect our results, if anything it would bias the estimated tax effects
downwards. Furthermore, our descriptive statistics show that the median firm in our subsidiary
sample exhibit no further own subsidiaries.
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Table 5.2: Country Statistics
































F The high number of parents & subsidiaries relative to including solely subsidiaries in our regressions
(cf. Column (1) of Table 5.4 with (1) of Table 5.5) results because, in the regressions of Table 5.4, we
just control for the tax rate, whereby, in the regressions of Table 5.5, we additionally apply the asset
weighted tax rate difference to the parent. For about half of the subsidiaries this variable cannot be
calculated due to missing values in the database mostly of the parent’s total assets.
liabilities to total assets. Its mean is calculated with 60.5% for the sample of parents
and subsidiaries, and with 62.5% for the subsidiary sample. Not surprisingly, sales are
on average much smaller in the subsidiary sample compared to the large sample with
parent firms (99.2 vs. 225.3 million US dollars). However, the substantially smaller
median values show a rather skewed distribution of the sales variable, thus, we apply
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable: Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Parent Firms & Subsidiaries:
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 248,859 .6045 .6396 0 1
SalesF 248,859 225,328 12,888 1 3.2e+08
Total AssetsF 248,859 340,882 14,251 1 3.7e+08
EBIT per Total Assets 248,859 .1227 .0518 -529 4,096
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 111,206 .0689 .0463 -1 1
Age♦ 109,054 21.7 14 1 321
Statutory Corporate Tax RateN 248,859 .3238 .3383 .1 .566
GDPJ 248,433 992 689 5.57 2,915
GDP per CapitaJ 248,433 27,810 27,219 633 89,923
Corruption IndexI 248,433 .7284 .74 .15 1
Lending RateB 205,105 .0609 .0564 .0211 .5495
Subsidiary Firms only:
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 78,337 .6245 .6658 0 1
SalesF 78,337 99,219 9,328 1 9.8e+07
Total AssetsF 78,337 117,643 6,892 1 1.3e+08
EBIT per Total Assets 78,337 .1066 .06 -21 1,961
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 34,615 .0573 .0413 -1 1
Age♦ 34,231 17.4 12 1 250
Statutory Corporate Tax RateN 78,337 .3184 .31 .1 .566
Tax Rate DifferentialH 78,337 -.0142 -.0051 -.466 .4166
Firm-specific Risk Proxy Variables:
Volatility of Profitability 140,614 .102 .0502 0 1.41
Intangible Assets per Sales 118,510 .0342 .0008 0 1.57
Notes: Firm data is exported from the AMADEUS database, full version, October 2008.
N Statutory corporate tax rates obtained from the European Commission (2006) and from KPMG
International (2006).
F Unconsolidated values, in thousand US dollars, current prices.
 Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) per total assets, unconsolidated values.
♦ In years since establishing.
J GDP in billion US dollars, current prices; GDP per Capita in US dollars, current prices; data from
the IMF WEO Database October 2008.I Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (divided by 10) from Transparency International (TI), ranks
from 0.00 (extreme level of corruption) to 1.00 (free of corruption).
B Average interest rate for loans in the private sector of a country, obtained from the IMF
International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2006).
H Statutory corporate tax rate of the subsidiary minus the tax rate of the parent.
 Based on all available observations in the whole dataset of multinational parent firms and
subsidiaries exported from AMADEUS.
 Standard deviation of the affiliate’s EBIT margin, i.e. the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes to sales, over the sample period 1998–2006.
a logarithmic transformation. For the sample of subsidiaries, the profitability measure
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) per total assets exhibits a mean of 10.7%,
again with a lower median of 6.0%. Of course, the average firm age is higher in the large
sample than in the subsidiary sample (21.7 vs. 17.4 years). However, this information
is missing for more than half of the observations. For the large sample, the average
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statutory corporate tax rate is calculated with 32.4%, the minimum with 10% and
the maximum with 56.6%. The average statutory corporate tax rate difference to the
parent (only available in the subsidiary sample) is −1.4% indicating a higher tax rate
for parent than for subsidiary firms on average.
5.4.2 Firm-specific Risk Proxy Variables
We use two different proxy variables for the firm-specific risk of financial distress.
First, for every firm, we calculate the volatility of profitability which is the standard
deviation of the affiliate’s EBIT margin, i.e. the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes to sales, over the sample period 1998–2006.16 This measure spreads from 0 to 141
percentage points with a mean value of 10.2 percentage points. The proxy properties of
this variable for firm-specific risk are quite intuitive, with a larger volatility indicating
a higher risk, and vice-versa. However, the measure suffers from disadvantages. On the
one hand, for many ranges of profitability the measure misidentifies firm-specific risk:
e.g. if a firm’s EBIT margin spreads between 10% and 40% which would be interpreted
as an above-average risky firm (high volatility), or, vice-versa, e.g. in the range of -
8% and -6% which would be interpreted as a below-average risk (low volatility). On
the other hand, a firm’s EBIT margin might be endogenous as its level could be a
result of profit shifting behavior (e.g. via transfer pricing of intermediate goods) due
to international tax differentials. In addition, the volatility of profitability measure by
construction assumes implicitly that the firm-specific risk is constant over time, at least
over our sample period within the standard deviation of the affiliate’s EBIT margin is
calculated.
Therefore, second, we alternatively apply the affiliate’s yearly ratio of intangible as-
sets to sales as a proxy for firm-specific risk.17 Firms with high R&D activities and/or
little operational revenue are more likely to fail with the business strategy and to gen-
erate lower as planned (or even no) sales and profits in the future which ex-ante yields
a higher probability of bankruptcy or insolvency, respectively. The mean of the intan-
gibles ratio is calculated with 3.42%. To dampen the potential impact of outliers, we
drop values above the 99% percentile of the distribution. The endogeneity concerns on
this measure are less pronounced, however, the variable has the disadvantage that like-
16See Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicode`me (2008) who apply a very similar proxy variable for firm-specific
risk.
17See e.g. Myers (2001) who also links firm-specific business risk to the holding of an above average
level of intangible assets.
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wise the successful outcome of R&D (like patents, royalties, etc.) could be capitalized
in the balance sheet item “intangible fixed assets”.
See Section 5.6.3 for our classification of affiliates in high-risk vs. low-risk firms and
hence divergent estimation results. However, there exists endogeneity and misidentifi-
cation concerns of both risk proxies, as stated above. Therefore, in a robustness test in
Section 5.6.4, we apply an exogenous risk proxy variable that measures R&D expendi-
tures relative to sales in German industries resulting from a large survey analysis.
5.5 Econometric Approach
Our estimation strategy of indirectly identifying external debt and internal debt shifting
has the following form
(DEBT/ASSETS)it = β0 + β1STRit + β2TAXDIFFit + β3Xit + ρt + φi + it (5.1)
with subscript i denoting the observational unit (affiliate) and t the time period (year).
The dependent variable is the sum of total current and total non-current liabilities to
total assets. The explanatory variables of central interest are the statutory corporate
tax rate (STRit) and the statutory corporate tax rate difference to the parent firm
weighted by total asset shares (TAXDIFFit). We assume debt shifting to be mainly
relevant in the parent-subsidiary relationship, therefore, we do not apply tax rate dif-
ferences to all other subsidiaries of the parent. For a subsidiary, the most unambiguous
profit shifting incentive exists with the immediate shareholder that holds 100% of the
ownership shares which in our case is the parent firm. Furthermore, controlling for the
size of a subsidiary relative to its parent by weighting the tax differential by total assets
is important for capturing the precise benefit of shifting debt.18
The vector Xit stands for a range of time-varying affiliate and country control char-
acteristics. On the micro level, this is the firm size represented by the logarithm of sales
and the profitability represented by EBIT per total assets. We additionally control for
firm age with the logarithm of years since establishing and for firm-specific risk with
the proxy variable intangible assets per sales described in the previous section. On the
18For example, a loan of 1 Mio. US dollars may have a different value for the lender than for the
borrower due to size differences. Of course, for equal tax rates of the subsidiary and the parent
there exists no incentive for debt shifting and the tax differential is zero. See Huizinga, Laeven, and
Nicode`me (2008) for a similar weighting of the tax incentive. Alternatively, the total asset shares
could also be included in the estimations as a regressor leaving the tax differential unweighted which
yields very similar coefficient estimates.
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macro level, we control for GDP (as a proxy for the market size), for GDP per capita (as
a proxy for the productivity growth of a country), for an index of corruption (as a proxy
for creditor rights or the quality of the legal system respectively) and for the average
interest rate for loans in the private sector (as a proxy for credit costs). Moreover, we
include year dummy variables (ρt) and affiliate fixed effects (φi). it denotes the error
term. We estimate an OLS model. Applying fixed-effects estimation techniques is gen-
erally suggestive when analyzing micro data to control for unobservable, firm-specific
factors while explaining variations in leverage ratios.19 Furthermore, the affiliate fixed
effects additionally control for institutional heterogeneity of countries with respect to
deduction allowances of interest expenses.
Finally, if the tax differential is included in the regressions, we assume that changes
in the statutory corporate tax rate capture the incentive for adjusting external debt
(cf. Mintz and Smart, 2004). For a theoretical analysis see Huizinga, Laeven, and
Nicode`me (2008) who call this the domestic effect, in contrast to the international or
debt shifting effect which is represented by the weighted tax differential. Therefore, and
suggested by our theoretical considerations of Section 5.3, we expect β1 > 0 to provide
indirect evidence for the use of external debt (if the tax differential is included in the
regressions), and we expect β2 > 0 to provide indirect evidence for the use of internal
debt shifting.
Profit shifting by means of internal debt shifting should not be sensitive to the
corporate tax rate but to the tax rate difference between the lending and the borrow-
ing multinational affiliate (cf. Mintz and Smart, 2004). Thus, if the tax differential is
included in the regressions, changes in the statutory corporate tax rate capture the
incentive for adjusting external debt.
19The fixed-effects model is also preferred to a random-effects approach as suggested by a Hausman-
Test. Note that, in contrast to our approach, Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2007) and Huizinga, Laeven,
and Nicode`me (2008) apply fixed effects for the multinationals group. Thus, they control for MNE-
specific, time-constant unobservable effects. However, we suppose that an unobservable characteristic
that potentially influences the affiliate’s financial structure is affiliate-specific and not equal for all
affiliates of the group.
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5.6 Estimation Results
This section comprises our empirical results and additionally a robustness check com-
paring firms in high-risk vs. low-risk industries. All regressions include a full set of
year dummy variables and affiliate fixed effects. In parentheses below the coefficient
estimates, the result tables display heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are
adjusted for clustering at the affiliate level. Note that the (adjusted) R2 values are at
relatively high levels around 70% due to the inclusion of affiliate fixed effects.20
5.6.1 Tax Rate Effect on Firm’s Leverage
First, Table 5.4 presents baseline estimations of the tax rate effect on a multinational
affiliate’s debt-to-assets ratio. As we do not yet analyze debt shifting in theses regres-
sions, the sample consists of multinational parent firms and subsidiaries (as defined in
Section 5.4). In Column (1) to (3), we include additional control variables besides firm
size (Log Sales), i.e. our set of time-varying macro controls (GDP, GDP per capita,
corruption index) and the affiliate’s profitability (EBIT per Total Assets). As expected
(cf. Hypothesis 1 in Section 5.3) and widely documented in the literature, throughout
the coefficient estimates of the statutory corporate tax rate are positive and significant
at the 1% level. Accordingly, a rise in the tax rate by 10 percentage points yields an
increase in the debt-to-assets ratio of multinational affiliates of 1.1 percentage points
(cf. Column (3) of Table 5.4). Note that this rather small effect results with the sample
of multinational parent firms and subsidiaries without controlling for debt shifting in-
centives with the tax differential.21 We achieve a much larger tax rate effect of .31 (cf.
Column (3) of Table 5.5, adding up the coefficient estimates of the tax rate and the tax
differential) with the sample of solely subsidiary firms while controlling additionally for
internal debt shifting incentives with the tax rate difference to the parent.
With respect to the control variables in Table 5.4, larger firms exhibit significantly
more leverage indicating a better access to outside capital with a larger size. Further-
more, our estimations suggest that more profitable firms use less debt finance as they
are more able to finance investments with retained earnings, but this effect is very
20The adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-
effects model.
21If we estimate this effect for subsidiary firms only, the respective coefficient rises to .15. These
regressions are not shown but are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5.4: Tax Rate Effect on Firm’s Leverage
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1998–2006
Sample of Multinational Parent Firms & Subsidiaries
Dependent Variable: Debt–to–Assets Ratio
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stat. Corp. Tax Rate .117∗∗∗ .107∗∗∗ .109∗∗∗ .111∗∗∗ .142∗∗∗ .129∗∗∗
(.024) (.023) (.024) (.024) (.035) (.036)
Log Sales .028∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗ .031∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
EBIT p. Total Assets -2e-4∗∗ -2e-4∗∗ -1e-4∗∗∗ -.004
(8e-5) (9e-5) (1e-5) (.003)
Log Age -.050∗∗∗
(.003)
Intangibles per Sales .019∗
(.012)
Log GDP .001 .001 -4e-6 .001 5e-5
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.004)
Log GDP per Capita -.101∗∗∗ -.102∗∗∗ -.090∗∗∗ -.069∗∗∗ -.095∗∗∗
(.010) (.010) (.012) (.016) (.015)
Corruption Index .046∗∗∗ .049∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗ .002 .010
(.013) (.013) (.014) (.019) (.019)
Log Lending Rate .008∗∗
(.003)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 248,859 248,433 245,094 205,105 109,054 105,871
# Firms 44,875 44,874 44,451 40,451 21,113 20,586
Adjusted R2 .7223 .7232 .7228 .7346 .7513 .7425
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational
parent firms (i.e. firms that hold at least one foreign wholly-owned subsidiary) and multinational
subsidiaries (i.e. firms that exhibit a foreign parent holding 100% of the ownership shares). Firms
with losses during the whole sample period were dropped. Dependent variable is the sum of current
and non-current liabilities to total assets. EBIT p. Total Assets is earnings before interest and taxes
per total assets. Log Age is the natural logarithm (Log) of years since establishing. Lending rate is
the average interest rate for loans in the private sector of a country. Adjusted R2 values calculated
from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
small. GDP (as a proxy for the market size of a country) shows no effect on firm’s
leverage. However, firms in more developed countries (proxied by GDP per capita)
seem to be characterized by lower debt-to-assets ratios as these firms can generate eq-
uity more easily. Finally, better creditor rights or a better quality of the legal system,
respectively, proxied by a larger corruption index (which stands for less corruption)
affects the leverage of multinational affiliates positively.
In Column (4) to (6) of Table 5.4, we include further control variables to test the
sensitivity of the tax rate effect. First, we additionally include the average interest
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rate for loans in the private sector of a country (Log Lending Rate) which surprisingly
exhibits a significantly positive but very small effect. This could be explained by the
substitutive relationship between external and internal debt financing if capital market
conditions worsen (cf. Bu¨ttner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser, 2006). In Column
(5), we add the firm age as an explanatory variable and observe that older firms are
less leveraged suggesting that younger firms are more restricted in raising equity.22
However, the information on a firm’s date of incorporation is missing in the database
for more than half of the firms. In Column (6), we control for our preferred proxy
variable for firm-specific risk, the share of intangible assets over sales (see Section 5.4.2
for a description), which enters positive with a significance at the 10% level. Thus,
riskier firms relate more to debt financing as generating equity is more difficult with
a higher risk of financial distress. However, most importantly, the inclusions of these
additional controls do not alter our qualitative tax rate effect and just slightly increases
the coefficient estimates.
5.6.2 External Debt and Internal Debt Shifting
In a second step, in Table 5.5, we analyze tax effects on external debt and internal
debt shifting by regressing the same specifications of Table 5.4 but with the additional
inclusion of the asset weighted tax rate difference to the parent. This differential cap-
tures the MNE’s incentive for debt shifting between the subsidiary and the parent
firm. Therefore, now the sample comprises only multinational subsidiaries. Through-
out all regressions, the tax differential exhibits a positive and highly significant effect
on the debt-to-assets ratio which provides indirect evidence that MNEs are involved
in the intra-company shifting of debt. Quantitatively, if the statutory corporate tax
rate difference to the parent rises by 10 percentage points, the subsidiary’s leverage
ratio increases by .55 percentage points (cf. Column (3) of Table 5.5), which is .88%
of the sample mean. As we additionally obtain a positive and highly significant effect
of the tax rate while controlling for the debt shifting incentive, we interpret this as
indirect evidence that multinational subsidiaries simultaneously use external debt to
react on tax rate changes in a tax-minimizing way. This confirms our theoretical con-
siderations (cf. Hypothesis 2 in Section 5.3). A reason for the much larger effect of the
tax rate compared to the tax differential could be that debt shifting cost, i.e. cost of
22We apply the logarithm of firm age since the distribution of this variable is considerably skewed.
Alternatively, taking no logarithmic transformation and additionally include the quadratic transfor-
mation of the age variable yields almost equal quantitative results.
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Table 5.5: External Debt & Internal Debt Shifting
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1998–2006
Sample of Multinational Subsidiary Firms
Dependent Variable: Debt–to–Assets Ratio
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stat. Corp. Tax Rate .258∗∗∗ .260∗∗∗ .258∗∗∗ .210∗∗∗ .325∗∗∗ .366∗∗∗
(.044) (.043) (.043) (.044) (.065) (.066)
Tax Rate Differential .058∗∗∗ .055∗∗∗ .055∗∗∗ .045∗∗∗ .046∗∗ .044∗∗
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.022) (.023)
(Tax Rate Differential)× .237∗
(Intangibles per Sales) (.138)
Log Sales .035∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
EBIT p. Total Assets -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.065∗∗∗ -.118∗∗∗
(1e-4) (1e-4) (.025) (.022)
Log Age -.067∗∗∗
(.006)
Intangibles per Sales .100∗∗
(.043)
Log GDP -.003 -.003 -.003 .005 .005
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.009) (.009)
Log GDP per Capita -.153∗∗∗ -.154∗∗∗ -.157∗∗∗ -.129∗∗ -.175∗∗∗
(.018) (.018) (.020) (.028) (.027)
Corruption Index .084∗∗∗ .084∗∗∗ .119∗ -.003 .027
(.024) (.024) (.026) (.036) (.036)
Log Lending Rate .005
(.006)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 78,337 78,200 78,148 65,276 34,231 33,379
# Firms 14,332 14,332 14,326 13,044 6,837 6,697
Adjusted R2 .6883 .6905 .6907 .7048 .7208 .7181
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational
subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent holding 100% of the ownership shares. Firms with
losses during the whole sample period were dropped. Dependent variable is the sum of current
and non-current liabilities to total assets. Tax Rate Differential is the statutory corporate tax
rate difference to the parent firm, i.e. the tax rate of the considered subsidiary minus the parent
tax rate, weighted by total asset shares. (Tax Rate Differential)×(Intangibles per Sales) is the
interaction term of the tax differential with the intangibles per sales variable. EBIT p. Total Assets
is earnings before interest and taxes per total assets. Log Age is the natural logarithm (Log) of
years since establishing. Lending rate is the average interest rate for loans in the private sector.
Adjusted R2 values calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
changing the capital structure of two affiliates just for profit shifting purposes, might
be significant and large (see Bu¨ttner and Wamser, 2007, for a similar conclusion).
Again, the tax effects of Table 5.5 are robust to the inclusion of our set of control
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variables already applied in the regressions of Table 5.4. Thereby, the qualitative effects
of the controls are unchanged but the respective coefficient estimates are slightly larger
(besides for Log Sales). However, now the lending rate is no longer significant which
potentially points to its asymmetric effect on external debt (negative) and internal
debt (positive) while explicitly controlling for debt shifting (cf. Desai, Foley, and Hines,
2004b; Bu¨ttner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser, 2006). As a new element, in Column
(6) of Table 5.5, additionally to the firm-specific risk proxy (Intangibles per Sales) we
include an interaction term of the tax rate differential and this risk proxy. We observe
a weakly significant positive impact of the interaction variable on leverage suggesting
that the debt-to-assets ratio of riskier subsidiaries reacts more elastic on changes in
the tax rate difference to the parent. Thus, the higher the risk of a firm the more debt
shifting with the parent is undertaken. This preliminary result supports our theoretical
considerations (cf. Hypothesis 3 in Section 5.3), however, this issue will be further
analyzed in a more rigorous way with sub-samples of high-risk and low-risk firms in
the next two subsections.
5.6.3 High-risk vs. Low-risk Firms
We now test Hypothesis 3 of Section 5.3 in a more straightforward econometric ap-
proach. Hypothesis 3 says that it is more likely for subsidiaries with a high firm-specific
risk to use debt shifting than for low-risk subsidiaries and, vice-versa, that it is more
likely for low-risk affiliates to use external debt than for high-risk affiliates to get ad-
vantage of the depreciation tax shield. Therefore, we divide our sample of multinational
subsidiaries into sub-samples of high-risk and low-risk firms. Thereby, we apply the two
proxy variables for firm-specific risk introduced in Section 5.4.2. First, a subsidiary is
labeled as a high-risk (low-risk) firm if it exhibits an above (below) average Volatility of
Profitability which is the subsidiary’s standard deviation of its EBIT margin, i.e. the
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales, over the sample period 1998–2006.
This threshold mean is calculated with .102, i.e. 10.2 percentage points is the aver-
age standard deviation of a subsidiary’s EBIT margin during the years 1998–2006.23
In addition, as an alternative proxy for firm-specific risk that is less suspicious to be
23To gain a threshold mean that is at maximum representative for an average multinational affiliate,
the calculations of the mean values are based on all available observations in the whole dataset
of multinational parent firms and subsidiaries exported from AMADEUS. However, choosing the
threshold mean based just on the subsidiary sample results in slightly lower mean values and does
not change the resulting pattern of the asymmetric tax effects in the high-risk vs. low-risk firm
sample.
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Table 5.6: High–Risk vs. Low–Risk Firms
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1998–2006
Sample of Multinational Subsidiary Firms
Dependent Variable: Debt–to–Assets Ratio
Sub–Sample High–Risk Firms Low–Risk Firms
Risk Measure Volatility of Intangibles Volatility of Intangibles
Profitability per Sales Profitability per Sales
> Average > Average < Average < Average
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stat. Corp. Tax Rate .192∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗ .185∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗ .377∗∗∗ .377∗∗∗ .417∗∗∗ .394∗∗∗
(.057) (.056) (.058) (.056) (.068) (.067) (.070) (.068)
Tax Rate Differential .078∗∗∗ .073∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗ .060∗∗∗ .023 .023 .044∗ .047∗∗
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.023) (.023) (.025) (.024)
Log Sales .034∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗ .032∗∗∗ .039∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
EBIT p. Total Assets -.016∗ -4e-4∗∗∗ -4e-4∗∗∗ -.114∗∗∗
(.009) (9e-5) (3e-5) (.024)
Log GDP -.010 -.010 .005 .005
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Log GDP per Capita -.156∗∗∗ -.134∗∗∗ -.152∗∗∗ -.186∗∗∗
(.023) (.023) (.028) (.028)
Corruption Index .131∗∗∗ .115∗∗∗ .017 .008
(.032) (.032) (.037) (.038)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 8,333 8,288 4,273 4,272 28,976 28,924 29,164 29,107
# Firms 1,607 1,607 1,404 1,404 4,867 4,867 6,272 6,271
Adjusted R2 .6789 .6831 .6889 .6913 .7037 .7056 .7160 .7254
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational
subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent holding 100% of the ownership shares. Firms with losses
during the whole sample period were dropped. Dependent variable is the sum of current and
non-current liabilities to total assets. Tax Rate Differential is the statutory corporate tax rate
difference to the parent firm, i.e. the tax rate of the considered subsidiary minus the parent tax
rate, weighted by total asset shares. EBIT p. Total Assets is earnings before interest and taxes per
total assets. Regressions (1) and (2) (Regressions (5) and (6)) include solely subsidiaries that exhibit
an above (below) average Volatility of Profitability which is the standard deviation over the sample
period 1998–2006 of the subsidiary’s EBIT margin, i.e. the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes to sales. The threshold mean is calculated with .102. Regressions (3) and (4) (Regressions (7)
and (8)) include solely subsidiaries that exhibit above (below) average Intangible Assets per Sales.
This mean is calculated with .0342. Tax rate coefficients of Column (3) vs. (7) and of (4) vs. (8) are
different at the 90% confidence interval, respectively. Adjusted R2 values calculated from a dummy
variables regression equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
endogenous and/or to misidentify firm-specific risk, we mark a subsidiary as a high-
risk (low-risk) firm if it exhibits above (below) average Intangible Assets per Sales. The
sample mean of this ratio is calculated with 3.42%.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5.6. For high-risk firms (Columns (1)–
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(4) of Table 5.6), throughout, the coefficient of the tax differential is highly significant
and around .07 which is larger than in the regressions with the whole subsidiary sample
(Table 5.5). Whereas for low-risk firms (Columns (5)–(8) of Table 5.6), we observe no or
just a weakly significant impact of the tax differential on the debt-to-assets ratio. On the
contrary, the tax rate effect is much larger for low-risk than for high-risk firms (.39 vs.
.19, on average). Note that the coefficient estimates of the tax rate in Column (3) vs. (7)
and in (4) vs. (8) are each statistically different at the 90% confidence interval.24 Thus,
this pattern confirms our theoretical considerations and provides indirect evidence that
high-risk firms use external debt less intensive (to adjust leverage due to tax rate
changes to minimize tax payments) but are more involved in internal debt shifting
than low-risk firms. Our set of control variables show the same effects than in the
estimations with the whole subsidiary sample (Table 5.5). However, interestingly, the
coefficient of the corruption index is no more significant in the sub-sample of low-risk
firms suggesting that the quality of creditor rights in a country is only relevant for
lenders of companies with a high firm-specific risk.
5.6.4 Robustness Check: High-risk vs. Low-risk Industries
We are aware of potential endogeneity concerns on our firm-specific risk proxies. The
volatility of profitability variable and the intangibles per sales variable are obtained
from the firm’s balance sheet and might also be influenced by tax differentials, either
indirectly via profit shifting activities (transfer pricing for intermediate goods) or di-
rectly via the location of profitable assets (see Dischinger and Riedel, 2008, or Chapter
3 of this thesis, respectively). Therefore, as a test of robustness, we apply an exogenous
risk proxy which is the ratio of overall R&D expenditures to overall sales in German
industries in the year 2005 based on a comprehensive survey of the Stifterverband fu¨r
die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2007).25 Analogue to the ratio of intangibles per sales, we
interpret a high R&D-intensity in an industry as a high firm-specific risk, while assum-
ing the German industry structure to be representative for European countries and
additionally assuming the distribution of these R&D-intensities over the industries to
be stable during our sample period. This ratio of R&D expenditures to sales has the
24Furthermore, taking solely subsidiaries in these regressions that actually own intangible assets yields
more pronounced effects, i.e. the coefficient of the tax rate for the low-risk firm sample rises to .61
and is different from the coefficient in the high-risk firm sample on the 99% confidence interval. The
mean of the ratio of intangibles to sales for this sub-sample is calculated with 5.94%.
25See Overesch and Schreiber (2008) for an empirical analysis of enhanced profit shifting activities
due to higher R&D-intensities that likewise uses this survey data.
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additional advantage of being solely based on R&D expenditures (the real risky char-
acteristic of a firm) and not on patents, trademarks, royalties, etc. that are likely to be
enclosed (if activated) in the balance sheet item intangible assets. Note that the share
of capitalized patents or brands could be interpreted inversely with respect to the firm-
specific risk as they might be used as collateral for debt and likewise may strengthen
the market position against competitors. In the survey analysis of the Stifterverband
fu¨r die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2007), the mean R&D-intensity of all industries is 4.0%.
Thus, we define the Electronics Industry and the Consultancy Industry to be High–
Risk Industries as they exhibit an above average ratio of overall R&D expenditures
to overall sales of 7.3% and 16.1%, respectively, referring to the survey. Our Electron-
ics Industry sub-sample consists of subsidiaries with NACE codes 30–33 (=Subsection
DL of the NACE systematic: Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment), and
our Consultancy Industry sub-sample comprises subsidiaries with NACE codes 72–
74 (=Computer and related activities; R&D; Other business activities). In contrast,
we define the Transport Industry and the Trade Industry to be Low–Risk Indus-
tries as they exhibit a below average R&D-intensity of .5% and .6%, respectively.
The Transport Industry sub-sample consists of subsidiaries with NACE codes 60–63
(=Land/water/air/pipeline transport; Supporting/auxiliary transport activities, activ-
ities of travel agencies), and the Trade Industry sub-sample comprises subsidiaries
with NACE codes 51–52 (=Wholesale/retail/commission trade except of motor vehi-
cles/cycles, repair of personal/household goods).26
The results are presented in Table 5.7. We observe an even more extreme pattern
compared to Table 5.4: The tax rate is almost never significant for subsidiaries in high-
risk industries (Columns (1)–(4) of Table 5.7), whereas the significant coefficients of
the tax rate for subsidiaries in low-risk industries (Columns (5)–(8) of Table 5.7) are
on a high level of .44, on average. On the other hand, the estimations show no effect
of the tax differential for firms in low-risk industries, however, there is a significant
and very large impact of the tax differential on the debt-to-assets ratio for firms in
26Note that adding the industries Real estate activities (NACE code 70) and Renting of machinery
and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods (NACE code 71) to our Con-
sultancy Industry sub-sample to represent the whole Section K of the NACE systematic does not
change our results neither qualitatively nor quantitatively. Furthermore, adding the industry Post
and telecommunications (NACE code 64) to our Transport Industry sub-sample to represent the
whole Section I does not change our results qualitatively. In addition, adding the industry Sale,
maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel (NACE
code 50) to our Trade Industry sub-sample to represent the whole Section G again does not change
our results qualitatively nor quantitatively.
Chapter 5 – Leverage, Corporate Taxes & Debt Shifting 126
Table 5.7: High–Risk vs. Low–Risk Industries
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1998–2006
Sample of Multinational Subsidiary Firms
Dependent Variable: Debt–to–Assets Ratio
Sub–Sample High–Risk Industries Low–Risk Industries
Industry Electronics Consultancy Transport Trade
Industry Industry Industry Industry
Explanat. Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stat. Corp. Tax Rate .289∗ .262 .105 .092 .612∗∗∗ .466∗ .325∗∗∗ .369∗∗∗
(.168) (.181) (.128) (.125) (.250) (.260) (.069) (.065)
Tax Rate Differential .239∗∗∗ .231∗∗∗ .093∗∗ .092∗∗ .056 .067 .030 .021
(.082) (.082) (.046) (.046) (.080) (.076) (.023) (.022)
Log Sales .020∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗ .030∗∗∗ .031∗∗∗ .054∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .048∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗
(.007) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.008) (.009) (.003) (.003)
EBIT p. Total Assets -.112∗∗∗ -4e-4∗∗∗ -.038∗∗ -.163∗∗∗
(.039) (2e-5) (.019) (.028)
Log GDP .063 -.024∗ 1.06∗∗ .009∗∗
(.404) (.014) (.450) (.004)
Log GDP per Capita -.136 -.099∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -.228∗∗∗
(.405) (.053) (.449) (.027)
Corruption Index .064 .066 -.119 .027
(.118) (.066) (.128) (.040)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 3,853 3,840 13,529 13,502 2,996 2,988 28,495 28,429
# Firms 656 656 2,953 2,949 551 551 4,917 4,916
Adjusted R2 .6704 .6766 .6704 .6716 .6769 .6829 .6791 .6961
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are multinational sub-
sidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent holding 100% of the ownership shares. Firms with losses during
the whole sample period were dropped. Dependent variable is the sum of current and non-current
liabilities to total assets. Tax Rate Differential is the statutory corporate tax rate difference to the
parent firm, i.e. the tax rate of the considered subsidiary minus the parent tax rate, weighted by total
asset shares. EBIT p. Total Assets is earnings before interest and taxes per total assets. High–Risk
(Low–Risk) Industries exhibit an above (below) average ratio of overall R&D expenditures to overall
sales referring to a survey of the Stifterverband fu¨r die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2007) for German
firms in the year 2005. In this study, the mean ratio is 4.0%. The Electronics Industry results in R&D
expenditures per sales of 7.3% and consists of subsidiaries with NACE codes 30–33 (=Subsection
DL: Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment). The Consultancy Industry results in R&D ex-
penditures per sales of 16.1% and consists of subsidiaries with NACE codes 72–74 (=Computer and
related activities; R&D; Other business activities). In contrast, the Transport Industry results in R&D
expenditures per sales of .5% and consists of subsidiaries with NACE codes 60–63 (=Land transport,
transport via pipelines; Water transport; Air transport; Supporting and auxiliary transport activities,
activities of travel agencies). The Trade Industry results in R&D expenditures per sales of .6% and
consists of subsidiaries with NACE codes 51–52 (=Wholesale trade and commission trade, except
of motor vehicles and motorcycles; Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, repair of
personal and household goods). Adjusted R2 values calculated from a dummy variables regression
equivalent to the fixed-effects model.
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high-risk industries (coefficient of .16, on average).27 These results confirm our original
analysis of high-risk vs. low-risk firms in the previous subsection (Table 5.6) and likewise
support our theoretical considerations. High-risk firms seems to use more internal debt
shifting whereas low-risk firms relate more on external debt to adjust leverage in a
tax-minimizing way. Note that now GDP enters significantly positive for the low-risk
industry sub-sample suggesting that larger markets are characterized by a higher degree
of competition (likewise for equity) which leads to a greater use of debt financing for
low-risk firms.
We did further more general robustness checks on all of our regressions. First, we
included in the estimations only observations with positive profits, second, only observa-
tions that exhibit any debt financing, and third, only observations with a debt-to-assets
ratio larger than the 10% percentile of the distribution. Furthermore, we employed
EBIT per sales instead of EBIT per total assets as the profitability measure. All these
alternative estimations, respectively, did not alter our results either qualitatively or
quantitatively.
5.7 Conclusions
First, our empirical analysis finds a significant and robust effect of the corporate tax
differential on a multinational subsidiary’s total leverage which indirectly provides ev-
idence that intra-company debt shifting is used by MNEs to shift profits from high-tax
to low-tax locations. Quantitatively, the subsidiary’s debt-to-assets ratio increases by
about 1% if the statutory corporate tax rate difference to the parent firm rises by 10
percentage points. With respect to the statutory corporate tax rate, while controlling
for debt shifting incentives with the asset weighted tax differential, a 10 percentage
points rise in the tax rate increases the subsidiary’s leverage ratio by 5%, everything
else being equal. The results are comparable with the existing literature. Obtaining
additionally a positive effect of the tax rate while controlling for debt shifting is inter-
preted as indirect evidence that multinational subsidiaries simultaneously use external
debt to react on tax rate changes in a tax-minimizing way. Second, our paper is the first
showing that subsidiaries with an above average firm-specific risk are more involved
27Note that the same pattern of asymmetric tax effects also results taking other industries than the
ones applied here. For example, using the industry Manufacture of medical, precision and optical
instruments, watches and clocks (NACE code 33) as a high-risk industry (R&D-intensity of 8.9%,
referring to the survey) or the industry Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; Publishing
and printing (Subsection DE = NACE codes 21–22) as a low-risk industry (R&D-intensity of 1.2%).
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in debt shifting activities than subsidiaries with a below average risk. However, low-
risk subsidiaries use external debt more intensive to get advantage of the depreciation
tax shield. Our large panel estimations with data on European MNEs control for firm
size, profitability, age, various country characteristics, as well as time and affiliate fixed
effects.
The adverse effects of MNEs’ debt shifting activities for high-tax countries are
broadly discussed in the existing literature. In general, even in the absence of any debt
shifting, countries with a relatively high corporate tax rate exhibit lower tax bases of
MNEs and of domestic firms, compared to low-tax countries. Over and above, with the
use of internal debt shifting strategies by MNEs, corporate tax bases in high-tax coun-
tries are even more reduced as profits are shifted out of these countries to locations with
a relatively low tax rate. Thus, by allocating debt over all possible locations, MNEs
minimize their global tax payments. Most countries in the EU have already reacted to
this with thin capitalization rules. Overesch and Wamser (2006), for example, provide
evidence that debt shifting can be effectively limited by such regulations. They show
that the German thin capitalization rule induces lower internal debt shares of multi-
national subsidiaries located in Germany. Bu¨ttner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser
(2008) can confirm this result, however, they also find that investment is adversely af-
fected. In contrast, with the same database (MiDi), Weichenrieder and Windischbauer
(2008) find only weak effects of the regulation tightening in Germany in 2001 and no
evidence of reduced real investments. They presume that reorganizations within the
MNE to circumvent the regulation could be a reason for this limited impact, e.g. the
creation of ownership chains with intermediate holding companies.
Moreover, two alternative policies could be effective in fighting debt shifting and con-
sequently profit shifting, but at the same time are politically difficult or very complex,
respectively, and therefore far away from implementing. First, introducing a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) would generally make shifting of profits
within the EU pointless (see European Commission, 2001, and European Commission,
2008; or Fuest, 2008, for a review on the current state of the proposal). Second, limit-
ing interest deduction allowances by complex tracing rules such that at the margin the
MNE faces the same marginal corporate tax rate on every incremental monetary unit
of debt (cf. Jog and Tang, 2001) would theoretically be an effective policy to dampen
debt shifting.
With respect to the asymmetric use of external debt and internal debt shifting of
high-risk versus low-risk firms, our results suggest that tax authorities should intensify
tax audit at multinational affiliates with a high firm-specific risk. These are affiliates
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that exhibit a relatively high R&D-intensity, that hold a large share of intangible assets,
or that are characterized by a relatively volatile profitability. In addition, reducing im-
perfections in capital markets that results in lower interest rates, for example lowering
the information asymmetry between creditor and debtor, might help to increase the
high-risk affiliate’s incentive for using external debt while simultaneously decreasing
the incentive for using internal debt.
Interestingly, an alternative strategy to shift profits via internal borrowing and lend-
ing has not been analyzed in the literature yet: MNEs could significantly deviate intra-
company interest rates from the market rates for income shifting purposes. Of course,
similar to the regulation of transfer prices for intra-company traded goods, such a
practice is forbidden by the arm’s length principle. However, in general, a MNE can
additionally shift income if e.g. the borrowing affiliate in a high-tax country pays a
higher interest rate (than the market rate) to the lending affiliate in a low-tax coun-
try. An empirical analysis of internal interest rates or interest payments within MNEs
might be possible e.g. with the MiDi database of the German Bundesbank or with the
UK Annual Foreign Direct Investment register (AFDI). Furthermore, the comparabil-
ity of credit agreements can be difficult for tax authorities due to heterogeneities for
example with respect to dynamic interest rates, maturity, premature and unscheduled
repayments, or special agreements. Hence, this opens up a scope to MNEs for further
strategies of tax avoidance.
Chapter 6
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This doctoral thesis empirically assessed corporate tax effects on the location deci-
sion of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) assets, profits and debt. The fundamental
conclusion of this thesis is the observation that corporate activity of MNEs is signifi-
cantly influenced by corporate taxation. The location of investments and the location
of profits are affected by corporate tax rates as well as by tax rate differences within
the multinational group. More precisely, on the one hand, MNEs minimize their global
corporate tax liability by relocating profitable assets and functions to countries with a
relatively low corporate tax rate, while on the other hand, MNEs use strategies to avoid
corporate taxes by shifting income from high-tax to low-tax affiliates. This is inferred
from numerous estimations using a large micro database of European MNEs for the
years 1995 to 2006 and applying different specifications and econometric methods. The
various panel regressions show an impact of corporate tax rates, as well as a robust
impact of international tax differentials on multinational affiliates’ level of intangible
asset investment, rate of profitability, and degree of leverage.
If the results with respect to profit shifting activities are compared to the existing
empirical literature using U.S. data, it has to be concluded that the amount of profits
shifted by European MNEs seems not to be more pronounced than the volume shifted
by U.S. MNEs. This is inferred from the smaller coefficient estimates. The supposition
of a more extensive shifting behavior in Europe than in the U.S. could be justified due to
larger tax rate differences between many neighboring states and the predominating tax
exemption system within the European Union (EU). However, this cannot be confirmed
by the study of Chapter 2. But, this thesis provides evidence of different strategies of
European MNEs for shifting corporate income to low-tax locations. Hence, specific
channels for profit shifting are empirically analyzed: first, the channel via research and
development (R&D) or intangible assets respectively is studied. Intangibles are shown
to be located at affiliates with a low corporate tax rate relative to all other affiliates of
the multinational group (Chapter 3). Second, the channel via intra-company financial
transactions is identified by providing evidence of debt shifting activities by MNEs to
bias the allocation of pre-tax profits in favor of low-tax affiliates (Chapter 5).
The results of Chapter 4 are in line with the observations in Chapter 3. On the one
hand, Chapter 4 provides evidence that the profitability gap between parent firms and
their foreign subsidiaries (which indicates a much higher profitability of the multina-
tional headquarters) significantly decreases over time. On the other hand, Chapter 3
finds a negative effect of a multinational subsidiary’s corporate tax rate (relative to
other affiliates) on the level of intangible asset investment at this subsidiary. These
days are characterized by an increased fragmentation of the production process across
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international borders which does not only comprise of standard operating functions
like manufacturing and sales but more and more equally includes value-driving units
like R&D and licensing departments. Thus, the evidence of intangible asset relocations
to low-tax affiliates is consistent with an increasing mobility of profitable assets within
MNEs in the last decade, which consequently results in a growing profitability of for-
eign subsidiaries, or vice-versa in a shrinking parent firm profitability. This in turn
reduces the observed profitability gap.
One overall conclusion of the empirical analyzes in this thesis is a purely methodical
one. In general, the research of corporate micro data is complex and difficult as firm
behavior is to a high degree influenced by unobservable characteristics. For example,
a firm’s profitability level or the amount of intangible asset investments are likely to
be driven by internal firm-specific factors like management quality, degree of product
innovation or quality of the engineers. However, these factors are impossible to be
captured by variables available in standard corporate accounting databases. Hence,
the application of panel data in combination with econometric models that explicitly
control for such unobserved heterogeneity by fixed-effects techniques is inevitable in
providing unbiased estimations and thus leads to more reliable results of firm behavior.
For example, in the analysis of Chapter 2, the coefficient estimates of the tax differential
are considerably smaller in the panel estimations applying firm fixed effects (Table
2.3) than in the cross-section regressions where the inclusion of fixed firm effects is
technically impossible (Table 2.4). Likewise, the study in Chapter 5 shows much smaller
effects of the tax differential while controlling for affiliate fixed effects than comparable
papers using fixed effects on the level of the multinational group (see Table 5.1).
Finally, with regard to conclusions for political consulting, the robust empirical ev-
idence of profit shifting activities by European MNEs presented in this thesis yields
a significant argument for the European Commission’s proposed changeover from the
current EU corporate tax principle of separate accounting to a system of formula appor-
tionment (Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, CCCTB). The CCCTB system
should in principle abolish the incentives for intra-European income shifting. Moreover,
the more detailed results of this doctoral thesis provide the following more specific pol-
icy implications within the current EU tax system of separate accounting. Referring to
the estimated positive effect of the parent firm’s ownership shares of its foreign sub-
sidiary on the profit shifting magnitude between the two affiliates, one policy advice
for tax authorities in high-tax countries may be to condition the investigation inten-
sity of MNEs’ intra-company transactions with foreign affiliates on the level of the
respective shareholding. Due to the time-intensive and complex assessment of transfer
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pricing documentations, this selection could improve the efficiency of the tax auditing.
In addition, relating to the observed more intensive use of debt shifting for high-risk
versus low-risk firms, tax authorities should tighten tax examinations at multinational
affiliates with a high firm-specific risk. Such high-risk affiliates may be characterized by
relatively high R&D expenditures to sales, by a large share of intangible assets, or by
a relatively volatile profitability, respectively. Furthermore, tax authorities in high-tax
countries could likewise concentrate their inspections at affiliates of MNEs that exhibit
clustered intangible asset holdings at low-tax locations within the multinational group,
in particular with respect to patents, copyrights, and trademark rights.
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